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Parliamentary

Calendar

of the House of Commons

and of the

House of Lords

for the year 1857

and

of the House of Commons

and of the

House of Lords

REFORM

OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

AND OF THE

HOUSE OF LORDS

FOR THE YEAR 1857

AND OF THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

AND OF THE

HOUSE OF LORDS

FOR THE YEAR 1857


1857

PLAN
OF
Parliamentary Reform,
IN THE FORM OF A
CATECHISM,
WITH
REASONS FOR EACH ARTICLE.

WITH AN
INTRODUCTION,
SHEWING
THE NECESSITY OF RADICAL,
AND
THE INADEQUACY OF MODERATE,
REFORM.

BY JEREMY BENTHAM.

LONDON:
PRINTED IN THE YEAR 1817.
Reprinted and Re-published,
WITH NOTES AND ALTERATIONS,
BY PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR,
BY T. J. WOOLER,
SUN-STREET, BISHOPSGATE.
1818.



PLAN

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Parliamentary Reform

Reasons for Each Article

WITH AN

INTRODUCTION

SHOWING

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AND

THE INADEQUACY OF MODERATE

REFORM

BY JEREMY BENTHAM

LONDON:

PRINTED IN THE YEAR 1791.

Reprinted and reprinted,

WITH NOTES AND ALTERATIONS

BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE

OF COMMONS

IN THE YEAR 1831.

1831.

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ERRATA.

Page	Line	
7	.. 9	for contested, read contested. 5.
9	.. 2	for terms, read terms,)
28	.. 15	for smallest, read smallest, the
	.. 10	for unwilling, read willing
31	.. 36	for extension, read extension of Suffrage
33	.. 16	for electione, read electionem—
	.. 28	for admitted, read admitted ;—
39	.. 24	for uch, read such
52	.. last	for 30,000, read 30,000l.
74	.. 12	for thinks, read thinks ;—
91	.. last	for power, read power of opinion
94	.. 2 B	for 43, read 93.

ADVERTISEMENT.

This celebrated performance being now out of print, and having been originally published at a price beyond the reach of many readers, the Editor of the Black Dwarf conceiving that much good might be effected from a re-publication in Numbers, at a cheap rate, with the style adapted to the popular reader, applied for permission to the Author, which was granted in the most liberal manner by the excellent Writer. The letter and reply are annexed.

" 7, Clement's Inn, March 31, 1818.

" SIR—Understanding that you seek not profit, but desire to forward the public good, and that it would not be unpleasant to you to see your excellent work on Parliamentary Reform published in numbers, in a cheap way for general circulation, I should like, with your permission, to undertake the task, making such alterations in the style as might render it more easy of comprehension to the popular reader.

" With the highest respect for your talents and integrity,

I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

" Jeremy Bentham, Esq."

" THOMAS J. WOOLER.

" Queen Square Place, Westminster, April 6, 1818.

" SIR—I have to acknowledge the favour of your letter of the 31st last.—As to the work in question, it was written for every body, it belongs to every body. Under these circumstances, I can consider in no other light than that of a token of regard, the obliging attention manifested by the application thus made to me for my consent to the re-publication of it. I am duly sensible of the advantage it cannot but derive from the name of the proposed re-editor, and any improvements he may be pleased to make in it.—The more extensive intelligible, as well as accessible it is rendered, the more effectually it will of course be adapted to the views which dictated it.

" I am, Sir, your's,

" Mr. Wooler."

" JEREMY BENTHAM."

BENTHAM'S

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM

Catechism.

INTRODUCTION,

SHEWING THE NECESSITY OF RADICAL, AND THE USELESSNESS OF
MODERATE REFORM.

CHAPTER I.

*History of the ensuing Tract—Alarming State of the Country and the
Constitution.*

THE following little tract was written as long ago as the year 1809. It was offered at the time to one of the time-serving daily prints, in which other papers on the same subject had found admittance. No name was sent with it; and, the weathercock being at that time upon the turn, insertion was declined.

From that time to the present, despair of use kept it upon the shelf. In such a state of things as the present, if in any, it possesses a chance of finding readers.—Sad condition of human nature! until the cup of calamity, mixed up by misrule, has been drunk to the very dregs, never has the man a chance of being heard, who would keep it from men's lips.

For a long time past the necessity—and not only the necessity, but, supposing it attainable, the safety of a radical Parliamentary Reform, had presented itself to my mind in the strongest colours. Long had this only possible remedy against the otherwise mortal disease of misrule, been regarded by me as the country's only hope. Long had I beheld, and not long after did I delineate the road to national ruin, in the economy of *Edmund Burke*, adopted and enforced under *William Pitt*, by the pen of his confidential adviser, *Mr. Rose*; and both these sketches are now before the public*.

Drawn on, in the road to the gulph of ruin, if my eyes do not deceive me, the country is already at the very brink:—reform or convulsion, is the

* In the Pamphleteer, Nos. 17 and 20.

only alternative. And though the hope of its being attainable may be faint, I, for one, in the disease under which I see the country lingering, cannot discover any other than this one possible remedy. I shall endeavour in the ensuing tract, to give some details of that plan of Reform, which would in my opinion be productive of any good effect. On the necessity of Reform, more than a few introductory pages cannot be spared.

No additional measures need be employed for the destruction of every thing by which the Constitution of this country has ever been distinguished to its advantage; the principles already avowed need only continue to be avowed—the course of action, dictated by those principles, need only be persevered in—and the consummation is effected.

Gagging Bills—suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act—interdiction of all communication between man and man for any such purpose as that of complaint or remedy—all these have already become precedent—all these are in preparation—all these are regarded as things of course.

The pit is already dug: one after another, or all together, the securities called *English liberties* will be cast into it. Should a score of obscure desperadoes, with the sacred name of reform on their lips—and nothing better than riot or pillage in their hearts, concert mischief in a garret, or an alehouse—fear will be pretended; prudence and wisdom mimicked; honest cowards will be made to agree to and co-operate in these measures dictated by the feigned cowardice of real knaves—and thus for the transgression of a few, the whole will be punished.

It is indeed time for every man to prepare himself, from being the subject of a disguised despotism, for that state of things in which he will be made the subject of an open and avowed despotism.

As for the *Habeas Corpus Act*, better the statute-book were rid of it. Standing or lying as it does; up one day, down another; it serves but to swell the list of sham-securities, with which, to keep up the delusion, the pages of our law books are defiled. When no man has need of it, then it is that it stands: a time comes when it might be of use, and then it is suspended.

CHAP. II.

Most Prominent Present Grievance, Garrisoning France.

The field of *Waterloo* will one day be pointed to by the historian as the grave—not only of French but of English liberties. In the Netherlands was consummated the conquest, not of France alone, but of Britain with her. Whatsoever has been done and is doing in France, will soon be done in Britain. Reader, would you wish to know the lot designed for you? Look to France, there you may behold it.

In France, on the subject of their common interests, no longer can any information be received through the channel of any newspaper, other than those which are avowed instruments in the hands of the ruling despotism: no longer from any source can any information be obtained, that has not for its object constant and universal deception: information in which, with a degree of anxiety proportionate to its importance, truth is suppressed, and by which pernicious error is circulated and inculcated. Any such source of instruction as a newspaper, into which any expression can find its way, by which the “*feelings*” of “*great characters*” in their high situations can in any degree be “*kurt*”—(and is it possible they should not be hurt, as often as any misdeeds of their’s are exposed?) is in that country a nuisance

no longer tolerable. The same causes will produce the same effects: by the same "great characters" by whom the monster of anarchy has so happily been crushed in France—will the same monster be crushed in Britain.

There they are—our fifty thousand men, with the conqueror of French and English liberties—the protector of the Bourbons—the worthy vanquisher and successor to Bonaparte, at the head of them: there they are—and, there they will be kept, until every idea of good government—every idea of any thing better than the most absolute despotism—has been as thoroughly weeded out by the Bourbons, as ever it had been by Bonaparte.

There they are, and for what is it that they were planted there?—For security? For the security of Britons? for the security of Frenchmen? for the security of Germans? for the security of Netherlanders? for the security of any other race of men under the sun?—Impossible.

Had the security of any thing, but universal despotism, been the object of that new Holy League, by which all France is put under a garrison,—the means of security were as obvious as the efficacy was certain—and in comparison with the existing ones, the forms lenient to the vanquished. Blow up all their fortifications: carry off all their cannon: destroy all their arsenals and their foundries: destroy all their manufactories of arms: leave them not a fowling piece: mark out for predicted vengeance every attempt to set up another foundry:—parcel out half the country among the allies; or, should any such partition be too dangerous to Christian charity, among the crowned and newly-christianized Christians, divide the whole into any number of lots. Yes; though the whole country were parcelled out into lots—still, if in each lot, men were left to take their own measures for the preservation of what was left to them, all these inflictions put together would have been mercy, in comparison to that of fastening upon their shoulders the old man of the woods, with his 150,000 foreign guards.

For the moment, in respect of *subjection* and absence of every thing that ever went under the name of *liberty*, France is but what she was. Let the ultras, the real King's men, rule, and then Spain will be to France the model of good government. Then, under the protection of the Waterloo conqueror and his employers, the wardrobe of the Holy Virgin will be supplied with a new gown, and every prison in the country with a new set of torture-boots and thumb-screws.

On the supposition that there is any real necessity for the system of garrisoning France at present, it is impossible to suppose any case in which a demand for that system would not be made. The demand is composed of *possibilities*—converted, it is alledged, into practical *certainities* by past facts. There *have been* Septembrizers and Anarchists; therefore, no sooner does France cease to be garrisoned by us, than the reign of those miscreants will re-commence. There *has been* one Napoleon Bonaparte; therefore no sooner does France cease to be garrisoned by us, than in comes either the self-same, or exactly such another. Well; who can cause these past events not to have taken place? Nobody. Well then; never can the necessity of garrisoning France with English armies cease.

For what then is it that France has been, is now, and by the blessing of God is destined to be for ever, garrisoned? Is it for security? Is it for the keeping out anarchy? Is it for the keeping out *bad* government? Alas, no: to such an object never has any real fear attached itself. Would the healing, and the moderately monarchical constitution, on which, at their entrance, the despots trampled, have been *bad* government? No; it was not for keeping out *bad*, it was for keeping out *good* government. Under

whatsoever form a government might have been established—either a constitutional monarchy, or democracy upon the model of the American United States—*there* was the real object of terror, to all the newly re-christianized crowned heads, and to their loyal and correspondently pious, coroneted, and not yet coroneted advisers.

There they are—but happily with the Atlantic between us and them, the never sufficiently accursed United States. There they are—living, and (oh, horror!) flourishing, and so flourishing! under a government so essentially *illegitimate*! Oh, what a reproach to legitimacy! Oh what a reproach, a never to be expunged reproach, to our own matchless constitution—matchless in rotten boroughs and sinecures! Oh, had they but one neck, these miscreants! Ten times, twenty times the blood spilt at Waterloo, would be well spent in cutting it. There they are, with their prosperity, the effect—there they are, with their good government, their matchless good government, the cause of it.

There they are—but happily, with two thousand leagues of sea between us and them—the ten millions of two-legged swine, with the illegitimacy and the unencumbered and undisturbed prosperity in which they wallow.

But now, suppose the same, or a similar accursed government, with the same accursed prosperity, transplanted from that blessed distance, planted under our very noses; planted with no more than one-and-twenty miles of sea to dilute its stench. Without so much as a single *useless place, needless place, overpaid place, or unmerited pension*—not to speak of *sinecures*; no, not so much as a *peerage*, to settle a borough or buy off a country gentleman; suppose these *miscreants*, not one of them re-christianized, not one of them occupied in embroidering a robe for the Holy Virgin, debating, and resolving, and enacting, without so much as a single bayonet to secure good order to their deliberations; and like their accursed preceptors and fore-runners, paying off public debt faster than we are contracting it. Suppose all this state of things brought into existence; and not more than half a guinea for a place in a passage boat—not more than three hours row in a wherry, necessary to enable a man to see it.

In this case, by what possibility could the eye, the head, or the heart be shut against the spectacle of the united nuisances, *prosperity* and *good government*? To what use deny their existence? With as much effect might a man deny the existence of the dome of St. Paul's, in the face of those who are viewing it from St. James's park.

Here then is *one* use, for the fifty thousand Britons, who, in France, with the hundred thousand men of other nations, are preying at one and the same time upon the vitals of France and Britain. Behold now another.

Need this other use be mentioned? exists there that reader, who has not already told it to himself? Yes, it is to return to all plans of reform, to all petitions for reform, to all groans, to all complaints, to all cries for mercy; the proper and already proposed answer, the bayonet. The bayonet? yes; by the blessing of God, the bayonet. But is it altogether so sure, should matters come to this, that the soldiers will push their bayonets exactly in that direction which may be ordered by *legitimacy*. Will they push their bayonets against the people? Of what class are the men by whom they will be to be pushed? Are they of the blood royal? Are they of the peerage? Are they not of the swinish multitude? Are they not as perfect swine as we are? Is it possible they should ever forget it? And when the swine is driven in a direction that is not pleasing to him, is he not apt to retrograde?

An army in France necessary for the security of Britain? Yes! if an army in China is so too; not otherwise.

If any thing good for the people is proposed, the answer is at hand; wild, theoretical, visionary, Utopian, impracticable, dangerous, destructive, ruinous, anarchical, subversive of all governments; there you have it. Well, but in America there it is; and no such evil consequences, nothing but what is good results from it. Aha! and so the United States government is your government, is it? You are a republican, then, are you? what you want, is to subvert this constitution of ours; the envy of nations! the pride of ages! matchless in rotten boroughs and sinecures? Very well; begin and set up your republic; and, in the mean time, you, who are so ready to talk of *feelings*, think what *yours* will be, when after a few nights lodging in the toiler, the knife of the hangman, after having rubbed off its rust upon the Spenceans, is doing its office in your bowels.

You propose *democracy*; if you propose any plan that would put any power into the hand of those of whose obedience all power is composed; and if any such epithet as *democratical* is applicable to your plan, you are told that that is a conclusive reason for casting it out without further thought; casting it off as if it were a viper, and trampling upon it; and for this reason eternity is to be given to every thing that is corrupt and mischievous.

What, according to these men, is the use of the constitution? To make the *people* happy? Make them happy? No! curse on the swinish multitude! What then? Why to make the *one* man happy, the one object of legitimate idolatry, with the small number of *others* to whom it accords with his high pleasure to impart any of the means of happiness.

Now by this bugbear word *democracy*, are the people of this country to be frightened out of their senses? are they to be frightened by Gwelfs any more than by Stuarts, into passive obedience and non-resistance?

CHAP. III.

Causes of the above and all other Mischiefs; the Ascendency of particular Interests, the Monarchical and Aristocratical, which are adverse to the Universal Good.

Goaded to the task by the groans of all around me, I have been looking of late more closely than ever into the constitution; I mean the present state of it; with an attention which the nature of the objects that were continually forcing themselves upon all eyes, and upon all ears, rendered more and more painful to me; and what follows is the result of this most appalling of all examinations.

As early as the year 1809, it had seemed to me, that the road to national ruin might be but too clearly traced in the principle which had not only been acted upon, but avowed by those in whose hands the fate of the country rested. This principle was, that in the hands of the trustees of the people, the substance of the people was a fund, out of which, without breach of trust, and without just reproach in any shape, *fortunes* might, and ought to be made, at any price, and to an amount absolutely unlimited, by those who, without exposing themselves to punishment, could contrive to lay their hands on the means.

In this principle, I saw the two domineering interests, the monarchical and the aristocratical, contending with, and crushing the sometimes struggling, but always vainly and feebly struggling democratical; completely agreed, and, without concert, co-operating with each other in the dissemination, and in the ~~inculcation~~ of this principle leading to ruin: the party

out of power inculcating it in theory; the party in power, by theory and practice.

It was abundantly evident, that, on the part of both these interests, this principle, together with the practice that belonged to it, was but too natural. The notion that it had any such plea as that of necessity for its adoption, vanished at the slightest touch.

Portions of power, money, and the unreal dignity of titles and ribbons are the means of reward possessed by the monarch, and it is his possession of these means, that enables him to *corrupt* the members of the two other branches of the efficient sovereignty; namely, the two Houses of Parliament.

It is a principle, the existence and force of which is as indisputable as the course of the stars, that the possession of either of the three above mentioned means of gratifying the unbounded desires of men, draws to its possessor the other two.

And the greater the quantity he may possess of either of these, the more easy will he find it, and the more desirous will he be, to obtain the others. But the more he has of any one of them, the more is it *right* also that he should have of them? All of them at the expense of the people,—the poor people, at whose expence whatsoever is enjoyed by their rulers is enjoyed? Oh, gross, oh, flagitious absurdity! The more? No: but on the contrary, the less. Whatsoever be the quantity of *reward*, which, in any shape, may be necessary to obtain at a man's hands the requisite service, the more he has of it in any *one* shape,—the less need he has of it in any *other* shape.

In the case of the poorest individual—has any such immoral notion ever been started by any man, in the character of a *guardian*, as that any proper source of enrichment to himself is to be found in the substance of his *ward*? Is power over a single individual and his little property, a sufficient payment for the labour? and power over twenty millions, and their property, together with all the mass of patronage—lucrative of necessity—shall not that be sufficient? Those who either have no property, or have it not in sufficient quantity for their maintenance, must, indeed, either be paid or not employed—but among men, who have sufficient property, is it supposable that there can ever be a deficiency in the number of those, in whom the *pleasure* of possessing such power will be sufficient compensation for all the *pain* attached to the exercise of it? Look at the country magistracy: see we not there a host of examples? Yes; and in those examples a host of proofs.

Unfortunately, in the breasts of all who have *power*, as they all agree and certify, that their *merit*, to one another and to the people, is infinite—so, say they, must be the *reward*.

The infinity and absolute irresistibility being thus established of the demand for reward—viz. money, power, and factitious dignity: then comes the demand for the supply—and that supply a proportionate one. Here, however, to a first view, comes somewhat of a difficulty. Money, in *infinite* quantity cannot be demanded all at once from the body of the people: however habitually blind and passive, they would become desperate; they would rise: better (they would say to themselves), better be shot or hanged at once, than starved.

A set of *drains* must therefore be established and set to work—drains through which, by degrees (those degrees ever in the eyes of the devourers but too slow) under colour either of *use*, or, what is so much better, of *necessity*—money may be drawn out of the pockets of the blinded, deluded, unsuspecting, uninquisitive and ever too patient people. Here follows a list, though

not a complete one, of these productive drains. The taxes that are yearly procured prove their dreadful efficiency:—1. Wars:—2. distant and proportionably burthensome dependencies all over the habitable globe: (and note that, in prosecution of these views, every such dependency, without exception, has been made a source of net expence; the amount of which is destined to perpetual and unlimited increase). 3. Penal colonies. 4. Claims of universal dominion over the universal water-way of nations, with a determination to destroy the shipping of all nations by whom those claims shall be contested. Annexation of “*Hanover to Hampshire*,” and that to the end that not a hostile gun may be fired anywhere on the continent, but that we may be in readiness to interfere, subsidizing one of the contending parties, and helping to oppress the other!* 6. Splendor of the crown; that effulgence, in exact proportion to the increase of which, will increase the respect, and with it the submission, and with it the happiness of the people. 7. Erection of *Hanover* into a kingdom for that purpose, and that the Hanoverians may the less grudge the increase of taxes that will be required by the increase of *dignity*.

As for *war*—never has there been, never can there be a pretence for it wanting, so long as that nation exists, or has existed, any where, against which war can or could be made.

The nation to be warred upon is either formidably strong, or providentially weak: if formidably strong, too long have we delayed the necessary task of obtaining, at the expence of it, indemnity for the past and security for the future; if providentially weak, now is the favourable time for taking advantage of its weakness, and preventing it from becoming formidable: now has the Lord of Hosts, as the Archbishop’s prayer will not fail to inform us, delivered the enemy into our hands! Thus, if there be nothing *past*, for which to obtain *indemnity*, *security* for the *future* will at any rate, be an easy purchase.

The French people, for example, have already had one set of *Septembrizers*, and, so happy were they under them, that with the first favourable opportunity they would give themselves another: and, no sooner had they septembrized France, than they would cross over, and, with the assistance of the travelling Orator, and the *Spenceans*, septembrize us in the same way. The French have already had one Bonaparte; and so happy were they under him, that leave them to themselves, and immediately they would give themselves another. In his scheme for invading and conquering this country, the first Bonaparte failed; the second Bonaparte, by whom such another plan would immediately be formed, would succeed in *his*. From these two considerations put together, or indeed from either of them, follows the necessity of garrisoning France, and keeping possession of the country till the danger is at an end—which it is impossible it ever should be.

Yes: wars would be invaluable, were it only for the *merit* of which they are the never-failing sources. When a battle is fought, unless it be a drawn one, it must be gained by somebody; on one side it must be, in whatsoever degree the generals on the respective sides are fit or unfit for their work. The greater the number that fight, the greater the number of those who are capable of being killed. A battle is gained—the number of the killed is great—and half a million is scarce enough to reward the merit which one single man has displayed in it.†

* Parl. Reg. xv. Anno 1784. Commons, Earl Nugent. “He (Lord Chatham) had often said, that Hanover was a mill stone about the neck of England, that would weigh her down and sink her.”

† See note at the conclusion, for an account of all the money given to Lord Wellington.

The great misfortune is, in regard to all these drains of money, and all the resources of merit and reward, that for every shilling which, by means of any one of these drains, the men of merit—and all placemen, without exception are, *ex-officio*, men of merit—thus put into their pockets, some score, at least, must come out of the pockets of the poor people. A man who sets his neighbour's house on fire, that he may roast an egg for himself, is the emblem by which a certain sort of man is pictured by Lord Bacon:—would you see a man of this sort, you need not look far, so you look *high* enough: for these five-and-twenty years, or thereabouts, to go no further back, this poor nation has been kept on fire, lest the emblematic eggs—viz. enormous and unmerited rewards—should be wanting in sufficient quantity to its rulers.

Is money wanting (and it always is wanting) for the support of the *splendor of the Crown*?—for the support of *royal dignity*? Money is supplied by Parliament, and that supply always is deficient—Droits of Admiralty are sent by Almighty Providence to feed, but never to fill up—for nothing can ever fill up—the deficiency. The persons for the reward of whose merit more and more of that object of universal desire is everlastingly wanted, join with one another, not only in commencing groundless war, but in commencing that groundless war in a piratical manner—because in that manner the Monarch and his instruments may add millions to their conjunct splendor—since not only the foreigners who for this purpose have been converted into enemies, are plundered, but the men, by whose hands the plunder is got in, are deprived of that, which would have been their due, had the war been commenced otherwise than in the way of piracy. Thus do those on whom it depends bribe one another to commit piracy! piracy, which has been made legitimate, because, by their power, and for their own benefit, it has been made unpunishable*.

As it is the interest, so it is, and has been, and always will be the study and endeavour of the Monarch to draw to himself the greatest quantity possible, of those good things of this wicked world—money, power, and factitious dignity. And here we have one *partial*, one *separate*, one *sinister* interest, the *monarchical*; the interest of the ruling *one*, with which the *universal*, the *democratical* interest, has to contend; and to which that all-comprehensive interest has all along been made, and unless the only possible remedy, a radical parliamentary reform, should be applied, is destined for ever to be made a sacrifice. A sacrifice? yes; and, by the blessing of God, upon the legitimate and pious labours of his Vicegerent, and the express image of his person here upon earth, a still unresisting sacrifice. Omnipresence, immortality, incapability of sin; equal as he is to God, as touching all these “*attributes*” (ask Blackstone else, i. 270, 250, 246, 249), who is there that, without adding impiety to disloyalty, can repine at seeing included in the sacrifice, any, or every thing, he might otherwise call his own.

Meantime the money, which, in an endless and boundless stream, is thus to keep flowing into the monarchical coffers—cannot find its way into those sacred receptacles without instruments and conduit pipes. Out of the pockets of the people it cannot be drawn, but through the forms of Parliament:—nor therefore without the concurrence of the richest men in the country, in the situation of Peers, Great Landholding, and as yet uncoroneted Commoners, styled *Country Gentlemen*,—and others. In those men

* The capture of the Spanish frigates in 1804, and the attack and capture of Copenhagen and the Danish fleet in 1807, may serve for examples.

is the chief *property* of the country, and with it—(for in the language of the Aristocratic School, *property* and *virtue* are synonymous terms—the *virtue* of the country. And here we have another partial, separate, and sinister interest—the *Aristocratical* interest—with which the Democratical interest has also to contend:—another overbearing, and essentially and immutably hostile, interest,—against which, and under which, the universal interest has to struggle, and as far as possible to defend itself.

Such is the state in which the country lies:—the universal interest crouching under the conjunct yoke of two partial and adverse interests, to which, to a greater or less extent, it ever has been made,—and to the greatest extent possible, cannot ever cease to be made a continual sacrifice.

For the consummation of this sacrifice, adequate *inclination*—never could have been wanting:—but the effective power never at any former period could have been seen swelled to a pitch approaching to that at which it stands at this moment.

Well—such being the swell of voracious power, what are the means—what the instrument—by which it has been effected? What but the precious matter already mentioned continually operating in the character of matter of *evil*—*matter of corruptive influence*? The quantity of this essentially good, this accidentally, but alas! how extensively pernicious matter is ever upon the increase:—and ever upon the increase the pernicious effect of it. In an endless series of alternating and reciprocating operations, this matter is itself both effect and cause. Waste begets corruption; corruption, waste. Fed through the already enumerated drains—viz. useless places, needless places, overpay of needful places, groundless pensions, and sinecures, many times more richly endowed than the most richly endowed efficient offices—these, together with Peerages, and Baronetages, and Ribbons—for Peerage-hunters, Baronetage-hunters, and Ribbon-hunters—by their bare existence, always with the fullest effects, and never with the personal danger, or so much as the imputation attached to the word *bribery*, they operate in the character, and produce the effect of *corruptive influence*—that pestilential matter, against the infection of which not a household in the country can be said to be secure, from the Archbishop's palace down to the hovel by the road side.

What? not the Ducal mansion, secure against the pestilential influence of money? Oh, no: *that* full as little as any other. The Duke, who, if there were no such thing as a ribbon, nor any such place as a gaming house, &c. might of himself be independent, is dependent by his dependents: and the more enormous the mass of his property, the more numerous, as well as the higher, the list of his alliances, the wider and the more craving is the circle of his dependents*.

* In the pension list are still to be seen the pensions enjoyed by divers Ladies, procured for them by a certain *Duke*, they being his relations by marriage, then in a state of infancy; their father, a hero of the turf, living and dying in the bosom of affluence.

In one part of the present most religious reign, there existed an *Earl of Leinster*; at that time, and under that title, *premier Peer of Ireland*. Being so high, and withal so rich, he was made a *Duke*, that, with the exception of the blood royal, no race might ever be so high as his. When for some time he had been a *Duke*, being so high as he was, it was found that he was not rich enough. On the pretence of his administering the sort of *Law* called *Equity*, but having no more to do with either, or with *Justice*, than the *Duke of Montrose* has, who receives his 2,000*l.* a year for calling himself *Lord Justice General*, he was accordingly made *Master of the Rolls*: assistant as such to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland,—receiving fees, and doing nothing whatever for any of those fees: helping thus to deny justice to the poor,—falsely pretending to render justice, and from richest and poorest without distinction exacting money on that false pretence: “obtaining money

Laud his virtue, party Orator, party Scribe:—laud that virtue, which is composed of rank and property, and consists of nothing else: laud him to-day, while he is yet your's:—come to-morrow, he has crossed over, and his place is on the other side. A Duke has a borough, and in it a brace of seats. Sincere or insincere, quoth the Duke to one of his agents, whose attachment to the cause of the people was well known to him, cast your eyes around you, and find me out the two most honest and able men you can lay your hands on, to fill those seats. The Agent bestirs himself, and reports. But ere the report reaches its destination, the coroneted patriot has found money wanting, and the borough, the seats, and the patriotism that would have filled them, are all sold.

Yes: in this country—under this Constitution—may be seen an official person, who is, for ever, by his station, *ex-officio* C———r* General: it is his *situation* makes him so: it suffices for the purpose: and, *to produce the effect* (and let this be well observed), *no overt act—no, nor so much as a thought—is on his part necessary*;—for, were it possible for him to have the *will*, in his *situation*, it would scarcely be in his *power* to avoid being C———r General.

Well: does this attribute (which Blackstone has forgotten to add to the other “*attributes*” of the God of his idolatry) of C———r Generalship, which, after all, could not have place if there were not a Parliament to c——, —does this inseparable attribute, disastrous as it is, in this our country, form any peremptory objection to Monarchy? Not it, indeed. But why not?—Because in *democratic ascendancy*—such as it would be constituted by *radical reform*—the corruption would have its antidote, and that antidote an effectual one.

Extinguish Monarchy? Suppress, extirpate the Peerage? Oh, not I indeed; nothing would I extinguish: nothing would I extirpate: that which you have, continue to have, and God bless you with it—in all matters of reform, in so far as is not inconsistent with the very essence of the reform, this is, and has ever been, with me a ruling principle. Leaving, with all my heart, the full benefit of it to Monarchy and Aristocracy—to the *ruling few*, my aim and wishes confine themselves to the securing a participation in that same benefit to *democracy*—to the *subject many*—to the poor suffering and starving people.

Monarchy a property! Not it indeed. Monarchy is a trust: is it not, Prince Regent? Have you not said it is?—Peerage a property! Not it indeed. Peerage is a trust: is it not, my Lord any body? If it is not, what business have you to be what you are, and where you are?

Ascendency is what is sufficient: this, therefore, is all that should be asked for. In Ireland, we have Protestant ascendancy. Well: and what is the effect? In Ireland, the Catholics, who are the great majority, are not yet quite so well circumstanced as could be wished: still, however, they exist; still they are not extirpated.

on that false pretence;” and, instead of the hulks, having his station at the head of the House of Lords.

After those examples, to which scores of such might be added, let no one speak of *wealth*, in the character of a *preservation against corruption*: for this is among the pretences by which the waste made of it, in cramming official pockets with it, has been justified.

* Whatever blanks may be observed in the remainder of this work, the honour of them will be due to the prudence of the printer. In the present instance, for filling up the deficit between the C and the r, the candour and sagacity of the Reader may employ the letters *onservato*, or any others, if others there be, which in his view may be more apposite.

What was the course taken by the ingenuity of *Ferdinand Count Fa-
tium* for the seduction of his fellow traveller? Ask his biographer, *Smollet*; he will inform you. He began with picking her pocket; and her virtue was then at his command. The Monarch of these realms, by mere existence on the throne on which he is sitting, without need of stirring a finger, uttering a word, or giving a nod, may act in the character of that *Ferdinand*, and with the same disastrous success;—the hero of *Smollet's* history had no accomplices: he needed none. The official s—— of Britannia's virtue—the C———r General of this country—may have as many as there are men, in whose breasts exists a *demand* for any of the good things which he has at command: and, in regard to this *demand*, the difficulty would be to find, not the bosom in which it *does*, but the bosom in which it *does not* display itself.

In this state of things, C——— General being the proper style and title of the head-manager of the concern, taken by himself, add the Aristocracy—the corrupted and corrupting Aristocracy—and then C———r General and Co. is the proper firm of the partnership. As to the business of it, it consists but too plainly, like that of the Bank of England, in draining the contents of all pockets into its own; and the more intolerable the indigence thus produced, the more craving is the demand for that corruptive supply, by the hope of which men are engaged to concur in those continually repeated measures, by which this indigence is continually increased.

Now, what is the effect of this almost universal corruption? A mere *ideal* imperfection?—Alas! no: but a somewhat more palpable and sensible one. The real, the sensible mischief consists in the *sacrifice* made of the interest and comfort of the *subject many*, to the overgrown felicity of the *ruling few*: the effect of the corruption being—to engage all whom it has corrupted to bear their respective parts in the perpetual accomplishment of their perpetual sacrifice. Is not this sufficiently intelligible?—Well, if *that* expression be not, perhaps *this* may be: viz. that the *subject many* long have been, and, but for the only remedy, a radical reform, may for ever expect to be, continually more and more grievously oppressed, that the *ruling few* may be more and more profusely pampered.

Now, suppose an army of Frenchmen garrisoning England, as an army of Englishmen (oh! pretenceless and inhuman tyranny!) is garrisoning France. In that case, what would be the description of our condition? What, but that the dominion we were groaning under was the dominion of a set of men whose interest was opposite to our own, by whom that oppositeness was understood and felt, and by whom our interest was made a continual sacrifice to that separate and hostile interest.—Well: is not *that*, but too indisputably, the just description of the dominion under which we live?

Discarding the case of *national* subjection under a foreign yoke, take the case of *domestic subjection*:—take the case of *Negro* slavery. Is not the description of the case still the same? The Slave-holder, it may be said, has an interest in common with that of his slaves. True; and so has the Mail-Coach Contractor in common with that of his horses. While working them, and so long as they appear able to work, he accordingly allows them food. Yet, somehow or other, notwithstanding this community of interest, it too often happens that *Negro* as well as horse are worked to the very death. How happens this?—because in the same breast with the conjunct interest is lodged a separate and sinister interest, which is too strong for it. Even so is it in the case of C———r-General and Co. under whose

management the condition of the poor people is day by day approaching nearer and nearer to the condition of the negro and the horse.

"I can have no interest but that of my people," says the royal parrot—I can have no interest but that of my people: with these words in his mouth, he gives the touch of the sceptre to a bill for establishing a nest of sinecures*.

* Behold the connexion between waste and corruption, in the view taken of it by divers statesmen at divers periods.

Proceedings of the Society of the *Friends of the People*, London, 1793, May 5th, *W. Baker, M. P.* Chairman, *Lord John Russell*, Deputy Chairman, p. 22.—"We positively affirm, that in fact, a case has lately occurred which, on the very principles of the objection, establishes the necessity of a Reform in the construction of the House of Commons. We mean the late *Armament* intended to act against *Russia*, which might have involved the nation in a most impolitic and ruinous war; and to which a large majority of the House of Commons gave their support, in direct contradiction to the real interests, and to the acknowledged sense of the people."

Page 31.—From the answer (to Major Cartwright's Society), proposed from the Committee for the adoption of the Society:—"The immense accumulation of debt, the enormous taxation of seventeen millions of annual revenue, demonstrate that the collective interests of the community have been neglected or betrayed."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 408, *Burke*, anno 1770, as quoted with applause by *Mr. Erskine*, now *Lord Erskine*:—"When the House of Commons was thus made to consider itself as master of its constituents, there wanted but one thing to secure it (this was in 1770) against all possible future deviation towards popularity—an unlimited fund of money to be laid out according to the pleasure of the Court."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 420. *Mr.* (now *Sir Philip*) *Francis*. Speaking of Parliamentary Reform, "this (says he) is the only measure that can restore and preserve the Constitution,—that can prevent such ruinous wars in future."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 319. *Charles Fox* and *Edmund Burke*. "Since that time," (1784, the year of Pitt the second's accession), "four fifths of the elective franchises of Scotland" (in this work he had the aid of the first Lord Melville) "and Cornwall more particularly have passed into the hands of government; and the prediction which an honourable gentleman (*Mr. Burke*) then made upon the occasion, has been literally fulfilled—no House of Commons has been since found strong enough to oppose the Ministers of the Crown." Thus far *Charles Fox*:—add—nor willing enough.

Woodfall's Debates, vol. iii. anno 1797. *Charles Fox* and *Pitt* 2d. Speaking of the American way, and observing that popular or not popular at the commencement (anno 1780), in which year a dissolution of Parliament took place, the war was at any rate "extremely unpopular, as a proof that the Parliament did not even then (anno 1780) speak the voice of the people; and after asserting the opportunities of information possessed by him, and the care and accuracy with which he had endeavoured to avail himself of them," he adds, "not more than three or four persons were (then) added to the number of those who had from the beginning opposed that war."

In the same page, *Pitt* being present, *Fox*, from words alleged to be those of *Pitt*, imputes to him a persuasion to that same effect. "You see," says *Pitt*, (as thereupon quoted by *Fox*), "you see that so defective, so inadequate is the present practice, at least, of the elective franchise, that no impression of national calamity, no conviction of ministerial error, no abhorrence of disastrous war, are sufficient to stand against that corrupt influence which has mixed itself with election, and which drowns and stifles the popular voice."

Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, iii. 323. *Charles Fox*. There is a lumping consideration, which, now more than ever, ought to make "every man a convert to Parliamentary Reform: there is an annual revenue of twenty-three millions sterling collected by the executive government from the people." Thus far *Fox*. Anno 1797, it was these twenty-three millions: now, year ending 5th Jan. 1817, 57,860,694*l.* Last year, year ending 5th Jan. 1816, it was 66,443,802*l.* Commons House. Abstract of net produce of revenue; year ending 5th Jan. 1816 and 1817. Date of order for printing, 3rd Feb. 1817. The hope, of course excellent, with all speed its deficiency will be supplied, and increase added. Well now, besides the other evils, is it not by the twenty-three millions that the sixty-six millions have been generated? In another twenty years will the sixty-six millions have been swelled to one hundred and thirty-two millions? No:—but for what reason? Only because, before it can have arisen to that pitch, the people must, in such a proportion, have been either slaughtered or starved, that by no addition, either to the slaughtering or the starvation, could any increase be produced.

Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, iii. 330. *Charles Fox*. (Speaking of and to *Pitt* 2d)

Under the constitution as it stands, under the administration as it is carried on, in what state are the affections of the people towards the one and the other? Take the answer from Lord Castlereagh (Morn. Chron. Feb. 8th, 1817). In the year just ended, 53,000 were the number of firelocks "indispensably necessary to aid the civil power in the discharge of its duty;" in other words, to keep the people from the endeavour to substitute a reform for the government as it stands. Now, indeed, at this season of forced retrenchment, 5,000 is the number of men to be struck off from the desired complement of 53,000. Struck off! Why? Because they are regarded as superfluous? Oh, no: for of those means of coercion which require no money, boundless is the supply which at this very moment is providing—namely, Green-bags and the evidence of Spies on which to found Gagging Acts and suspension of the Constitution Acts. Why then? Because as retrenchment must be made under the most undisguised despotism, when revenue decreases, so under disguised despotism, when the taxes have fallen off one-sixth, some retrenchment becomes absolutely necessary. In this time not only of peace but of triumph, no Pretender in existence; France, instead of a cause of fear, an object of compassion; fifty-three thousand men are necessary to be kept up to prevent a second revolution! Our great grandfathers, what would they have said to such a number? Our great grandfathers, in whose days, a Pretender continually threatening from abroad, with a strong party at home, even after a defeat, still strong enough to keep on foot matter for another rebellion, which, in twenty-eight years from that time, actually broke out! In the same year of the last, as this is of the present century, what was the whole number demanded and provided for this same service?—Answer: 16,000, and no more; not so much as *one-third* of the number actually in demand, as above. Sir Robert Walpole, then in opposition, opposing even that number on the ground of alleged excess.*

He "has borrowed no fewer than 115 titles, including new creations and elevation from one rank to another; how many of them are to be ascribed to national services, and how many to Parliamentary interest, I leave the House to inquire." So far Fox. This was no more than thirteen years, from 1784 to 1797: since that time twenty years have elapsed. To any person who would have the goodness to inform me, on produceable grounds, what the addition that has since been made may amount to, that I may give to the information such publicity as may be in my power, the gratitude of all honest reformists will be due.

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 383. "*Mr. Grey*" (now *Earl Grey*) "remarked, that when *Mr. Pitt* moved for an addition of 100 Members to be added to the counties, he could not carry his motion; and yet he had contrived (this was in nine years, from 1784 to 1793) to procure the nomination of forty Members by indirect means: for he had added to the House of Peers thirty Members, who either nominated directly or by irresistible influence, that number of Members of the House of Commons, as the . . . petitioners were ready to prove." See the Petition, ib. p. 518, in which it is asserted, that at this time (1793), 150 Members owe their elections entirely to *Peers*, and that *forty Peers* return eighty-one Members.

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 383. *Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*. "Were the evils of the "American war nothing? These were in his mind, entirely owing to the unequal and "corrupt representation in Parliament."

* Upon a necessarily hasty search, made into such documents as happen to lie within my reach, the following are the amounts of such part of the army, as appears to have been employed for the same sort of service as that for which the 53,000 have been employed. To match the present and last year, the years here exhibited, by the description of *years of ordinary demand*, have all of them been years of manifest and complete peace. Out of the hundred years in question, no more than 29 are on this occasion brought to view. Of the comparative smallness of this number, there have been three causes. 1. About half the number of years have been years of actual war. 2. Of the remaining *fifty*, or thereabout, being *years of peace*, *twenty-nine* was the only number, concerning which any infor-

Well, then: by a standing army it is that we are governed: and a standing army; the magnitude of which has been seen, is the sort of instrument, without which, it is said, we could not be governed; and by which it is the intention of those that govern us that we shall be governed. And this is that Constitution, that matchless Constitution, in the praises of which those never tire whose opulence or power have been produced by, or are dependent on, its abuses. And in this Constitution we have a Parliament—and in this Parliament a House of Commons—and in this House of Commons a mask for a military government of its own erection—and this mask so transparent a one! and, under this military government, so long as the mask remains, are we to lie down, now and for ever, prostrate and contented.

Well, the *United States*; the seat of *representative democracy*, alias anarchy—what *plots*, real or pretended, have they, or have they ever had, in their bosom? What *standing army* have they? What laws have they to prevent each man from communicating with every other on the subject of those concerns which are the concerns of every man? What laws on pain of death, to prevent every man who is *not* a soldier, from speaking his mind to any one who *is*?

Oh! but the fault is always the fault of the people: behaving continually worse and worse, they must continually be treated with more and

mation could be found. In consideration of their being so nearly in agreement with each other, and at the same time forming so considerable a majority, *twenty*, out of the twenty-nine, are here inserted, under the head of *years of ordinary demand*. In the case of the remaining nine years, ranked under the head of *years of extra demand*, the circumstance of the superiority of the numbers, in so small a number of instances, has been regarded as constituting a conclusive proof, that in those years there existed some special cause of alarm, of such a nature as to cause those years to approach to the condition of war years.

How is it that, by preparation for war to be carried on abroad, increase should be given to the number of troops provided for home service?—Answer. They are raised and kept at home in *readiness* to be employed in foreign service; and till they are thus employed, they are not distinguishable from those destined to no other than home service.

Note that, in the very nature of the case, to a very considerable amount, the number cannot but have been, from the very first, superfluous and excessive; the excess having for its cause the principle of the inseparable union between waste and corruption, as already brought to view.

Years of <i>ordinary demand</i> .				<i>Extra demand</i> .	
Years.	Number of Soldiers.	Years.	Number of Soldiers.	Years.	Number of Soldiers.
1717	16,000	1767	16,754	1728	22,955
1729	17,709	1768	17,265	1734	25,734
1736	17,704	1769	17,142	1740	28,852
1737	17,704	1775	17,547	1741	29,033
1738	17,704	1774	18,024	1742	35,554
1752	18,857	1786	14,380	1746	33,030
1753	18,357	1787	14,140	1770	23,000
1764	17,532	1788	14,380	1771	23,442
1765	17,421	1789	17,448	1784	21,505
1766	17,306	1790	17,448		

* * From Chandler's Debates, years 1717, 1728, 1729, 1734, 1737, 1738, 1740, 1741, 1742. From Almon's Debates, 1752, 1753, 1764, 1765, 1766, 1767, 1768, 1770, 1789, 1790. From Annual Register, 1769, 1771, 1774, 1784, 1786, 1787, 1788. From Almon's Parliamentary Register, year 1775.

more just severity : the sinners for their own sins—the non-sinners for the sins of the sinners—so long as any of them are left alive . . . *.

No : never has any extensive discontent, that has ever manifested itself, been the fault of the people. Discontent? no: patience—too much patience, in *that* has been their fault, their only fault: a sad fault--and unhappily, an incurable fault under every government but one sufficiently representative, under which alone the concerns which are those of every man, are left without restraint to the discourse of every man. What interest have the people in being governed badly? in having their universal interest sacrificed to any separate and adverse interest? But the interest which the men, by whom they have been governed, have had in governing badly, as they have governed, has here been made manifest, or nothing can be.

CHAP. IV.

Sole Remedy in Principle—Democratic Ascendency.

Such being the disease, behold the only remedy : let him, for whose nerves it is too strong, shut his eyes, and prepare his neck for a yoke, the pressure of which will continue on the increase, till either convulsion break it, or existence sink under it. The principle then of this remedy may be expressed in two words. Democratical Ascendency, or Ascendency of the people. Considering this then as the end to be attained—radical parliamentary Reform is the only means, by which either that immediate end, or political salvation, the ultimate end, can be accomplished.

Without any outward and visible change being made in the forms of the Constitution, but solely by the means of the ever increasing mass of corruptive influence in the hands of the crown, the two separate, partial, and sinister interests, viz. the *monarchical* and the *aristocratical*, have obtained over the *democratical* interest (which is no other than the *universal* interest) an ascendancy so complete, that, under the outside show of a mixed and limited monarchy, a monarchy, virtually and substantially absolute is the result.

Without any outward and visible change being made in the forms of the Constitution, though waste already committed cannot be caused *not* to have been committed, though past misrule cannot be caused not to have reigned, yet the plague may be stayed. Restore to the democratical, to the universal interest, that ascendancy which by the confederated, partial, and sinister interest has been so deplorably abused (and so long as it continues, will continue to be abused);—and thus you have the remedy. *This* is what parliamentary reform will do, *this* is what parliamentary reform means.

This in the year 1780, and again in 1783, was the declared wish—the accomplishment of it the avowed parliamentary endeavour, of the late Duke

* So long as, in any shape, offences are committed, having for their object relief from the mischief of mis-rule, the laws, whatever they are, that have been made for the punishment of them, are thereby proved insufficient; and thus, for the self-same offences, fresh and fresh laws, continually increasing in extent and severity, must be made.

In theory as well as practice, is not this become already a maxim of government? Is not this become the very character of the government? Lie as you are, you are more and more oppressed gradually : seek relief, forcibly, or be it ever so peaceably, you are oppressed and crushed suddenly. When all *hands* are cut off, lest they should write treason—all *eyes* put out, lest they should read treason—all *tongues* cut out, lest they should speak treason—then it is that the climax of precautionary wisdom will be at an end. Yes, then indeed ! but how much earlier? Not at all : unless in some part of this or a future century, as towards the close of the seventeenth, the people, soldiers and all, should become *effectually* tired of such theory and such practice.

of Richmond: a Duke with royal blood flowing in his veins: even at the earliest of those two periods, a veteran, not only in the army, but in parliament, and in high office. His declared object was, to restore to the people what by him were regarded as their *unalienable rights*: and in giving to the people those rights, his declared and principal *means* were, *universal suffrage* and an *annually elected* House of Commons. Now, what object less good than this could have been the object or expectation of this Duke? Could it have been *anarchy*? Could it have been so much as *democracy*? But read his plan, one of the few schemes of legislation to which the authors have been at the same time able and willing to give the support of *reasons*. Read his plan, and with it read his reasons: they are contained in a letter dated August 15, 1783, and addressed to "Lieutenant-Colonel Sharman, commander of the Volunteers, Ireland." And better, and sounder, and closer reasoning is not often to be found. Never yet has that man been found who durst grapple with it. Men shut their eyes against it, and write and talk as if it had never been in existence*.

Now in this change, for unless the plague continues and spreads, a change there must be, is there any *innovation*?—No; there is not so much as an *innovation*. The one thing needful is, that the *power of the purse* should be actually and effectively in the hands of the real representatives, the freely chosen deputies of the body of the people: the *power of the purse*, because that is the power, by the exercise of which, all other needful powers were acquired, for the defence of the people against Stuart tyranny. Now, at various periods in the history of this country, this all productive power was actually in the hands of the people: witness statute after statute: witness in one reign, viz. of Edward the Third, and at thirty-two years interval, two statutes, by each of which, the annual holding of a parliament (and in those days PARLIAMENTS ANNUALLY HOLDEN WERE ANNUALLY ELECTED), was declared to be the legitimate state and condition of the government.

Now if in those days, in which the press was unknown, in which scarce any man but a priest could so much as read; if in those days in which standing armies were unknown, the people could, without danger to themselves or any body else, possess and exercise the power of the purse; if in those days of ignorance and barbarism all this could be; in these our days under the protection of such a forest of bayonets; in these our days, in which every man either reads or hears his newspaper, and in which every thing that man can need for his instruction may be found in newspapers; in these days, shall blind cowardice, or tyranny in the skin of cowardice, find in pretended universal ignorance a pretext for scorning universal suffrage?

But enough of the endlessly mischievous absurdity involved in the word *innovation*. What! is evil converted into good by being old? or good into evil by being new? What! is experience worth nothing? In toothless infancy is there more wisdom than in grey hairs? From self-contradictory nonsense, let us come to common sense: from things long past and widely unlike, let us come to the present state of affairs.

Is there, in the ascendancy of the democratic interest, the slightest show of danger to any thing but the continuance of unconstitutionally usurped

* It however exists, and at Hone's, 67, Old Bailey, may be had for twopence. The title is—The right of the People to Universal Suffrage and Annual Parliaments, clearly demonstrated by the late Duke of Richmond. His Bill, dated 1780, is not to be found in the Parliamentary Register, but was published by itself, first by Ridgway, and (Feb. 1817,) by Hone for 4d.

and most perniciously abused power? In any determinate and assignable shape, the smallest ground for apprehension? What shall decide? Shall it be *experience*? Well, by experience, and that as well in its *negative* as its *positive* shape, the decision is pronounced.

Look to positive experience: behold it in the American United States. There you have, not merely democratic ascendancy in a mixed government, but pure democracy, and nothing else. There you have, not one democracy only, but a whole cluster of democracies: there, all is democracy; all is regularity, tranquillity, prosperity, security: continual security, and with it, continually increasing opulence, enjoyed with practical equality. All, all is democracy: no aristocracy; no monarchy; all that dross evaporated. As for us, we need no such purity, we could not brook it; the dross has a glitter on it; our eyes are used to *that* glitter, and we cannot part with it. With us, so far as is consistent with national salvation, possession not only of *property* but of *power*, even though that power be but a *trust*, is a sacred thing. Well, let us keep it then, the whole of it. We do not want pure democracy, nor any thing like it; what we want, under the existing forms of subjection, is the virtual and effective ascendancy of the democratic interest. This is all we are absolutely in need of—with this we should be content; with less than this it is in vain to speak of content; for less than this cannot save us.

Look to *negative* experience. While, in the language of legitimacy and tyranny, and of the venal slavery that crawls under them, *democracy* and *anarchy* are synonymous terms; see whether, on the whole surface of the globe, there is, or ever has been, anywhere, a single example from which this abuse of words can receive countenance. Look once more at the United States, and see whether, on the habitable globe, there exists anywhere so *regular*, so *well regulated* a government.

Look not to *Greece* or *Italy*—look not to ancient or to middle ages—look not to any *self-acting* democracy. Compared with a *representative* democracy, in which the sole power exercised by the people is that of choosing their deputies, and in those deputies their rulers, whatever else has been called *democracy*, has had nothing of democracy but the name.

Well, then, since experience proves to us that in a total democracy, such as the American democracy, a democracy that is self sustained, there is no such thing as danger; no diminution of security for person, property, reputation, condition in life, religious worship, or for any thing on which man sets a value; what ground can the nature of the case afford for any apprehension of danger in a *partial* democracy, with monarchy and aristocracy by the side, and at the head of it, for its support? and for keeping it in order, a conquering, an irresistible standing army, that grand instrument of order, all around it?

Well, then, such being the only possible instrument of political salvation, let us consider the principles by which the *application* of this instrument ought to be guided.

At present, the cause of the *misrule* is this: that the power is completely in the hands of those whose interest, desire, and determination it is, that the misrule should continue; the thing required, is leaving the executive part of the government where it is, so to order matters, that the controuling part of the government shall be in the hands of those whose interest it is that good government shall take place of misrule in every shape; and more particularly in the two most intimately connected and mutually fostering shapes, waste and corruption, corruption and waste. Now, the persons whose interest it is that good government should take the place of bad, are

the whole body of the people, with the exception of two classes: 1. Those by whom a pecuniary loss would be sustained or apprehended by this change. 2. Those by whom a loss of power, would be sustained or apprehended by this change.

With regard to money, maintaining the principle of leaving things as they are, and supposing delinquency out of the question, the only loss that could befall any body, would be, loss of the chance of increase. And in the event of any change, by which misrule should be made to cease, undoubtedly, loss of power actually in possession would be an inevitable consequence. Loss of money? Yes! But of what money but money at present expected to be received as the wages of corruption. Loss of power? Yes! But of what power but that power which at present is perpetually on sale for the purchase of the wages of corruption.

Before proceeding any farther, there comes a question, which is intitled to an answer. Is there any sufficient probability that so vast a multitude of individuals, of whom the great majority cannot be supposed to have any tolerable acquaintance with the business of governments, will concur in making a tolerably apt choice of persons, by whom the government shall be carried on?

The short answer to this, is, that for the purpose of rulers a choice sufficiently apt can be, and habitually is made by the Americans, and therefore we may depend with entire confidence on a similar aptness of choice by the people of England. The question is, then, reduced to *this*; in what circumstances belonging to the case are we to look for the *cause* of a state of things, of the existence of which there cannot be a doubt, but which, in a distant view of it, presents itself as thus improbable.

For giving an answer more easily, a distinction no less familiar in itself than important in its consequences may here be brought to view. This is the distinction between a *self-formed* and a *derivative* judgment. On the ground of *self-formed* judgment, it is true that few could, in a case such as that in question, be expected to act with any tolerable degree of wisdom; but neither is it less so, that on the ground of *derivative* judgment, there exists not any such large and miscellaneous body of men, of whom the majority may not, even in such a case as this, be expected, and with reason, to act with a degree of propriety adequate to the purpose. For, in respect of those concerns, which to each individual taken by himself, are of still superior importance—viz. *physic, law, and religion*, does not every man who is not, in his own eyes, competent to make on the ground of his own self-formed judgment, choice of an agent or assistant, feel himself reduced to the necessity of acting on the ground of *derivative* judgment? In a word, on the ground of *public opinion*, and under the yoke of this, as well as so many other necessities, the business of *private and domestic* life goes on in the way we see. Well, and why not also of *public* life. The business of *each* individual? Well, and why not then the business of *all*?*—And note, that on this occasion, the probability of making any such choice as shall be not only foolish but mischievous (and so far as it is not mischievous, no matter how foolish), is circumscribed within very narrow limits, by the nature and number of the indivi-

* Reader, mark well the following parallel: when read, go back a few pages, apply it to pages 4 and 5.

I. *Under mixt Monarchy—British Constitution.*

1. Falling off of the receipts of this last year, ending 5th January, 1817, as compared with those of the last preceding one, £9,083,108.
2. Receipts of the same year, ending 5th of January, 1817, £57,360,698.
3. Proportion of the amount of the *deficiency* to that of the *receipt*, about one-sixth.

duals who, on such an occasion, can offer themselves, with the least prospect of finding acceptance, by the majority of so large a multitude as that in question: say, at least, several thousands. It is true that, were the electors the parishioners of a small parish, it might happen, that foolish and ignorant men in preponderant numbers, might agree in the choice of some artful and profligate man of their own level and their own set, by whom, to his own private and sinister purposes, their confidence would be abused. But when the electoral circle is of any such large dimensions as those intended, all such individual causes of deception are altogether out of the question: no man can either propose himself, or be reasonably expected to be proposed, but upon the ground of some reputed qualification, of his possession of which the whole population of the electoral districts will have the means of judging.

But of all qualifications, real or imaginable, the qualification, which consists in the possession of property to such an amount as to draw attention, is at the same time the very qualification, concerning the possession of which men in general are best satisfied with their competence to form a right judgment; and it is also that qualification on which the greatest reliance is placed by the uninformed classes, as a presumptive evidence that its owner possesses those abilities which he ought to have to fit him for the office of representative.

In the event of the proposed change, would not the men who at present determine the course of election by the influence of *will on will*, exercise, for the most part, the same effective power, and produce, so far as concerns possession of the seats, the same effects as now, by the influence of *understanding on understanding*? But, it is to be remembered, that in a reformed Parliament, seats would be sought only by those persons who should think

4. Total unredeemed Funded Debt of Great Britain and Ireland, 1817,	
February 1st.....	£799,601,107
Unfunded Debt, England, 5th January, 1817	50,047,088
Unfunded Debt, Ireland, 5th January, 1817, English currency.....	5,327,663
Total unredeemed Debt.....	£854,975,858

5. Debt *more* than 14 times the amount of the revenue.

II. Under Representative Democracy—American United States Constitution.

1. Receipts of the last year (ending five days earlier than the above, British)—dollars, 47,000,000.

2. Deduct payments and appropriation that same year, 38,000,000.

3. *Surplus* remaining in the Treasury, applicable in discharge of the public debt, 9,000,000. Proportion of the *surplus* to the *expenditure*, about one-fourth.

4. Public debt at the end of the last year, dollars 110,000,000. Amount in pounds sterling, the dollar about 5s. about 27,500,000.

5. Debt, *not* three times the amount of the revenue.

The British sums are taken from the Commons' House Document, 3d February, 1817: the American from that which follows:

Morning Chronicle, Jan. 2, 1817: Extract from the *Message*, transmitted by the *President* of the United States of America, to both Houses of Congress, Dec. 3, 1816.

"It has been estimated, that during the year 1816† the actual receipts of revenue at the treasury, including the balance at the commencement of the year, and excluding the proceeds of loans and treasury notes, will amount to about 47 millions of dollars: that, during the same year, the actual payments at the treasury, including the payment of the arrearages of the war department, as well as the payment of a considerable excess beyond the annual appropriation, will amount to about the sum of 38 millions of dollars; and that consequently at the close of the year, there will be a surplus in the treasury of about the sum of 9 millions of dollars.... The floating debt of treasury notes and temporary loans, will soon be entirely discharged. The aggregate of the funded debt, composed of debts incurred during the wars of 1776 and of 1812, has been estimated with reference to the 1st of January next (1817), at a sum not exceeding one hundred and ten millions of dollars.

† [Estimated:] Because to the whole of the year, *positive statement* could not be applied, near a month of it being at that time still to come.

them worth having on those terms, by which alone they could be had—namely, the exercise of industry and honesty.

And how many would there be found among the present members, in whose eyes the seat would be worth the having, when to neglect their duty, or betray their trust, *as they now do*, and yet remain unpunished, would be no longer in their power.

Well, and suppose among the 658 members, returned under a system of democratic ascendancy, *ten* knaves should be found plotting and confederating with one another (though what in that case could they be gainers by any such plotting?) and fourscore and ten fools foolish enough to be led by them, in such a case, what is the mischief they would be able to do?

Alas, how happy would not this state of things be in comparison with the present, in which more than *thrice* ten such knaves are occupied without ceasing, not only in the plotting of mischief, but in the doing it, and carrying it into effect; and more than thrice fourscore and ten in whom are combined the knavery of following, with eyes wide open, at the tail of the knaves, and the folly of suffering themselves to be led by the knaves, with winking, or half closed, or carelessly, or purposely averted eyes*.

* Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, vol. iii. p. 316. *Charles Fox*.—"I say that it is demonstrated, beyond the power of subterfuge to question, that genuine representation alone can give solid power, and that, in order to make the government strong, *the people must make the government*. I say, that you ought to act on *this grand maxim of political wisdom thus demonstrated*, and call on the people according to the original principles of your system to the strength of your government;—I say, that in doing this you will not *innovate—you will not imitate*"—(meaning the French Constitution, which he had been speaking of)—"you will only recur to the true path of the Constitution of England. In making the *people* of England a constituent part of the Government of England, you do no more than *restore* the genuine edifice, designed and framed by our ancestors."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 377.—*Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*.—"In bringing forward this business, he was aware how ungracious it would be for that House to shew that *they are not the real representatives of the people*."

Ibid. p. 379.—*Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*.—"Why should *innovations* of the prerogative be watched with less jealousy, than innovations in favour of the popular part of the constitution."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 380.—*Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*.—"On looking into the Journals of the 24th of May, 1784, he found a motion made, that the King's Speech should be read, wherein his Majesty says, that he would be always desirous to concur with his Parliament, in supporting and maintaining in their just *balance* the rights of every branch of the Legislature."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 387.—*Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*.—"Are all these innovations to be made, in order to increase the influence of the executive power—and is nothing to be done in favour of the popular part of the constitution, to act as a *counterpoise*?"

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 407. Commons. "A modern author of great eloquence," [*E. Burke*, anno 1770] says *Mr. Erskine*, now *Lord Erskine*, "speaking of those changes in the English government, truly said, 'The virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons, consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation. It was not instituted to be a controul upon the people, as of late it has been taught by a doctrine of the most pernicious tendency, but as a controul for the people:'"

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 417.—*Sir William Young*.—"A delegation of Members to that House, ought ever to be...of persons having one common interest with those who sent them there." So much for *principle*—now for *fact*. Who were the persons in the parenthesis here marked as omitted?—*Answer*, "Gentlemen answering the description of those whom he then addressed." Could this have been serious? Was it not irony?

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 465.—*Mr. Whitbread*.—"Sir, I maintain that there ought to be *community of interest* between the people and their representatives."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 468.—*Mr. Whitbread*.—"We wish only to restore to the democracy that power which it ought to *possess*."

Works of *Sir William Jones*, by *Lord Teignmouth*, vol. viii. p. 506.—"Speech on the Reformation of Parliament," spoken anno 1782, May 28th, at the London Tavern, afterwards penned and published by himself.—"It is true" (says *Sir William Jones* in this speech) "that the *spirit* of the Constitution ought not to be changed:" [no, in so far as good—in so far as bad, why not?] "it is *false* that the *form* ought not to be corrected; and I will now demonstrate that the spirit of our Constitution requires a representation of the people *nearly equal, and nearly universal*."

The ascendancy of the people? Yes; it must be the ascendancy: nothing less will serve.

Talk of *mixture* in the constitution—of what is this mixture composed, but of one essentially useful ingredient, and two *essentially noxious*? What better reason then can we give for keeping these noxious ingredients than that we are used to them—and being used to them could not bear—for who could bear—to part with them?

The greatest praise, then, that could be given to the noxious ingredients would be, that they were wholly inoperative; and above all, they ought not to possess (as they now do) that proportion of force which should enable them to destroy, or materially to weaken the efficiency of the only essentially useful ingredient.

It will never do to talk of *balance*; leave that to Mother Goose and Mother Blackstone. Balance, indeed! A fine thing for politicians upon roses—by whom, on questions most wide in extent, and most high in importance, to save the toil of thinking, an allusion or an emblem is accepted as conclusive evidence, so as it has been accepted by others. What mean ye by this your *balance*? Know ye not, that in a machine of any kind, when forces *balance* each other, the machine is at a stand? Well, and in the machine of government, is the perpetual absence of all motion the thing which is wanted? And since you must have an emblem—since you can neither talk, nor attempt to think, but in hieroglyphics—know you not that, as in the case of the body *natural*, so in the case of the body *politic*, when motion ceases, the body dies?

So much for the *balance*: now for the *mixture*, to which such virtue is wont to be ascribed. Here is a form of government, in which the power is divided among three interests—the interest of the great body of the people, that is of the *many*; and two separate interests, the interest of the *one* and the interest of the *few*, both which are adverse to it; two separate and narrow interests, neither of which is kept on foot, but at the expense, to the loss, and by the sacrifice of the broader interest. This form of government, you say, has its advantages. Its advantages? Compared with what? Compared with those forms of government, in which the people have no power at all, or in which, if they have any, they have not so much? Oh, yes; with any such form of government for an object of comparison, its *excellence* is unquestionable. But, compare it with a form of government in which the interest of the people is the only interest that is looked to; in which neither a single man, with a separate and adverse interest of his own, nor a knot of men with a separate and adverse interest of their own, are to be found; where no interest is kept up at the expense, to the loss, or by the sacrifice, of the universal interest to it, where is, *then*, the *excellence* of this mixed form of government?

Nay, but (says somebody) in the form of government in question, the *supreme*—the *universal* power is a mixture of the three *powers* corresponding to the three *interests*; the *excellence* produced by it is not in any one of the three ingredients taken by itself: no, it is in the *mixture*. Take away any one of the three masses of power, the mixture is changed—the excellence is diminished; take away any two of them, there is mixture no longer, and the excellence vanishes.

Is this notion about *mixture* good? Oh, yes, good enough, so long as the respective natures of the several interests are kept out of sight. Look at them, and then see whether it be possible, that, taking the power of the people for the *simple* substance, any such quality as *excellence*, in comparison with the excellence of the simple substance, can be

produced by the adding to it either or both of the two other powers, and thus making a *mixture*.

Let us define the simple substance—the real democracy, to be that form of government in which the interest of the whole people is the only interest provided for; and in which the only power is a power having for its object the support of that interest. If to this simple substance you add a power, employed in the support of the interest of one *single* person, and a power employed in the support of the interest of a comparatively *small knot* of persons, in either of these cases you have a *mixture*; well, and compared then with the *simple* substance, when and where can be the advantages of this *mixture*?

What could man ever find to say in behalf of *monarchy*, but that monarchy is *legitimacy*? or in behalf of *aristocracy*, but that *property* is *virtue*?

These are fair questions; should any man feel disposed to answer them, let the answers be so too; and let them not, oh! let them not, be either imprisonment or death!

Go to the flour-mill; get a sack of *flour*, in which there is flour, and nothing else; make bread of it—there you have the *simple substance*. In making your bread, add now to the flour some powder of *chalk*, with or without some powder of *burnt bones*; in either case you have a *mixture*. Well, in either case, so long as you do not add to the flour too much of that which is *not* flour, your bread may afford nourishment—it may give support to the constitution of your natural body. But, does your body derive any nourishment? its constitution any support? or your bread any thing that can be called by the name of *excellence*, from either of these two new ingredients.

Father of the *representative* system! O rare *Simon De Montfort*! thou who, in giving birth to it, didst to mankind more good than ever was done by any one other mortal man! in giving birth to that most beneficent system, thou gavest birth to the only practicable democracy; to the only democracy, by which extent beyond a nutshell, or duration beyond a day can be attained. Comes the persecution of the *Stuarts*, and democracy—representative democracy is planted in AMERICA, with nothing but monarchy to hang over it: comes the persecution of the G——, the monarchy is now cut up; and now the salutiferous plant, established in its own roots, cleared of every weed that had choaked it, shines in all its purity—rears and spreads itself with matchless, and enviable, and envied, and hated, and dreaded vigour*. By the mere passing from the

* The rapid sketch given in the text of the progress of the representative system, will, it is hoped, be more fully comprehended by the following historical notice:—

Henry the 3d, who succeeded to the crown of England in 1216, being then a minor, and who assumed the government in 1227, being then of age, made himself extremely unpopular by his incorrigible attachment to foreigners; by his violation of the most solemn promises; by his many illegal and arbitrary exactions of money, and the assistance which he gave to the Papal legates in the like exactions; by all which the kingdom was oppressed and fleeced in the most intolerable manner. His infamous conduct had at length so incensed the Barons, that, in 1258, the government was taken out of his hands, and committed to twenty-four persons, with extraordinary power to reform all abuses. Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, the richest, most powerful, and popular of the Barons, and whom the King had personally insulted, was at their head. The members of this aristocratical body, instead, however, of using their power for the general good, employed it to perpetuate their own authority, and for their own private advantage. The consequence of this was, that the power of Montfort began to be hated, and the King's misfortunes pitied. Montfort, in order to diminish the odium under which he had fallen, called a Parliament, which met on the 28th January, 1265, and which was "*nearer to the ANTIEN model*;" that is, in order to protect himself against the King and the lesser Barons, whom he had excluded from all share in the govern-

one country to the other, oh, what a host of plagues and miseries in detail did it not leave behind! The list of these abuses would be well worth holding up to view; but, for any such task the present is no place.

No; *but* for the English constitution, *democracy*, the only democracy worth the name, never could have been known. Oh, rare English constitution! there is thy greatest—there thy only lasting praise!

Balance? Equality? No; I cannot say *equality*, when what I mean is, *ascendency*. This hand would be palsied—this pen motionless—if, for the first time in a life, already of some length, it were to attempt deception. I do mean nothing less than ascendency; I do not mean more, indeed I do not. The Monarch may, for ought I know, plunge his hangman's knife in my bowels; but I am not for "cashiering kings." The one thing needful and sufficient for the purpose I would have if I could, whatever were its name. More than this, not being needful for the purpose, I would not have if I could. For any more than myself I have no title to speak. In speaking thus for myself, I speak what I should expect to find the quiet sense of a vast majority of the people in two, at least, of the three kingdoms, high and low, rich and poor together. But, should the only remedy be refused, oppression continue, and exasperation rise against it, then it is not quiet sense that will speak, but exasperation; and, as to what exasperation may say or do, who is there that can undertake to measure it?

ment, he applied directly to the *great body of the people* for support. To this, Parliament, which met in *one* body, were summoned by particular writs. Eleven Bishops, 5 Earls, and 18 great Barons of Montfort's party, and 64 Abbots, 37 Priors, and 5 Deans to supply the place of the nobility and clergy of the King's party, who were not summoned. Now comes the most important point of all—the application to the people. Writs were sent to the sheriffs of *all* the counties, directing them to cause two of the most discreet Knights of each county to come to this Parliament; and similar writs were sent to the CITIZENS of *several* cities to send two most discreet and honest citizens; to the BURGESSES of **several* burghs to send two wise and upright burgesses; and each of the cinque ports were required to send two Barons. This appears to be the first instance in English history, in which the *whole body of the people in counties, cities, and boroughs* were called upon to elect representatives; and it was an event most important in its remote consequences to the whole human race.

The religious and political persecution of the Stuarts, drove our countrymen to seek liberty in the wilds of America, where, not forgetting the excellent institutions for which their ancestors had bled and conquered, they established many colonies with *democratical and representative* constitutions. As the colonies became more firmly settled, they obtained charters from the King, who appointed governors as his representatives. When freedom was to be found at home, by the establishment of the Republic, and the overthrow of the monarchy and aristocracy of England, the emigration to America ceased; but it was renewed on the occupation of the throne by the contemptible despot Charles the 2d. Englishmen had not forgotten the deeds of Hampden, nor the virtue and unsullied glory of the Republic. The blood of Sydney—the great, the good Algernon Sydney—sprinkled on the altar of monarchy, taught them that liberty was not in England. They sought liberty again in America, and thus were many more colonies established.

In 1765, the Ministers of the third *Guelph* made the first attempt to tyrannize over and enslave the Americans, by endeavouring to impose taxes upon them without giving them any share in the representation. These attempts were repeated: violence at length was resorted to. In 1776, the Americans declare themselves free and independent. We all know the result—the establishment of liberty in a constitution of matchless excellence. This is, without exception, the most important and auspicious event in the history of mankind. Its influence and its benefits are equally incalculable. Posterity alone can justly estimate them. To it we owe the French Revolution—the first combat between all principles and all prejudices—and to the French Revolution we owe the establishment of Republicanism in South America, in the place of Spanish tyranny. To it we owe that the Sovereigns of Europe are giving to their subjects the *shadows* of constitutions, that they might not demand the *substance*, that real substance, which their subjects will soon so well know how to obtain; and, above all, we owe to the French Revolution a rapid diffusion of knowledge, and a resistless spirit of inquiry and of freedom, that is daily producing the most beneficial results.—EDITOR.

* Henry, from whose history of England this account is drawn, says (speaking of the same parliament) in the 8th volume, *several*, as above; but in the 7th volume, he says *EVERY* pty and *EVERY* burgh.

CHAP. V.

Remedy in Detail—Radical Parliamentary Reform—Elementary Arrangements—their Necessity.

The immediate cause of all the mischief of mis-rule is, that the men acting as representatives of the people have a private and sinister interest, and sufficient power to gratify that interest, producing a constant sacrifice of the interest of the people.

The secondary cause of the mischief—the cause of this immediate cause is this, that these same agents are in one case unduly independent, in another unduly dependent. They are independent of their principals—the people; and dependant upon the C———r-General, by whose co———tive influence the above-mentioned sacrifice is produced.

Here, in a nutshell, may be seen the mischief and its causes; and against this mischief, revolution excepted, *Parliamentary Reform* is the only possible remedy. In these elements, when developed, may be seen what *radical* reform is—what the sort of reform termed *moderate* is, and thence, what and where the difference between them.

The reform sketched out in the ensuing plan being of the *radical* kind, the advantages contained in it will there be found. But, on the present occasion, what is required is to shew, that while by *radical* reform an adequate remedy would be applied—by *moderate* reform no remedy would be applied. In brief, the *undue independence* would remain, and with it the *undue dependence*.

Now for developement:—

The first point to be considered is, the situations to which, to be effectual, the remedy must apply itself. These are:—

1. Situation of *Parliamentary Electors*.
2. Situation of *Parliamentary Representatives*.

First, as to the situation of *Parliamentary Electors*.

The *ultimate* end to be sought is, *advancement of the universal interest*.

In order that the *universal* interest may be advanced, *all particular* interests must be comprehended and advanced, except, that in any case it can be shewn, that the advancement of any particular interest would injure the advancement of the universal interest; and then this particular interest must and ought to be excluded—always keeping steadily before us this principle—that in no case should any exclusion be made, unless the comfort and security of the *WHOLE* receives an absolute increase, as the result of the exclusion of a *FEW*.

If it be not indeed the same thing in other words, Virtual universality of Suffrage and practical equality of representation, are included in the above definition, as means for advancing the universal interest.

What I mean by virtual universality of Suffrage is this: if the word *universal*, as applied to suffrage, were used without any other word to limit its signification, it would necessarily include the admission to the elective franchise of many persons of various descriptions, none of whom would be capable of exercising it to the advantage either of others or of themselves. *Idiots*, and *infants* in leading-strings, may serve for examples.

By *virtually* Universal Suffrage, then, what I mean is, that which will remain of absolutely Universal Suffrage, when, from the number of individuals designated by the word *universal*, every deduction shall have been made, as, by specific considerations, shall have been shewn to be produc-

tive of *benefit*; that benefit, at the same time, over-balancing every inconvenience resulting from the limit thus applied.

If, in the instance of any *one* individual of the whole body of the people, it *be right* that the power be possessed and exercised of contributing to the choice of a person, by whom, in the Representative Assembly, his interest shall be advocated, how can it be otherwise than right in the instance of any *other* such person? In the impossibility of finding an answer to this question will be found contained the substance of the argument in support of *Universal Suffrage*.

If, in the instance of any one individual, it *be right* that he should possess a *share*, of a certain degree of magnitude, in the choice of a person to form one in the body of the representatives of the people, how can it be right that, in the instance of any other individual, the share should be either *less* or *greater*? In this question is contained the substance of the argument in support of *practical equality of representation*.

Universality of Suffrage has for its limit the need of deduction for divers special reasons. *Equality of Representation* has for its limit the inconvenience which in the shape of *delay*, *vexation*, and *expense*, could not fail to be the result of any endeavour to give existence to *absolute* equality.

In the same description is, moreover, included *freedom of suffrage*—*freedom*, to which, in the present instance, *genuineness* and *non-spuriousness* may be considered as equivalent terms.

To say that a suffrage ought to be *free*, what is it but to say that the *will* expressed by it ought to be the very will of the person by whom it is so expressed—the will of that person and of that person only—his *self-formed* will—the product of his own *judgment*—not produced by the belief of the existence of any *will* or *wish* considered as entertained by any other person, at whose hands the voter entertains an eventual expectation of receiving *good* or *evil*, in any shape:—good or evil, according as the said voter shall or shall not have conformed, in giving his vote, to the wishes of this other person.

According to this explanation, if, in the instance of any voter, the vote which is given is not *free*, it is manifestly *not genuine*—it is *spurious*:—under the disguise of the expression of the will of the *voter*, it is the will of some *other* person. In so far as it is given as the will of the voter, it is an act of *imposture*.

In the same description is included secrecy of suffrage. Short reason, its necessity to secure *freedom*—that is to secure *genuineness*, to prevent *spuriousness*.

Important as is the result of the whole body of suffrages given in the electoral districts; yet, under any scheme of representation, in which any approach were made to *virtual universality* and *practical equality* of suffrage, —the *value*, even in his own eyes, of the share of the universal interest* which any one man can have in choosing one candidate in preference to any other, will, generally speaking, be so extremely minute that there can scarcely be that *private* and *separate* interest so small as not to be capable of prevailing against it, so as to give to the vote a direction *opposite* to that which would be the result of the regard entertained by the voter for his share in the *universal* interest.

In the case of the vast majority of the number of voters that would be produced by universal suffrage, half-a-guinea may, under a certainty of its

* Understand here the interest consisting in his individual share in the universal interest.

being received, be stated as abundantly sufficient for the purpose of perverting the vote. In the present state of things, four thousand guineas is said to be the average price of a venal seat. On this supposition, four thousand being supposed to be the number of voting electors, two thousand and one guineas would suffice to carry the election; and supposing four thousand guineas the price paid, here would be a couple of guineas which any man would have it in his power to receive by selling his vote. Here then is a quantity of corruptive force amply sufficient. Half-a-guinea per vote has been spoken of as the price habitually paid. But if thus an interest corresponding to the sure receipt of half-a-guinea, suffices to determine the conduct of each one of a two or three thousand of electors, much more will four times that sum.

It is true that in any such state of things as that which is here proposed, the value of a seat could not remain at any such sum as four thousand guineas. But no such seat could remain without possessing some value; and so long as the seat possessed a venal value, so long would each of the votes on which the possession of it depended.

Thus minute is the portion of corruptive force, which ought to be regarded as generally adequate to the production of the corruptive effect, on the supposition that, as in the present state of things, the direction taken by the vote is in each instance *known* or *knowable*. On the other hand, let but this direction be to a certainty *unknown* to every individual but the voter himself, and the complete freedom of his suffrage is the necessary result. At the instance, or for the satisfaction of any other person, at whose hands eventual good or evil is expected, in vain would he disclose, though it be ever so truly, the direction taken by his vote. As every voter would be apprised that, in such a case, not *truth* but *falsehood* would be the course prescribed by a sense of moral obligation; and, under the uncertainty produced by the diffusion of a maxim to this effect, by no elector could any adequate inducement be found for putting any real restraint upon the *freedom* of his suffrage: and by no person in the character of *tempter*, would be seen any adequate prospect of advantage—even from simple asking, still less from pecuniary expense, employed in the endeavour to divest the suffrage of the freedom so essential to its utility.

Freedom of suffrage being taken for the *end*, it will soon be seen how essential, in every instance, to the accomplishment of this *end*, *secrecy of suffrage* is as a *means*.

It shall presently be shewn in what different ways freedom of suffrage is *capable* of being taken away; to what extent, and by the influence of what descriptions of persons it actually and constantly *is* taken away.

Second, as to the situation of *representative*.

For the purpose of this part of the argument, the situation of elector must be supposed to have been properly marked out and established; and for the marking out and establishment of it, the investing of the suffrage with virtual universality, practical equality, freedom, and secrecy, must be regarded as effected.

The means by which the universal interest may be advanced in regard to the situation of representative, and therefore the ends which are to be obtained, are these:—

1. The due dependence of the representative upon his constituents:—that is, whenever the representative shall become, in the eyes of the acting majority of his constituents, unfit for his situation, by not possessing the requisite qualities, viz. appropriate honesty, intellectual abilities and active talents, it shall be in the power of his constituents, by means of a fresh

election, to remove him from his seat before he has had time to produce any irremediable mischief.

2. The due independence of the representative of all other persons, but more particularly of C——r-General and Co. as it is by their *corrupt* influence alone that a majority of the representatives can be purchased.

The constant attendance of the representative to his duty in the House is another essential object to be obtained.

1. *To consider the due dependence of the representative upon the elector.*

It had been proved, that on the part of the electors—at any rate, on the part of the great majority of them—there *does* exist the disposition to contribute towards the advancement of the universal interest whatsoever can be contributed by their votes: now by the majority of those votes will be determined the several persons on whom, as their representatives, will rest the duty of acting their parts towards the accomplishment of that same ultimate and comprehensive end.

Unfortunately, by the essential and unchangeable nature of the two situations, it will always happen that the representatives of the people will, one and all, be constantly exposed to the intense action of that immense mass of corruptive influence which is always at the command of C——r General and Co. And, in this state of things, it is altogether impracticable to keep them in any such state as that in which no such sinister interest would be able to produce any mischievous effect. All then that the case admits of, towards preserving a man in such a situation from being thus corrupted, is so to order matters that in the event of his becoming obsequious to the influence of C——r General and Co. and thereupon manifesting a deficiency of appropriate honesty, his power of doing mischief may receive a speedy termination.

2. *To consider the due independence of the representative towards C——r General and Co.*

In regard to this endowment, it is manifest that by no other direct means than that which consists in rendering the representative dependent by reason of his seat, can any thing be done towards securing to him the possession of this endowment. And the dependence will be in exact proportion to the value which he may attach to the possession of his seat. And thus it is manifest, that the representative's independence of C——r General and Co. is in exact proportion to his dependence upon the people.

In this case stands the mischief: monarch and lords remaining, that no reform in the Commons could prevent the Monarch from giving to any member of the Commons House, or to any person in any way connected with him, a useful and needful place, a needless place, a useless place, an overpaid place, a ribbon or other badge of factitious dignity, a baronetcy, a peerage, and so in the case of any number of the members. But that which a radical reform in the Commons can do, is so to order matters, that, if in the eyes of the electors the appointment wears the character of a bribe, they shall have it in their power, at the next general election, to rid themselves of the supposed betrayer of his trust—this is *the remedy*. In the occurrence in which the rewards of corruption may be bestowed, not on the member himself but on some person connected with him, and in which legal evidence shall be necessary for the purpose of punishment, the case admits of no remedy; except the withdrawing of their confidence by the electors, in not again returning the member, for which purpose no legal evidence is necessary.

Such being the *primary* or *principal* securities, now follow two *secondary* or *instrumental* ones.

3. *Impermanence* of the situation, secured by the annual recurrence of the elective process.

This species of instrumental security contributes in two distinguishable ways to strengthen the two principal ones. 1. In proportion to the *short-livedness* of the power, the profit capable of being reaped by C——r *General and Co.* by corrupting the representative in question, and engaging, him to betray his trust, diminishes. 2. The profit to C——r will diminish and therefore the price which he will be unwilling to pay, and thence the money which the corruptible representative will be able to receive will also diminish. In the same proportion likewise, the corruption-opposing remedy, placed in the hands of his constituents, increases, the sooner the time for re-election comes, the earlier may that remedy be applied*.

To reduce to the smallest quantity of time, during which it shall be in the power of the representative to continue in the supposed course of mischievous conduct, it would be requisite that *immediately* on the supposed commission of any such breach of trust, it should be in the power of the majority of his constituents to divest him of his trust.

But to produce any such effect might require the keeping of the body of the electors in such a state of almost continual attention and activity as would be incompatible with that degree of attention to their means of procuring those means of subsistence, without which the requisite quantity would fail; and thereby mischief be produced, in a degree far more extensive than could reasonably be expected to be produced, by the difference between a possession, capable of being revoked at any time,—and a possession, the termination of which could not be effected oftener than at the recurrence of some fixed and short period, such as that of a single year; in which last case the average duration of the supposed disposition to pursue a mischievous course would, vacations considered, be reduced to considerably less than *half* of the year.

On this occasion, two inconveniences require to be guarded against; general want of *preparedness*, and particular and incidental fraudulent *surprise*. When a fixed and universally fore-known day is appointed for a judgment to be passed by the several bodies of electors, on the conduct of their respective representatives, the time capable of being occupied in the consideration of that conduct, will, in every instance, be the same: in every instance allowing more opportunity for proper preparation than upon any other plan. *Surprise* is a species of fraud, to which all public bodies are exposed. By a particular knot of confederates, whose object is to carry some measure, which, in case of full attendance, they think would not be approved, a day is appointed, the earlier, in general, the more favourable to the fraud—two connected objects being of course aimed at; the one *respecting attendance*—to *get in* those from whom they

* Almon's Debates, anno 1744, Jan. 29.—On a motion for annual parliaments, in preference to triennial, made in 1744, by *Thomas Carew*, these arguments were urged with great force by him, and in reply to the ministerial advocate, Sir William Yonge, by *Sir John Philipps*, whose son was created, in the present reign, *Lord Milford*, the negative was carried by no more than 145 to 113—majority no more than 32. The only other speaker reported was Humphrey Sydenham, much inferior, who spoke in support of the motion. The weakness of Yonge's reasoning may, to a curious degree, be seen prominent.

Further on, comes the occasion for observing the confidence with which the wish for annual parliaments has been regarded as confined to vulgar ignorance, or a wish to destroy the government.

expect support; the other, to *keep out* those from whom they expect opposition. Another, respecting *preparation* is, that *supporters* may be as *well* prepared, and such *adversaries* as cannot be prevented from attending, as *ill-prepared* as possible.

By fixing an universally fore-known day, both these inconveniences will be excluded; but without, both would be admitted.

4. *Exclusion of Placemen from the power of voting in the House.*

Receiving the wages of corruption, by a representative, is the mischief, against which the impermanence of his seat is likely to act as a security.

Now any member of the House of Representatives, who holds an office producing to him either money, or power, actually harbours in his bosom a portion of the pestilential matter of corruption, and is under the dominion of its baneful influence.

In the *Plan* may be seen the *reasons*, by which is proved the utility of the attendance of Placemen in the House, with power of *speech*, and even of *motion*, and in the same place is shewn, that those reasons do not apply to the power of *voting*; and it will there be shewn, that he would be justly branded with weakness and folly, who should place the smallest confidence in any assembly, in which this baneful union should be suffered to operate, as it always must operate in the production of habitual dishonesty, breach of trust, and misrule.

The objections to Placemen and Pensioners' voting in the House, hold as strong against those who hold their situations *during good behaviour* as against those who hold them *at pleasure*.

5. *Universal constancy of attendance.*

It is a proposition almost too evident to need stating, that no man can perform his duty, unless he attend in the place where that duty must be performed.

The beneficial effects of such universal constancy of attendance; the mischiefs resulting from the want of it; and the means of effectually securing such attendance, may be seen in the *Plan* itself.

But it seems necessary to bring more particularly to view, that it is an additional security against *undue dependence* in the only case in which it can be productive of practical mischief, viz. the case in which a permanent *majority* has been brought under the dominion of the corruptive influence. Every man who, in the case of a *pernicious* measure, is in his real judgment against it, but who, by the sinister influence of C———r-General and Co. is prevented from acting against it, at the same time that, were it not for such influence, he would attend and vote against it, does by mere absence, exactly *one half* of the mischief that he could do by attending and voting in favour of the pernicious measure; and so, *vice versa*, in the case of a *beneficent* measure. On the other hand, suppose the man to be one who, in the vote he gives, is generally determined by considerations of public good, then if the mischievousness of the supposed measure be to a certain degree palpable, if he were in attendance, shame alone would suffice to prevent him from giving his vote on the wrong side. But shame cannot attach itself to absence, the cause of it not being known; here then, in so far as attendance and non-attendance are left optional, the half of every man's influence in the Assembly is left in the condition of a saleable commodity, capable of being sold to C———r-General and Co. without restraint of any kind, **not** only without fear of *punishment*, but without fear of *reproach* or *shame*.

And thus it appears, that, after every thing which can be done for the securing of honesty in the breasts of the individual members against the

assaults of corruptive influence, has been done, still *universal constancy of attendance* remains as a necessary supplement.

Now, if by means of corruptive influence always remaining in the hands of C———r-General and Co. even under a system of constantly universal attendance, a permanent majority could be bought of an assembly constituted by a system of deputation, in which suffrage was at once virtually universal, practically equal, and completely free; and that assembly composed of persons, each removable at the latest, in less than a year, the due and requisite dependence on constituents would be destroyed. But, that any such open corruption should really take place seems morally impossible. Even under the present system, spite of all its corruption, here and there a case has been seen, in which the corrupt will of C———r-General and Co. has experienced effectual resistance. Yes; even under the present system; how then could it ever be otherwise under a pure one?

That, even in so much as a single instance, any such general corruption should, in such a state of things, take place, seems altogether out of human probability. But, to produce any permanent and unremedied bad effect, it would require that such corrupt majority should be a permanent one; for, suppose it ever to cease, the majority of a single day would suffice to unravel the web of corruption, and devote the corruptionists, if not to punishment under the forms of law, at any rate to universal indignation and abhorrence, with a certainty of never more being re-appointed to the trust which they had thus abused.

Thus far as to the points of most prominent importance. There remain for consideration the arrangements necessary to simplify the mode of election, and thence to exclude mischief in so many various shapes, such as *delay, vexation, expense, drunkenness and tumult at Elections*, and *litigation* after and even before, and with a view to election; mischiefs that are even fostered under the existing mode. But, in regard to these, reference to the *Plan* itself may here suffice.

CHAP. VI.

Differences between this and the Original Plans of Radical Reform.

Having in the last chapter stated my own plan of Radical Reform absolutely, I shall now compare it with others. There are in my plan of radical reform ten principal arrangements, viz.

I. Applying to the situation of Elector.

1. Comprehension of all interests.
2. Virtual Universality of Suffrage.
3. Practical Equality of Suffrage.
4. Freedom of Suffrage.
5. Secrecy of Suffrage.

II. Applying to the Situation of Representative.

6. Due Dependence towards his Constituents.
7. Due independence towards C———r-General and Co.
8. Impermanence of Situation from annual Elections.
9. Exclusion of placemen from voting in the House.
10. Universal Constancy of Attendance.

Now, in the original plans of radical reform, there are these following arrangements:—I. Applying to the situation of *Elector* these three, viz.

1. *Comprehension of all interests.* 2. *Virtual universality of suffrage.*

3. *Practical equality* of suffrage. But, in these same original plans, neither *secrecy* of suffrage, nor, therefore, *freedom* of suffrage, are included.

II. Applying to the situation of *Representative*, these three, viz. 1. Impermanence of the situation by means of annual elections, operating as an *instrumental* security; and, in so far as these suffices, obtaining the two principal securities, viz. *due dependence*, and, to the extent of its operation, *due independence*. 2. Due dependence as towards Electors. 3. Due independence as towards C———r General and Co.

But, there are two other securities which I do not find in the original plans, but which, as instrumental securities with reference to those principal ones, have presented themselves to my view as indispensable;—exclusion of Placemen from the right of voting, and universal constancy of attendance.

Here then are *four* additional securities—two of them applying to the one situation, two of them to the other, in respect of which I hold myself more particularly responsible.

Taking any other plans of radical reform for the *original* plans, the plan composed of these same securities with the addition of the four others, which, in the character of instrumental, and indeed indispensable, securities, I have thus ventured to propose, may be distinguished by the name of *my plan of Radical Parliamentary Reform**.

Arrangements to simplify the process of Election, and thereby to diminish delay, vexation, expense, drunkenness, and disturbance, are to be found not only in the Radical Reform system, but, in principle at least, in some of the Moderate Reform plans; therefore, they belong not to the present head.

The unknown member of the House of Commons, at whose instance the rest of the House joined in that *petition* (such in those days was the form), to which Edward the Third *twice*, in the shape of a *law*, gave his sanction, may be considered as the original inventor of the Radical Reform Plan, so far as concerns *annual elections*. In the late reign, in 1744, it found in *Thomas Carew* a parliamentary reviver, and in him and *Sir John Phillipps* (not to mention others) two most powerful advocates: on which occasion, as hath been seen, it did not want much of being carried. During the present reign, this same arrangement has found in the Lords an advocate in the *late Duke of Richmond*†, and, since his death, in 1809, in the Commons‡, in *Sir Francis Burdett*; but, no inconsiderable part of the degree of extension insisted upon by the Duke of Richmond appears to have been given up by Sir Francis Burdett.

Finding *that* limit § already proposed, and from a quarter so respectable, and regarding it as promising in a degree sufficient for a first proposal to be effectually conducive to the purpose, and preferring union to dissension on every occasion in which a regard for the end in view will admit of such preference; hence it was that, in the annexed *Plan*, drawn up in 1809, and word for word as it stands at present, I adopted this same limit. I should be to a considerable degree satisfied with the arrangement in that same state, after the closer consideration recently bestowed upon the subject; though, at the same time, after maturer consideration, I do not see any source of danger, even though it were in a state of extension still more ample than that which was proposed by the Duke of Richmond.

* Since writing the above, I have become sufficiently assured, that long before the ensuing *Plan* of mine was drawn up, the expedient of the ballot had, in more publications than one, been advocated by *Major Cartwright*.

† See Appendix.

‡ Ibid.

§ Namely, to householders.

CHAP. VII.

Virtual Universality of Suffrage further considered.

In all eyes but those to which tyranny is the only endurable form of government, what principle can be more impregnable than universal suffrage?

1. Who is there that is not susceptible of discomfort and comfort, of pain and pleasure?

2. Of what is human *happiness, felicity, well-being, or welfare* composed, but comfort, and absence of discomfort, pleasure and exemption from pain*?

3. What greater or less part of the universal happiness and unhappiness is the happiness or unhappiness of any one member of the community, high or low, rich or poor, in comparison with any other?

4. Who is there by whom unhappiness is not avoided—happiness pursued?

5. Who is there, by whom unhappiness ought not to be avoided, and happiness pursued?

6. Who, in avoiding unhappiness and pursuing happiness, has not a course of conduct to maintain, which, in some way or other, he does maintain throughout life?

7. Who is there, whose conduct does not take, on each occasion, its direction from a *self-formed or derivative judgment*?

8. Who is there, whose conduct is never, on any occasion, directed by any other than a *self-formed judgment*? Who is there that, in relation to the most momentous of the private concerns of his life, does not frequently find himself under the obligation of taking for his guidance a judgment of the *derivative* kind?

9. Is not the part taken by a man, in relation to his own private affairs considered all together, of greater importance to himself, than any part could be, which, in relation to the whole number of public affairs taken together, could, even under a system of universal suffrage, ever come under his cognizance?

10. Suppose that the interest of the *subject many* and of the *ruling few* are incompatible; in what way would either the prevalent or exclusive possession of the requisite intellectual talents by the *ruling few* conduce to the welfare or interest of the *subject many*, so long as in the bosoms of the *ruling few* dishonesty existed, instead of appropriate honesty†?

* See Table of Springs of Action, by the Author.

† In respect of general utility and propriety, behold what were the sentiments of *Sir William Jones* on the subject of virtual universality of suffrage. From the authorities to which he refers, judge whether, in the best of those old times, such was not the ancient usage. Behold, moreover, how frivolous were the pretences on which were grounded the still existing exclusions made in the time of Henry VI.

Works of Sir William Jones, by Lord Teignmouth, vol. viii. p. 507.—“Speech on the Reformation of Parliament, anno 1782, May 28th.”—Speaking of the feudal system, “Narrow and base,” (he says) “as it was, and confined exclusively to landed property*, it admitted the *lowest freeholders* to the due enjoyment of that inestimable right, without which it is a banter to call a man *free*, the right of voting in the choice of deputies to assist in making those laws, which may affect not his property only, but his life, and, what is dearer, his liberty; and which are not laws, but tyrannous ordinances, if imposed on him without his suffrage, given in person or by deputation. This I conceive to have been the right of every freeholder, even by the feudal polity, from the earliest time; and the statute of Henry IV. I believe to have been merely declaratory. An act, which passed in the seventh year of that prince, near four hundred years ago, ordains that, ‘all they who are present at the county court, as well suitors *duly summoned* for the same cause, as others, shall proceed to the election of their knights for the parliament.’ All suitors, you see, had the right, and all freeholders were suitors in the court, however low the value of their

* Reasons for doubting this limit will be seen further on.

Are we to behold in general security, against misrule, the *only use and advantage* resulting to the community from the utmost extent, which (sub-

“ freeholds. Observe all along, that *one* pound in those days was equal to *ten* at least in the present time*. Here then is a plain declaration, that minuteness of *real* property created no harsh suspicion of a dependant mind, for a harsh suspicion it is, and, by proving too much, proves nothing.” Thus far *Sir William Jones*. Behold now the words of the statute, 7 H. IV. c. 15. After reciting the grievous complaint of the Commons (in the French original *Communauté*) of the undue Election of the Knights of Counties . . . sometimes made of affection of the Sheriffs, and otherwise against the form of the Writs, to the great slander of the Counties, and hindrance of the business of the Commonalty in [of] the said county, it enacts that, at the County Court, after proclamation, “ *all they that be there present*, as well suitors duly summoned as *others*, shall attend to the Election of the Knights for the Parliament, and then in the full County [Court] they shall proceed to the Election, freely and indifferently, notwithstanding any request or commandment to the contrary.”

And, a little after, it adds :—And in the Writs of the Parliament to be made hereafter, this clause shall be put :—“ Et Electione tuam in pleno comitatu tuo factam distincte et aperte sub sigillo tuo et *sigillis eorum qui electioni illi interfuerint* nobis in Cancellaria nostra ad diem et locum in brevi content, certifies indilate :” which is literally translated :—And your election in a full County Court, made distinctly and openly, under thy seal, and the seals of those who shall have taken part in that election, to us in our chancery, at the day and place in the writ contained, certify without delay. Note, that, without any distinction made, what is here required is—that the seals to be affixed shall be the seals of *all those who shall have taken part* in the Election. Suppose *villeins* (composing no inconsiderable part of the population) to be out of the question, who were the persons thus admitted to the exercise of this franchise? Who but all who were not villeins? With the exception of a class of persons happily no longer in existence, if this be not virtually universal suffrage—suffrage more extensive than in the case of the “householders,” by *Charles Fox* and *Mr. Grey* (as will soon be seen) proposed to be admitted by the said *Mr. Grey*, as *Earl Grey*, proposed not to be admitted—what else can be?

But were *villeins*, after all, really excluded? Look to the words, clearly not. Who were the persons by whom the Elections were to be made? Suitors summoned as such, and they alone? No: but “*all they that be there present*.” Well but (says somebody) in the state of villeinage, no *villein* could be said to have any will of his own. So much for surmise. But now as to the fact. Eight-and-twenty years before the time in question, viz. anno 1377, was passed the statute, 1 R. II. of which c. 6, a chapter of considerable length, is in the old French, and, in the *vulgate* edition, not translated. From this statute it appears, that already, even at that time, villeinage was a condition very different from slavery. *Rent* did they pay: and though, instead of money, it was in the shape of *services*, yet these services were certain. In this statute, what is assumed as a general fact is, that they were able to pay a *fine* to the *King*, besides making *satisfaction* to their *Lords*. The main offence imputed to them is, obtaining liberation from those services by forged deeds.

The existing *Copyholders* are the posterity of the ancient *Villeins*. The *Villeins* were, the *Copyholders* are, *Tenants*. So were they and are they styled, by *copy of Court Roll*. Deriving from the Records of the Court the title to the lands they occupied, what can be more natural, than that to *that* same Court they should lie under an *obligation*, under which it included the *liberty*, of access and resort to it. But supposing any of them *present* at any such Court, how is it possible that they should not have been included in the assemblage designated as above by the word “*others*?”

Presently, in the “*excessive*” multitude of the persons resorting to those Courts, we shall see a *fact*, and the *only fact*, employed in another reign, twenty-five years afterwards, as a pretence for limiting in those same Courts, the right of voting to those who possessed, in *freehold*, an estate equal in value to 40*l.* a year, money of present time. But, unless *Copyholders* be supposed, even at *that* time, to have made a part of it, where shall we find matter enough out of which to compose any such *excessive* multitude?

True it is, *Blackstone* (see his “*Considerations on the Question concerning Copyholders*,” &c. London, 1758, p. 7) applies a limitation to the import of the word *other* (it should be, the French is, *autres*, *others*), confining it to suitors. For this surmise, however, he gives no ground; nor of any such or other limitation can I find any intimation given, by any word or words of the statute. “*Communauté du dit Countee*,” says the old French. “*Omnes illi qui electioni illi interfuerint*,” says the Latin inclosed in it.

So much for the strong and prosperous reign of Henry the Fourth, in which virtually universal suffrage was then established. Comes now the weak and disastrous reign of his idiot grandson, under which, under the sort of pretences that will be seen, it was curtailed.

Statute 8 H. VI. c. 7.—“What sort of men shall be chosen, and who shall be chosen Knights of the Parliament.” Follows the *vulgate* translation: the original, which is in the old French, would fill up too much room here. I have by examination assured myself of the correctness of the translation, except as here corrected.

“Item, Whereas, the Elections of Knights of Shires to come to the Parliaments of our Lord the King, in many Counties of the realm of England, have now of late been made by

* If so, then to twenty at this present time, anno 1817.

ject to the necessary exclusions) can be given to the right of suffrage?

Answer. The *main* use and advantage, but assuredly not the only one.

"very great, outrageous, and excessive number of people dwelling within the same Counties of the realm of England, of the which, most part was of People of *small substance*, and" [or] "of no value, [i. e. worth] whereof every one [of them] pretended a voice equivalent, as to such Elections to be made, with the most worthy Knights and Esquires dwelling within the same Counties, whereby Manslaughters, Riots, Batteries, and Divisions among the gentlemen and other people of the same Counties, shall *very likely* rise and be, unless convenient and due Remedy be provided in this Behalf. (2.) Our Lord the King, considering the Premises, hath provided, ordained, and established, by authority of this present Parliament, That the Knights of the Shires, to be chosen within the said realm of England, to come to the Parliaments of our Lord the King, hereafter to be holden, shall be chosen in every county of the realm of England, by *people dwelling and resident in the same Counties*, whereof every one of them shall have *free Land or Tenement* to the value of Forty Shillings by the year at the least, above all charges."

Now as to the *grounds* of this limiting the right of suffrage.—First, as to any supposed deficiency of knowledge. Among those who, in the shape of landed property, had *not* so much as 40s. a year of that day, (going as far as 40*l.* money of the present day), the number of those who were able to *read*, was probably small; how much larger among those who *had* their 40s. and more? Probably very little. As for the "Knights and Esquires," some few of them not improbably were in those days able to *read*; but by not one of them was any book to be found from which any information, tending to the increase of knowledge, could be obtained.

Second:—as to *freedom of suffrage*, "Manslaughters," &c. (see extract) What? at that time, in any one instance, had any of these mischiefs really taken place? No: no such thing is so much as pretended. What, then? Oh, they *will very likely* take place, unless due remedy be provided. Aristocracy this—all over. But was ever pretence more plainly groundless?—By the alteration of the value of money, the efficiency of the aristocratical principle has, in *this* part of Election, though no thanks to Parliament, been somewhat diminished, and the extent of the right of suffrage somewhat increased. But, such, as will be seen, has been the influence of other causes, that from this extension no real advantage has resulted. See what in a following section will be said on the subject of *vote-compelling and competition-excluding terrorism*.

On the ground of general utility and propriety, behold the sentiments of Charles Fox.—Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, p. 331.—"There is one position in which we shall all agree, that man has a right to be well governed. Now it is obvious, that no people can be satisfied with a government from the constituent parts of which they are excluded."

In regard to *universal suffrage*, even under that unlimited name, we shall find him acceding to it and advocating it upon principle; refuting it in no other wise than upon the ground of a supposed matter of fact, in relation to which it has been seen, and will further be seen, the truth is exactly opposite. Not adverting to the effect of *secrecy of suffrage*, the notion on which he here grounds himself is, that in the case of *non-housekeepers* in general, freedom of suffrage is not to be looked for.

Before the above passage, behold what he says in p. 327.—"My opinion is, that the best plan of representation is that which shall bring into activity the greatest number of independent voters:" thereupon immediately he goes on and says, "and that that is defective which would bring forth those whose situation and condition takes from them the power of deliberation." In this I heartily concur with him: but in the next section it will be seen to what this observation leads; an observation by which it may be seen (ib. p. 326) he was led to the disapprobation of giving any *extension* to the system of County Representation.

A little earlier in the same page, "I have always" (says he) "deprecatd universal suffrage, not so much on account of the *confusion* to which it would lead, but because I think that we should in reality lose the very object we desire to obtain:—it would in its nature embarrass and prevent the deliberative voice of the country from being heard." Thus far Charles Fox—meaning by reason of the supposed want of freedom. As to *confusion*, upon any thing like the plan here proposed, all danger of this sort will be seen to be most completely excluded. Charles Fox sat for Westminster. In the Westminster Election what confusion do we see? Yet in the Westminster election, there remain causes of confusion in abundance, all which would, in the plan in question, be completely excluded.

So much as to what might be and would be. But now, look at what actually has been. Anno 1807, Sir Francis Burdett was, for the first time, elected successor to Charles Fox. Since then, near ten years have elapsed, and in all that time no more *confusion* than if Westminster had been a pocket borough. See the History of the Westminster Representation from that time, in Hone's Reformist's Register, No. 3. A most interesting picture of the state of purity and good order, into which Election proceedings not only *may be* brought, but *have been* brought, and have already for ten years been continued, under a degree of extension so little short of universal suffrage.

In the same sentiments, both as to the general principle and the ill-grounded reason for putting it aside, already had he spoken, and even still more explicitly, in the year 1793.

Almon's Parl. Register, anno 1793, p. 497. "His" (Fox's) "objection to universal suf-

Another is the extent given to the *pleasure* of power*, derivable from the exercise of it. By the first English Monarch of Stuart race, the pleasure of scratching where it itches was pronounced too great a pleasure for a subject. On the same principle, in the eyes of many an aristocrat of the present day, so will the pleasure, attached to the exercise of a power, so furiously and indignantly grasped by the monopolizing hand.—Yes: in the eyes of the aristocrat. But will it be so in the eyes of a lover of his country, or of a lover of mankind?

The just and proper extent which ought to be given to the right of suffrage, is now to be considered; and therefore it is necessary to establish the principle, which should justify the excluding any persons from this right.

The supreme principle that ought constantly to be borne in mind, is, that all interests should be comprehended and advanced: this is the foundation of the right of universal suffrage. But if it be sufficiently clear that any class of persons neither are nor can be in such a state of mind as to possess the intellectual fitness necessary to exercise the right of suffrage with advantage, then such a class may be excluded without injury to any thing useful in the principle of comprehending all interests.

Take now a few examples:—

I. Minors.—This is a vast class of persons, who may justly be excluded from the right of suffrage without injuring the principle of comprehending all interests.

It is evident in forming a limit to this class, that the exclusion is temporary, not like others permanent, and that its utmost duration is certain.

The age most proper to be fixed upon is a subject worthy of consideration; but no space can be spared for that purpose here. In regard to the sole management of private concerns at large, the right commences at the age of twenty-one by the English laws: but at a much earlier age commences the right of making a last will; and, what most particularly applies to the present question, the right of choosing a guardian; and hence it seems rational to conclude, that if the age of twenty-one be not too young to exercise the *entire* right of choosing a private guardian, it cannot be too young for exercising a very small *fraction* of the right of choosing a public one.

II. Females.—This sex, in which half of the species is contained, is usually passed over without notice; an omission which, under a Mahometan government, would be more consistent than under a Christian one.

If the great leading considerations and surest guides to just decision, namely, the principle of comprehending all interests, and the possession of the requisite honesty and requisite intellectual abilities do not apply with propriety to both sexes, it does not seem easy to say with what propriety they can be applicable to either.

“frage, was not distrust of the decision of the majority, but because there was no practical mode of collecting such suffrage; and that by attempting it, what from the operation of hope on some, fear on others, and all the sinister means of influence, that would so certainly be exerted, fewer individual opinions would be collected than by an appeal to a limited number. Therefore, holding fast to the right of the majority to decide, and to the natural rights of man, as taught by the French, but much abused by their practice, he would resist universal suffrage.”

At that same time, *Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*, though he did not approve of universal suffrage *absolutely*, yet approved of it, and of annual Parliaments also, *in comparison* of the existing system.

Woodfall's Debates, anno 1793, p. 383.—“He” (*Mr. Grey*) “did not approve of the Duke of Richmond's plan of Reform, though he thought it better than the present system.”—The Duke of Richmond's plan? Well, what was it? Suffrage universal, Parliaments annual; but without *secrecy*, and thence without *liberty* of suffrage.

* For the place of *this* pleasure in the list of pleasures, see *Springs of Action Table*, published at the same time with the present tract.

In regard to the principle of comprehending all interests—in order that that principle might be properly applied, it would be necessary to take a survey of the laws on this point, with reference to the two sexes.

A sort of preliminary question is likely to be put here:—for argument sake suppose, that in this part of the law due justice has not hitherto been done to the weaker sex, can there be any expectation, that in the formation of a plan of suffrage, better justice will be done? The answer is, that there seems no sufficient reason why justice should be despaired of; for, upon the spur of the occasion, even against the general bent of permanent interest, such sacrifices are sometimes made, as under the permanent, habitual, and tranquil operation of particular interest are never made.

In regard to the possession of the requisite intellectual abilities, by no man but John Knox has physical weakness been urged as an objection to vesting political power in the softer sex, even in the case of monarchy, the single possession of supreme power. And in the instance of the East India Directory, no man ever objected to the electoral function being exercised by the female sex*.

Thus, though in these several instances the propriety of vesting power in the female sex was confessedly established, yet in the case of democratic election, no such opinion has obtained, and any attempt towards giving a decided opinion on the subject would be altogether premature in this place. It may be asked what is the use, then, of these observations?—I answer, the use, at least the design, is to shew in what way so important a subject can be treated in respect to principle. It is left to the reader to determine, which is the most proper manner of treating the subject; the manner of which an example is just given, or that which consists in a horse laugh, a sneer, an expression of scorn, or a common place witticism†.

* In the county of York, if my information be correct, may be found a Borough, to which belong two seats, in which the Electoral function is virtually performed by a single person of the female sex.

† Woodfall's Reports, 1797, p. 327.—*Charles Fox*.—"I hope gentlemen will not smile if I endeavour"—After saying as above, he adds, "My opinion is, that the best plan of representation is that which shall bring into activity the greatest number of independent voters, and that that is defective which would bring forth those whose situation and condition takes from them power of deliberation. I can have no conception of that being a good plan of Election, which should enable individuals to bring regiments to the poll. I hope gentlemen will not smile if I endeavour to illustrate my position by referring to the example of the other sex. In all the theories and projects of the most absurd speculation, it has never been suggested that it would be advisable to extend the elective suffrage to the female sex; and yet, justly respecting, as we must do, the mental powers, the acquirements, the discrimination, and the talents of the women of England, in the present improved state of society; knowing the opportunities which they have for acquiring knowledge; that they have interests as dear and as important as our own; it must be the genuine feeling of every gentleman who hears me, that all the superior classes of the female sex of England must be more capable of exercising the elective suffrage with deliberation and propriety, than the uninformed individuals of the lowest class of men, to whom the advocates of universal suffrage would extend to it; and yet, why has it never been imagined that the right of election should be extended to women? Why, but because of the *law of Nations**, and perhaps† also by the *law of nature*‡, that sex is dependant upon ours; and because, therefore, their voices would be governed by the relation in which they stand in society. Therefore it is, Sir, that with the exception of companies, in which the right of voting merely affects property, it has never been in the contemplation of the most absurd theorists to extend the elective franchise to the sex."

* A law which has no existence.

† *Perhaps*. A peremptory exclusion, by which one half of the species is excluded from that security for a regard to their interests, which in the case of the other half is pronounced indisputable. Ground of this exclusion—or at least a principal part of that ground, a *perhaps*!

‡ *Law of Nature*—another non-entity. A too common phrase: in the present instance, *quere* what is at the bottom of it?

III. Soldiers and Sailors.—If these classes must be mentioned here, it can scarcely be for any other purpose than to shew that they have not been forgotten. All those who are out on foreign service are excluded by physical obstacles from participating in the exercise of this franchise; those, therefore, whom physical obstacles do not exclude, need the less repine, should the necessity arise of excluding them by legal ones. *Individually* considered, no tenable objection could surely be opposed to the suffrage of any individual of so extensive and meritorious a class of public servants. But, collected in a mass, under the command of C——r General and Co. they might, in any part of the country, or in many parts of the country at once, be set a rolling like an *avalanche*, overwhelming as they rolled the settled population of many electoral districts. Here is a mischief—but a mischief to which a few obvious regulations would oppose an effectual bar.

To the above perfectly obvious grounds of exclusion, add, for consideration, this one more, which will perhaps be found not quite so obvious.

IV. Non-readers, persons unable to read. The principle of excluding from the right of suffrage all persons who cannot read, is not at variance with the principle of comprehending all interests; the duration of the exclusion is not only temporary, but it may also be greatly shortened by the exertion of the individual excluded, while it offers a reward as an incentive to those exertions. The proof of the excluded individual's having gained for himself the right of suffrage, might be publicly reading the law by which the *elections* in this supposed reformed state of things shall have been regulated.

For the moral and intellectual effects flowing from such an institution, inquire of the *National Society*; inquire of any body except those whose undissembled wish has been to keep us of the swinish multitude for ever in our state of swine.

All the classes, for the reasons given, *necessarily* excluded from the right of voting, have been now stated. But there is a swarm of other classes that might be proposed for exclusion, on the ground of a deficiency in those constituent parts, of the fitness requisite for exercising the right of suffrage, namely, the requisite honesty and intellectual abilities: these classes are *foreigners* in amity, *foreigners* in *enmity* but at large, *outlaws*, *convicts*, *vagrants*, *insolvents*, *bankrupts*, *lunatics*, &c. But there is a principle which I will call the simplifying principle, or the principle of simplicity, which renders their being excluded unnecessary.

O rare *Simplicity*!—Hand-maid of *beauty*, wisdom, virtue, and of every thing that is excellent—Simplicity! though but a *negative* good, is not the less *a good*, applied to every subject to which it can be applied without overbalancing inconvenience. The principle of simplicity may, without scruple, be applied to the exclusion of *sensible*, the only real, evils, when the only evils that can result from the application are comparatively *insensible*.

The principle thus stated, the application follows:—Even at the place of Election, and much more so in any Court of Appeal constituted for the purpose, every investigation of the question, whether any particular persons do, or do not belong to the classes here supposed to be excluded, would be necessarily attended with the mischiefs of delay, vexation and expense, with which evils all legal proceedings are liable to be infested: now these are all real and acutely sensible evils. But this *right*, which, however important, when taken individually, is to all really effective purposes, such as the establishment of laws and the execution of measures of administration, but the *fraction of a fraction*; suppose then, that by all the objected classes, taken

together, no sensible change for the worse can ever, in all human probability, be made in the conduct of public affairs, the consequence is, that any supposed inconvenience is theoretical merely, and not practical.

Apply the *simplifying* principle, thus explained, to the question between the extent marked by the word *householders*, and the extent here marked out by the words *virtually universal suffrage*. In the *Plan* itself, in which the attention was confined to householders, there is an expedient, having for its object to increase simplicity as much as possible, and diminish the yoke of inconvenience, composed of delay, vexation, and expense, which unavoidably in a certain proportion, and designedly in a much greater proportion, has been made to press upon many sorts of *public* proceedings, but most intolerably of all upon almost all *judicial* proceedings.

Look at what is said in *Mr. Cobbett's* Letter on this subject to *Earl Grosvenor* (*Cobbett's Register*, Feb. 22, 1817), and in respect of simplicity, and its consequences as above explained, judge whether, compared with the *householder* plan, even with the benefit of the above-mentioned means of simplifying, the *virtually universal plan* has not the advantage.

In this same view, note a precaution regarding relative *time*. Let the evidence on which a claimant's title to the franchise is provisionally to be allowed, be not of the *oral*, but as proposed in the *Plan* of the *written* kind, suppose *a card* or *ticket* penned, authenticated, and allowed, at a time previous to the Election. By this means all discussion is excluded from that *time*; and to each voter the operation of voting may, as in the case of *holding up of hands*, be instantaneous. *Forgery* and fraudulent *personating* are the only means of deceit left; and since by small numbers no promise of effect would be afforded while among large numbers, the larger the number the fuller assurance of detection, there is no probability that any sensible evil should be produced.

CHAP. VIII.

The Safety of Virtual Universality of Suffrage.

The following observations on the dangerousness *imputed* to universal suffrage, have been compressed to the degree demanded by want of room and time.

The objection constantly made to universal suffrage is, that it would produce universal hostility and anarchy. This is at once denied;—it is denied that universal suffrage would cause the smallest approach to these evils. It shall be shewn why not.

It is asked, hostility against what object, and under what provocation? Alas! in the *present* state of things, provocation is but too abundant; in a *reformed* state of things there would be absolutely none. Instead of provocation, there would be its exact opposite. Instead of old provocation, there would be fresh, and never before experienced, beneficence. Where should provocation find its object? Not surely in a branch of government, now for the first time, at the instance of the people themselves, repaired and improved for their benefit, and then placed in their own hands.

If there were mischievous activity, on what occasion or in what shape should it exert itself? What is the sort of *power* which the people would be called upon to exercise? Is it, as in *legislation*, direct, imperative, and coercive *power*? No, but a mere exercise of the unimperative power of deputation, an exercise performed under the veil of the most tranquil and silent, and absolutely impenetrable secrecy, performed by a mere turn of the hand, and begun and ended in the same moment by each individual; a

power which is but the fraction of a fraction, the power of making one of a vast multitude*, majority of which must join, ere they can seat so much as one man in an assembly†, with whom another large majority must join, and with that large majority, the majority of another assembly‡, ere he can give effect to any power by which *command* is issued, and *obedience* produced.

But, suppose a considerable number of the people should be inclined to effect mischief, what sort of prospect could they entertain of effecting this purpose. No individual could expect to have the least part in it; if the supposed mischief were accomplished, it must be by the majority of a set§ of persons all different from the Electors, and the whole of this majority must consist of individuals bent upon the execution of this same pernicious measure: and what could this majority expect to gain by it?

No! when mischief has been aimed at and perpetrated by the passions of the multitude, it has never been aimed at by any such deep laid schemes as this.

No! it is not the dangerousness and mischievousness, it is in the safety and beneficence of this and the other principles of reform, that the opposition made by the *ruling few*, has its real ground. Not the *want* of pure and instructive light in the political world, but the *abundance* of it is the true object of their fears. If the *increase* of light were any part of their object, it is no secret to them how to compass that. In regard to *intellectual* talents, what is the real, the everlasting fear? Lest it be deficient? No: but lest it be abundant. Yes: by *religion*, to delude the people with false and *political* lights in politics; to keep them plunged in the thickest darkness;—uch is the policy of “*great characters*” in their “*high situation*,” such it is ever destined to be the policy of the ruling few, when vouchsafing to determine the lot of the *swinish multitude*.

The manner too, if the instruction by which the exercise of this right would be preceded in the reformed state of things, compared with the present, is worth notice.

It would not be as now, by loud and impassioned harangues; nor by thronging, which, if not actually tumultuous, is always pretended, and always wished to be so, by the incessantly increasing tyranny.

No, not by these means, but by a course of *writing*, on the part of those to be elected, and of *reading* on the part of the electors.

Yes:—*the pen* is the true means for administering sound, dispassionate, and undelusive information: *the eye*, in the *stillness* and *leisure* of the closet, applied to the *silent paper*, is the true organ for the reception of the matchless blessing. *Lips* on the one part, *ears* on the other part; these are the so imperfectly adapted, the only originally employable organs; fugitive, questionable, and delusive is the only information capable of being communicated and received by such organs—the sole and imperfect resource of immature, unlettered, and unenlightened times||.

Now look to speechifying and writing, and the comparative beneficialness and innoxiousness of the sort of information to be expected from the two sources.

* The whole number of the voters in each electoral district.

† Namely, the House of Commons.

‡ Namely, the House of Lords.

§ Namely, the two Houses of Parliament.

|| I observe this topic just now mentioned by *Mr. Cobbett*, as having been frequently worked by himself; and if so, doubtless with that force and acuteness which might be expected at his hands, as well as with that copiousness and diffuseness which is so well adapted to the situation of the bulk of those among whom he has to look for readers.

By speeches, many an assembly has been driven into precipitate and mischievous resolves; by writings much fewer, not to say none. By speeches, followed on the spot by resolutions taken on the spot, falsehoods are asserted, and means of detection excluded; in writings, scarce can falsehood be brought forward on one side, but there will be time for detecting and refuting it on the other; by speeches, imagination is fascinated, excessive passion excited, time for comprehensive conception and cool judgment denied. By *writing*, no advantage, in any of these ways, can be gained by one side to the injury of another. When tongues and ears are the organs of converse in an assembly, met under the notion of *hearing speeches*, by its own clamour (that is, by the clamour of a few impatient tongues on both sides of the question, or, what is much worse, on one side only), may not only all *documents*, but all *argument* be excluded; whereas, in so far as *pens* and *eyes* are the organs, by no power but that of a tyrant—of a tyrant about the throne, or on a bench, can any be deprived of the knowledge of whatsoever *has* been said, or *can* be said, on both sides.

Thus, not only in the first instance, but so long as the subject continued to be viewed at a distance, it is not strange, that the vastness of the idea, produced by the combination of *annual elections* with *universal suffrage*, should at first bewilder conception and keep fear excited;—the strange thing would rather be, if the case were otherwise*.

* Such, in my view, it cannot fail to be: for in *this state* was my own mind for a long course of years. The object a dark, and thence a hideous phantom, until, excited by severe and external pressure, the light of *reason* was brought to bear upon it. In the *Plan* itself may be seen, that, in 1809, fearful of going further, and embracing the occasion of finding, in the judgment of others, an outward support, I was not only content, but glad, to stop at *householders*; taking at the same time for conclusive evidence of *householdership*, the fact of having paid *direct taxes*. But, the more frequently my mind has returned itself upon the subject, the more close the application made to it, the more minute the anxiety with which every niche and cranny has been pryed into, the stronger has been the persuasion produced, that, even from an extent as unbounded as that which would have been given to the principle by the vigorous, laborious, and experienced mind of the Duke of Richmond (provided that freedom should be secured by secrecy) no mischief, no danger, such as that which is denoted by the words *anarchy* or *equalization*, i. e. *destruction* of property, would ensue: in a word, not the smallest deduction from any rights, but those which are universally acknowledged to be mere *trust-rights*—rights, the exercise of which ought not to be directed to the advancement of the separate interests of him to whom they are intrusted, but of the universal interest.

On the other hand, as I was satisfied that though many exclusions were made, and therefore the extent of the right of suffrage much diminished, still no very injurious deduction would be made from the beneficent influence of the principle of comprehending all interests; and convinced that every extension gained would smooth the way to a still further extension, with little regret I found that I could agree to the extent of suffrage bounded by householders, or payers of direct taxes.

I would agree with all my heart that Representation should be co-extensive with taxation. I should not apprehend from it danger either to persons or property; for, under a different name, what would it be but the Duke of Richmond's universal suffrage? But the defect is in the principle, that taxation should give the elective franchise. This is a principle supported only by imagination; a principle that looks neither to universal interest, nor interest in any extent; it makes no appeal to human feelings; it has no regard either to general utility or utility in any extent; it is a principle deaf and inflexible; in its temper it is a principle of despotism, though it may be applied to purposes directly opposite.

To which object shall we look for the cause of the horror and terror with which so many uncorrupted breasts are filled by the words *universal suffrage* and *annual elections*? Shall it not be to the weakness—alas! the too natural and universal weakness—of yielding too readily to first impressions? Of giving the reins to *imagination*, and to that *love of ease*, which spares itself the labour necessary to close inspection, and careful and comprehensive analysis? Yes; in the combination of all these co-operating causes may be found power but too sufficient for the production of these and so many other undesirable effects.

In my own instance, I well remember the time when the principle of *universal suffrage*, however modified, presented itself to me as being in a general view inadmissible. Yes; but *what* time? Any time after that attentive consideration and scrutiny, which the importance of the question now so imperiously calls for? No: it was a time at which no *purposed* attention had ever been directed to the subject. No; the closer the attention bestowed, the

Note here a little operation, which may be performed by any body who has leisure. Turn to the *History of Boroughs*: pick out the most open ones: those in which the right has the extent marked by the word *householders*, or by the word *pot-wobblers*; go back, as far as recollection about individual character can carry you—say, to the commencement of the present reign. Under the head of each such Borough, look over the list of the *Representatives*, who, from that time to this have sat for it; this done, then you may pronounce, whether, when compared with seats, filled in the mode most generally approved, viz. the *County Seats*, any marked deficiency be to be found, in respect of any one of the three *elements of appropriate aptitude*, as divided into its never-to-be-forgotten three branches, viz. appropriate *probity*, appropriate *intellectual aptitude*, and appropriate *active talent*.*

firmer has all along been my conviction—on the one hand of the safeness of the principle, taken in the utmost extent, and on the other hand, of the ease and consistency with which, for the sake of *union and concord*, many exclusions might be made, at any rate for a time and for the sake of quiet and gradual experience.

As to the influence of understanding, the only beneficent, the only endurable influence—my own persuasion is, that under the most unbounded universality of suffrage, the influence of *aristocracy*, instead of being annihilated, would still be too great: too great not to give admission to many an idle and comparatively unfurnished, to the exclusion of a laborious and better furnished, mind.

As far as I have been able to collect, the whole stream of experience runs that way.

In illustration of this position, one particular incident, in my own remembrance, has just been confirmed by cotemporary recollections. In the days of *Wilkes and Liberty!* among Wilkes's supporters—and, indeed, for activity and extent of influence, at the head of them—was Churchill, the *Apothecary*, brother to Poet Churchill. The Election time approaching, and Wilkes himself, being, by some incident, put out of the question, Apothecary Churchill was proposed. *An Apothecary Member for Middlesex!* By a loud and general clamour to this effect, the proposition was immediately crushed. Yet, besides extraordinary personal popularity, this Apothecary was of the number of those who kept their coaches.

As to *Apothecaryship and Gentlemanship*, for my own part, if, of two Candidates, knowing nothing of either, but that one was an *Apothecary*, and the other a *Gentleman* of 10,000*l.* a year, the question were to be asked of me, *for which will you give your vote?* my answer would be at once—the *Apothecary*, the *Apothecary for me!*—Why? Because I should be sure of finding in the mind of the *Apothecary*, knowledge and talents of the kind and quantity suiting to the exigencies of that useful and respectable profession, including the branches of art and science that belong to it. And I should expect, that the already acquired stock of *general* knowledge and talents, necessarily gained in the acquirement of the *particular* knowledge and talents required by his profession, would be capable of being transferred and applied to the newly adopted branch of industry—namely, Legislation.

Thus much for the *Apothecary*. Now as to the *Gentleman*. This Gentleman, with his ten thousand a year, having been bred up in the expectation of it, on what assignable ground could I build any equal expectation of his possessing the requisite knowledge and talents, in any tolerable degree, in any shape—at any rate in any shape in which it would possess a tolerable chance of being *transferred* to this purpose? Knowledge and talents, to whatever subject applied, are the fruit of *labour*, and are not to be had *without* labour. How then should he have come by it? By the force of what *motives* shall the pain attached to the labour have been overcome?

* Mr. Bentham has a style of his own, which, though strong, expressive, and exact, may not always, at first sight, be quite intelligible to many readers. The peculiarity of his language frequently consists in the use of uncommon, and new, and, therefore, sometimes unintelligible words. It has been, consequently, a principal object with the Editor, to express the meaning of the author by substituting more common words.

But, in some cases, there are peculiar words and phrases used by the author which cannot be changed without weakening the force and distinctness of the expression. This is particularly the case in the words and phrases in the text which have occasioned this note. To have altered them would have been to have done an injury to the author; to have left them altogether unnoticed would have been to have offended many readers. In this dilemma, the Editor thought it preferable to leave them untouched in the text, but to give an explanation of them in a note. In the Catechism, or plan of Parliamentary Reform, which follows the introduction, will be found a particular definition of the words and phrases in question, to which the reader is referred for full satisfaction; but the manner of publishing this work in numbers requires that some explanation should be given now, and the reader is requested to accept the following:—

If, in the *writs* which should be sent for the purpose of holding elections for Members of Parliament, the electors were directed to choose *fit and proper persons* to represent, &c. the

Aptitude? Elements? (cries a voice from Bond Street) *d—— you and your three elements!* No, no; *Property! Property!* *that's our sort!* *that's the only element we know of—worth all your's, and a hundred such put together.*

Oh, no, d——e! (cries another from a *four-in-hand*, interrupting himself, while in the *establishment of a row*)—*Oh no, you've forgot one, and that's blood, d——e: look there,* (pointing to the horse's shoulder) *look there, there you have it, d——e.* To be sure, to sit comfortably, a man should have both—no doubt of that; but where one fails, t'other must serve instead of it. After all, *blood's our surest card; vingt-un runs off with property now and then—blood, it can't run off with: that sticks by us.* Come, if you must have three elements, here's an amendment for you—*Blood, Property, Connexion; these are our three elements. Blood and Property in ourselves; Connexion in the good fellow we put in to think and speak for us.* There now, you old fellow! *off with your three elements—off with them to UTOPIA, 'twas there you got'em from, d——e!*

Well, good gentlemen, look over the list I am speaking about; look it well over—look at the *seats* and at the *sitting-parts* by whom they have been filled—look at them well—and as little will you find any deficiency of your own *legitimate* elements—man and horse elements together—as of my *swinish* ones.

Look to the most populous of all populous Cities, look to Westminster! Number of Electors, even many years back, not fewer than 17,000: not all of them, indeed, swine—the Dean and Chapter being of the number—not to speak of Right Honourables and Honourables;—swine's flesh, however, abundantly predominant; swinish the character of the vast majority of that vast multitude.

Well, then, look to Westminster; look first to present time, see now what you have there. See you not Lord Cochrane? What do you see there? See you not blood and property in one?—blood from ancestors—property from the most prized source—the source from whence all your oldest property sprung—enemies blood, with plunder for the fruit of it? See you not Sir Francis Burdett?—have not you there blood enough and property enough? Look now a little back before you had either Cochrane or Burdett, had not you Charles Fox?—had you not him as long as the country had him?

Even within a short time, when a vacancy was apprehended, what sort of man was looked to for filling of it? Was it a man *of and from* the people? Was it *Cobbett* with his penmanship? His 60,000 purchasers, and his ten times 60,000 readers? Was it *Henry Hunt* with his oratory? Was it not *Cartwright*, of the *Cartwrights* of *Northamptonshire*? Was it not *Brougham*, of *Brougham*? And whether sitting for Westminster, or looked to for Westminster, the case of a man who had neither the *blood* element, nor the *property* element, remains still without example.

qualifications that would render these persons *fit and proper* for the particular office of Representative, would be equivalent to the *elements of appropriate aptitude*; these qualifications might be found to consist in *three* principal things, and these would be the *three* elements: then—

1. The qualification of resisting the *corruptive* influence of C——r-General and Co. would be the *element of appropriate probity*.

2. The qualification of judging correctly upon all questions which might be proposed in the House, would be the *element of appropriate intellectual aptitude*.

3. The qualification of public speaking necessary to enable a member to speak on questions and propose Bills, and of literary composition to prepare reports, &c. would be the *element of appropriate active talent*.—EDITOR.

Look at Bristol, the next most populous city : when a man was looked for who should, if possible, stem the tide of corruption—that tide which so naturally flows so strong in maritime and commercial cities—who is it that was looked for? Was it the Spa-Fields Orator?—Did he not try and fail there? Was it not Sir Samuel Romilly? And though the blood he had came from the wrong side of the channel, and with a something in it too nearly allied to *Puritanism* to be relished by *legitimacy*, yet blood, such as it was, there was in him—yes, and *property* too, to sanction it.

Look to the most populous among Boroughs—look to *Liverpool*. When the same pestilential tide was hoped to be stemmed at Liverpool, who did that great commercial port and borough call in to stem it? Was it the *Cobbett*? Was it the *Spa-Fields' Orator*? Here, too, was it not *Brougham*, of *Brougham*.

The propensity to look wide of the true mark—to look to and accept, in place of the only true and direct elements of appropriate aptitude, those deceptious ones, blood, property, and connexion, is not peculiar to the *English*, it is common to *human* nature.

Look to *Republican Rome*: to protect themselves against the aristocracy, the people obtained a single *Representative* whose title was, *Tribune of the People*; in the breast of this one individual was contained *their* Commons' House. Well, from what *cast* of men did they take this man, who to them was a *host*. From among themselves? Not they, indeed. From whence, then? Even from their very oppressors themselves—from the *Patricians*. Such was their choice for hundreds of years together.

Now, though I think, as Earl Grey did once, that *absolutely* Universal Suffrage “is preferable to the present system,” yet I advocate *virtually* Universal Suffrage, in preference to absolutely Universal Suffrage; and, in doing it, is not what I have given above something more than mere theory—is it not *practice and experience* to boot.

Oh, but, says somebody, *this which you call practice—this, in support of which you are calling in experience—this is not any universal-suffrage plan—this is not even your own virtually-universal-suffrage plan; this is but the householder plan.*

Yes, to be sure, in *name* it is but the *householder* plan; though where a *pot* constitutes a *house*, the right itself must be admitted to be a little more extensive. But, be that as it may, if what you insist on is, that in political arrangements nothing should ever be tried, but what in the self-same shape has been tried already, then on this part of the question my pen is stopped. But, upon this principle how could any government ever be carried on?

But will you, on your side, for the future (not to speak of the past) for the future, will you take up this principle steadily, and adhere to it to the last? Vast as it is, and poisonous as it is vast, will you so much as pledge yourselves to be content with your existing stock of *remedies*? With your acts for destroying all personal security—with your universal gagging acts—with your statutes for *destroying the liberty of the press*, and your judge-made-ex-post-facto laws*—with your acts for *destroying all the communication of the people*—with your acts for stopping up the ears of *soldiers*, and for engaging them in the character of informers, to embrue their hands in the blood of their brothers, their sisters, their fathers, and their mothers—with your decisions and orders and resolutions for rejecting petitions and extinguishing hope—with your resolves for *rejecting petitions unheard*, because *the press* had been employed *in aid of the pen* in giving

* Meaning the Common Law, for an exposure of the delusion, imposture, and mischief of which, see Bentham's book on Codification.

the circulation to the matter of them—with your *sham precedents* brought forward for a colour to such resolves so fatal to liberty.

Well, if you shrink at this, there still remains a possibility of your forbearing to insist here upon exact and formal likeness and of your listening to a likeness in principle.

But, if likeness of *principle* will satisfy you, so long as you admit the *householder* plan, how can you be at a loss for *principle* in support of virtually universal suffrage? Take the body of *householders*—take the body of *universal suffrage men*—apply to each of the two bodies the two tests of appropriate honesty and judgment: apply to them the test of *appropriate honesty*: have you a sufficiency of it in your *householders*? Well, then, on what grounds can you look for any want of such sufficiency in *my universal suffrage men*? Although the universality were *absolute*, instead of being, as here proposed, *virtual*, is it the interest of your *householders*, to possess, to retain, and acquire property? Well, then, how many will you find among my universal suffrage men who would fail in any respect of being partakers in that same interest? Apply to them next the test of *appropriate judgment*: are not your *householders* sufficiently sensible of the interest which they have in possessing, acquiring, and retaining property—that sole and indispensable source of subsistence? Then why should my *universal suffrage men* be less sensible to this matter of fact, to which no human being ever failed of being sensible?

In your eyes, and in comparison with your own, the whole property of each individual of the great majority of my universal suffrage men may be considered as nothing. But do you therefore think that in their eyes it is nothing? The ALL of any one man, how much less is it in his eye, than the ALL of any other man in his? When you have solved this problem, then, and not before, say that universal confusion and universal destruction of property, would be the results of universal suffrage.

It is true, that for its success, this reasoning requires that you should be in a proper state of mind to see and admit its force. Unfortunately, just at this moment, such of you as are honest, are in no such state. Spectres have stalked in and planted terror and confusion in your minds. *Cobbett*, in the character of *Apollyon*, the Destroyer—*Cobbett*, with a *universal levelling machine* in his hand—*Cobbett*, with the Spa-Fields Orator at his heels; these are your bugbears. The spirit of wisdom with which you are inspired proceeds from the contemplation of these hobgoblins.

Well, then, to give your theory its finish take up my universal suffrage men's members and plant them in the House of Commons. Chosen by the swinish multitude, behold them seated on the Treasury Bench; in any situation there is nothing they would not be ready to do, so long as they saw any thing they could get by it. Yes, of course they would. Yes; but, according to this theory of yours, they are to level all property, and, of course, by levelling it, destroy it. Now, by so doing, what could any of them get? Some property they have, each of them; he who has least, has many times the amount of the utmost that could be expected to be put into his pocket by the operation of the universal levelling machine.

Oh, but these men, even these, are not the worst. The worst to be sure they are that we as yet know of. But what you perhaps don't see, and we do see is—the mob which is still behind them. This mob, which would begin with pushing them on, do you think it would end there? Oh, no; no sooner were they seated, than after them it would be continually pouring in others that would be worse and worse. For, with the exception of us and ours, this is the way with all men. Their object—their constant object is to do, in every ima-

ginable shape, as much mischief as they can continually contrive to do:—Such is their end; and for their means and their instruments, how can they do otherwise than take up and employ, and be perpetually upon the look-out for the most mischievous agents that are to be found. Such being the constant study and endeavour of this mob of yours, that you and all that think with you want to set upon us and destroy us—what will be the consequence? The men, they will be finding out and pouring into the House, will be—each of them worse than every other—men, the least mischievous of whom will be mischievous enough to out-Hunt Hunt, and to out-Cobbett Cobbett.

In the theory of the *Legitimates and Aristocrats*, this scheme of universal mischief, and its consequence, universal destruction, is given, not merely as the probable, but as the certain effect of the universal suffrage plan.

Now, what sort of beings are to commence or accomplish this scheme? Surely, not human beings? No! they cannot be human beings, they must be a set of beings, such as no man ever saw; a set of beings, for undertaking such a scheme as this, as opposite to all known human beings as can possibly be conceived; they must act, not only without, but against the bent of all known motives; they cannot have the smallest spark of any such motive as *social interest*; they can have as little of any such motives as *self interest*; the motive on which the human species necessarily depends for its existence. But they are to set out on this career, bent upon the destruction of all property, and of all who derive support from it, beginning or ending with themselves.

In the words *wild* and *wildness* seems to be condensed the substance of all the *talk* (to call it *reason* or *argument* would be misrepresentation) by which universal suffrage has been opposed. *Wildness*? O, yes; and but too much of it. But where will it be found? In the *universal-suffrage* plan, with the practice and experience on which it is *grounded*, or in the *theory* with which, against all practice and experience, it has been *opposed*?

It is but too true, that in the present state of things, not *all*, nor even the *majority* of those who would have votes upon a system of virtual universal suffrage, possess means so sufficient as could be wished to inform and qualify themselves: the majority of them have not *means* so sufficient as could be wished, to inform themselves *correctly* what good government is, or what the value of it: the majority of them have not sufficient means of access to the *documents* on which the acquisition of this necessary knowledge depends: they have not any such sufficient means in any regular way to *read the newspapers*; many of them, nay even the majority of them, have not as yet so much as the requisite skill in the elementary art of *reading*.

True; but is it in these their deficiencies that we are to look for the consideration, or so much as any part of the consideration by which your anxiety, and your determination to exclude them from the right of suffrage, is produced? Alas! alas! no. There is not any one of these deficiencies that it would not be little less difficult to you actually to supply, than to will or wish to do so; there is not any one of them, which they could not supply without any assistance of yours; which they would not supply to themselves, of themselves, if left to themselves; which they could not supply to themselves, if, instead of aiding, your wishes and endeavours were not employed in the preventing them from receiving such supplies; there is not one of these same supplies that, in the American States, is not actually and abundantly received. Yes; and what is the fruit of the supply thus received? is it anarchy? No; but instead of it, the best government that is or ever has been; that, with which yours forms *so strong*, not to say *so complete a contrast*.

Look on this occasion, if by any means you can endure to look that way; look once more to the American United States. Behold there democracy; behold there pure representative democracy. And what mischief do you see there? In the American United States is there no property? Has it ever been destroyed since the establishment of independence? Has it ever been destroyed *there*, as it was *here*, in 1780, by your *Anti-Popery* mob; and (not to speak of *Luddites*, and so many other political), in 1793, by your Church of England *Anti-sectarian* mobs with orthodox and loyal Justices of the Peace to encourage them*? In any one of these commonwealths has so much as the slightest shock been ever given to it? All this while, ever since the auspicious day of their independence, has there ever been that day, in which the great body of the people, these supposed destroyers of all property and all government, have not had full swing? Has there ever been that day, on which, for the keeping of them quiet, any one of your remedies† has been applied, or so much as thought of? Yet has there ever been that day, in which the door of that immense country has not stood wide open to the *scum of the earth*, as you would call it? and amongst others to your own wild Irish; to those wild Irish, whom your misrule, and the fear of your *torture mongers*, have been driven into banishment.

Oh, but (says somebody), what they have in America, is not the universal-suffrage plan, it is more like the householder plan; only still less popular; it is actually the property plan.

True; it is not the *universal-suffrage* plan exactly; but in *principle*, look once more, and say once more, where, and in what consists the difference? There as well as here (in the case of counties) how small (even when largest) is the amount of income required from landed property, as the qualification of voting, in comparison with the smallest amount of what is necessary for the means of sustenance.

Well, but will you then give us the *householder* plan? will you give us the American plan? with either of those plans, we for our parts—I, for my part at least, should be contented.

After all, what need can there be for looking to any such distance? Is sufficiency of appropriate intellectual aptitude the question? Look at home. Once more look at home. Turn your eyes to Westminster. By the hand of Virtue, in that great metropolis of Reform, behold Democracy triumphant for these ten years past—though with the mass of Corruption, as it were a mill-stone, still overhanging and threatening—Westminster, a field of contention, on which, till that auspicious moment, Monarchy and Aristocracy, the everlastingly leagued, yet everlastingly bickering adversaries of good government, had, from the commencement of the dynasty, been tearing one another and the country to pieces—impoverishing one another—poisoning the morals of the people. Instead of this system of abuse, behold freedom of Election—perfect and unexampled freedom; and with it sobriety, temperance, tranquillity, security. And this under what system of representation? even under the Householder Plan; the same which *Mr. Grey* proposed, which *Earl Grey* is so much afraid of; the Householder plan—the almost equivalent of virtually universal suffrage‡.

No exaggeration here; nothing but simple truth. In proof, take the

* See Hutton's Life.

† See page 43 for part of the remedies.

‡ For the passages quoted, see Hone's Reformist's Register, February 15, 1817, No. 3. On reading them, a suspicion may possibly arise of their having been penned by the author of this tract. In respect of personal knowledge, the facts are all unknown to him; the picture here given of them was equally so, till several days after it was in print.

following facts : all of them notorious—all of them every where uncontrovertible*.

* I.—COMMENCEMENT.

Origin of the System of uncorruption and Free Election established in Westminster.

I. OBJECT proposed. INDUCEMENTS—"To return Sir Francis Burdett free from expense, or personal trouble, and without even making him a *candidate*: Sir Francis Burdett the only man who had the sense and the courage to fight the people's battle. He had proved himself a friend to very extended suffrage, and to ANNUAL PARLIAMENTS."

II. MANAGERS, *who they were*. "Few in number, of no political importance whatever, without influence*, even their names unknown to the Electors. The Electors, from the long disuse of the elective franchise, in the way in which alone it should ever be used, had no confidence in each other. Each man was indeed ready to do his duty, yet few reckoned upon the same disposition in their neighbours...."

III. MANAGERS, *their mode of canvassing*. Managers to the people—"We have undertaken your cause; the way is open—it is before you; do your duty. Electors may receive letters of thanks from the Candidates who are acting for THEMSELVES, but you will not expect to receive them from the Committee who are acting for you, and by your means."

IV. RESULT as to SUCCESS. "For Sir Francis Burdett, the object of their choice (himself not soliciting any man), single votes as many within seven as all the Candidates, four in number, had received among them; and nearly two-thirds of the whole number of Electors polled voted for him."

V. RESULT as to EXPENSE. "From the commencement of the Election to the close," sum total 780*l.* 14*s.* 4*d.* To the person thus chosen for *representative*, himself not so much as a *candidate*, not a farthing.

VI. RESULT as to MORALS. "No drunkenness—no rioting—no murders—no bludgeon-men—no sailors—no Irish chairmen—no obstruction at the place of polling—no hired voters—no false swearing—no puffing and lying in the newspapers—no assassin-like attempt to destroy reputation—no attempt to mislead:—to the people was the business left: nobly and effectually did they perform it."

VII. OPPOSITION *vanguished*: MEANS in vain employed by it: *Terrorism, Bribery, Falsehood—the Holy Triple Alliance—impotent*.—"Threats, promises, persuasions, calumny, misrepresentation; frauds of all kinds; letters written for those who could not refuse their signatures, to induce others to procure votes; licences threatened; tradesmen to have their customers taken away."—N.B. From what I know of the source from whence the information came, I should, upon occasion, feel assured of finding these general assertions made good by proof of individual facts.

II.—CONTINUANCE.

VIII. On the part of the managers, PERSEVERANCE: on the part of the system of uncorruption, PERMANENCE.

"It is now nearly ten years ago; and from that time to this the Electors of Westminster have kept their steady course, while Corruption has been obliged to hide its head, and to draw in its claws."

"The Electors of Westminster have, since that time, *re-elected* Sir Francis Burdett *once*, and Lord Cochrane *twice*, on the same excellent plan. They have had to contend *three times* in Courts of Law; they have held upwards of *thirty* public meetings, all at their own expense, all too at an expense scarcely exceeding 4,000*l.*"

In ten years, four thousand pounds—scarcely more, even with the drain from the Great Hall! But for the cramming of *Giants*, ever *refreshed*, still insatiate, to how much more moderate a sum would not that so astonishingly moderate sum have been reduced†?

IX. PRINCIPALITIES and POWERS contended with and *vanguished*.—"In Westminster are the Courts of Law—the Houses of Parliament—the Palaces—the Admiralty—the Pay Office—the War and Ordnance Offices—the Treasury—the India Board—the great Army Agents—the Barrack Office—the Navy Office—the Victualling Office—the Tax Office—the Theatres—the Opera House, and many other offices and public establishments, all of them, from their very nature, *opposed to free election*; yet in this place—abounding beyond all others in the means and the love of corruption—in this place power was impotent against the people."

X. SOPHISTRY *thus confuted by fact*. "Westminster has replied, by its acts, to the calumny of the enemies of reform, that the House of Commons was corrupt, because THE PEOPLE were corrupt."

* By *influence* must surely have here been meant—not influence of *understanding on understanding*—the influence exercised by acknowledged wisdom on unexperienced probity; but the vile instrument commonly called and understood by this name, viz. the influence of *will on will*, the influence exercised by the double-headed beast, whose name is *Terrorism and Bribery*.

† The meaning is, that had it not been for the law suits, the expenses would not have been near 4,000*l.*

The Americans impose no tax upon the means of political information; you impose an almost prohibitory one. Why impose one so enormous? Is it for the sake of money?—in some degree of course; for where money is to be had, in what place and at what price is it not raked for? It is raked for in the Courts that should be Courts of Justice, to the destruction of Justice; it is raked for in the stores of medicine, to the destruction of health and life. Yes, surely, in some degree for the money, but in a still greater degree for the sake of the *darkness* in which to keep the people. The same transparent cunning which, in the teeth of all argument, and without the shadow of a pretence, has so recently and repeatedly engaged you

The People corrupt forsooth? This was the plea of the Alarmist, muddle-headed, joke-spinner, metaphor-hunter, and laborious would-be deceiver, now no more; in whose head no one idea was ever clear, nor any two ideas consistent*. *The people corrupt* forsooth? Why thus charge corruption upon the people? Even because, among the men he was addressing, he saw, and upon each occasion felt, an eagerness to catch at every pretence for shrouding, under a covering of contempt cast on the *subject many*, the system of depredation and oppression, continually carried on at their expense, by the *ruling few*. Even because, supposing the pretended *corruption* to be regarded as having its source in that quarter, it could not but be regarded as being below the reach of remedy, and *reform*, in every shape and every situation, hopeless. The aim of this man was to extinguish hope.

XI. CONTRAST *between this genuine reform and Government sham-reform*.—"Talk of *reformation* and *economy* indeed! Here are examples of both, worthy the contemplation of every man. Here is no petty retrenchment from unlimited extravagance; here is a radical reform in management and in morals, at once demonstrating that the people, and the people alone, are willing and able to do their own business in the best and the least expensive manner."

XII. EXAMPLE *set, LESSON given, PRACTICABILITY proved: ASSURANCE of like success every where*.—"Westminster, at this moment, exhibits a fair sample of what the whole people would be if the plan of reform proposed by Sir Francis Burdett were adopted. Corruption and profligacy would speedily disappear from among them; and the profligate and corrupt would no longer dare to offer themselves as candidates to misrepresent and abuse them. Then must a man have a character for wisdom and integrity, who aspired to the high honour of representing a virtuous, a free, an intelligent, and brave people; and then would the wise and the virtuous, whose more correct notions of honour keep them out of sight, come forward, proud to receive real honours from their countrymen. And what is there, after all, in the conduct of Westminster, which would not instantly be put in practice by the whole people, if they possessed even the right of voting enjoyed by the people of Westminster?"

N.B. Freedom of suffrage was here to an extent sufficient for the purpose; and yet without the protection of *secrecy*. True: but though Westminster is, in every other particular, a fit example for the whole kingdom, in this one it could not be. Why? Because in the circumstances in which the population is placed, freedom, even without the aid of secrecy, finds a protection, such as, unless it be in the adjoining metropolis, it would in vain look for any where else. Though by the particular independent condition of the majority of the inhabitants, Terrorism was vanquished, it was not till it had struggled and done its utmost. If, in spite of Terrorism, the majority was so great, how much greater might it not have been, had Terrorism been disarmed by secrecy?

It is among the peculiar excellencies of democracy, that to good government in this form nothing of *virtue*, in so far as *self denial* is an ingredient in virtue, is necessary. Such is the case, where the precious plant stands alone: no *Upas* tree†, no clump of *Machineel* trees‡ to overhang it. But, in this spot in question, both these emblems of misrule still live and flourish in conjunctions. Here then was, and still is, and will continue to be, a real demand for *virtue*: and here has the demand proved an *effectual* one.

Shade of *Hampden*! look down, and in a host of Tradesmen and Shopkeepers, behold thy yet living and altogether worthy successors!

* Windham.

† The *Upas* tree was related to be a tree in the Isle of Java, the poison of which was most deadly, and the circle of its destructive influence most extensive; no living being could approach it; birds in attempting to fly over it were arrested in their course by the mortal vapours that arose from it, and were laid dead at its feet; but the *natural* *Upas* tree is fabulous—no such tree exists. Would, that the *political* *Upas* tree were equally fabulous; but, that it is too real we all can feel; that it is equally poisonous, and more destructive, the history of mankind declares—the misery that surrounds us tells aloud. Let him who would see the English political *Upas* tree, turn to pages 10 and 11.—EDITOR.

‡ The *Machineel* tree grows in the West Indies: the juice of the tree is a deadly poison, and the natives barb their darts with death, by dipping them in it. For the English clump of *Machineel* trees, turn to page 11, paragraph 2.—EDITOR.

to deprive them of the use of the press for giving expression to their desires, engages you, in relation to all these affairs, which while they are yours, are at the same time so much their own, to keep them in the state of the profoundest ignorance possible, that in the existence of that ignorance you may have a plea for the perpetuation of it.

Oh, but the information they get is all of it from Cobbett—misinformation, all of it—mischievous information—a great deal worse than none.

Well; be it so: what of that? *The information you could give and would give, too, if you gave any, is good information, is it not? Well then what is it that hinders you from giving it? Have you not money enough? Enough at any rate for such a purpose. Know you not of writers enough, who (as touching righteousness and piety, inferior to nobody but yourselves) would none of them, any more than yourselves, have any objection to taking the money? Have you not your champions with and without names, and with names worse than none—names with which paper such as this ought not to be defiled? Would not the same hands which circulate your substitutes to the Bible serve and suffice to circulate whatsoever writings it might seem good to you to circulate, for the purpose of antidotes, and by divine blessing as substitutes, to all such others, by the influence of which, in the fulness of time, good government might be substituted to misrule.*

Oh, but to contend with Jacobins and Atheists!—with Jacobins who would substitute the Habeas Corpus Act to the abolition of it—Atheists, who would substitute the Bible to Creeds and Catechisms! To think of contending with such wretches on any thing like equal terms!—to think of arguing with miscreants, for whom annihilation would be too mild a destiny!

Aye, there's the rub! Always under every Monarchy, whether pure and absolute, or mixt and corrupt, indeed every where but in that seat of licentiousness, a representative Democracy—*force in excess* employs itself in filling up all *deficiencies* in the articles of *reason* and *argument*: and the more obvious the deficiency, the more excessive, the more grinding, the more prostrative, the more irresistible the force.

So much for us of the swinish multitude; so much for us and our ignorance. But you, Honourables and Right Honourables, how is it with you?

You permit the publication of debates. But is it for the sake of general information and the diffusion of it? Oh, no; it is for the gratification of individual vanity. He who is at the head of you, the ablest head you ever had, after he had fired off his speech against corruption—his furious speech, with the double-headed shot in it from top to bottom—his speech, in which all that is least mischievous in corrupt influence is fired upon with red hot shot, while all that is most mischievous in it is spared; did he not send it himself to Cobbett—to the Cobbett whom you would all crush*.

* On the 26th May, 1809, Mr. Curwen made a motion in the House of Commons, that a law be passed, imposing an oath upon Members of that House, as to their not having paid or bargained for their seats: and on the 1st of June, in a committee of the whole House upon the Bill, Charles Abbott, Speaker of the House of Commons, made the famous speech which is alluded to in the text, and afterwards he sent a written copy to Cobbett, asking him to insert it in his Register, which was done. See Cobbett's Register, vol. XV. No. 28, June 10, 1809.

Some extracts which follow are worthy to be treasured up in our memories.

“The question now before us is no less than this:—Whether *Seats in this House shall be henceforth publicly saleable?* A proposition, at the sound of which, our ancestors would have startled with indignation; but a practice, which in these days, and WITHIN THESE WALLS, in utter oblivion of every former maxim and feeling of Parliament, has been avowed and justified.”

“We are now, however, come to a pass from which we have retreat. Upon this

What the people are in want of is not so much the *time* as the *liberty* to inform *themselves*. What you are in want of, you who have time as much as you choose to have—you who, so many of you, have so much more time than you know what to do with, what you want is *inclination*—the *inclination* to inform *yourselves*.

Thus the evil of deficiency, be it what it may, is a removeable one: from you it came, by you it is kept up, at your pleasure it lies to remove it. Leave the people but the liberty, and by their knowledge will your ignorance be put to shame.

Is the evil of *your deficiency* a removeable one? Yes; establish a radical reform and you will then (I will presently shew you how) have removed it. But upon any other terms it is absolutely without remedy. It is fixed to your freehold; it sticks to *property*, to *your* only element of aptitude, the only element you either possess or acknowledge. From that surfeit of all the good things of this world, under which the man who is gorged with property is condemned to suffer, comes *love of ease*; love of ease—that appetite, which existing in that degree of excess in which in your situation it does so generally and necessarily exist—is *indolence*. But be the field of action what it may, indolence and information always exclude each other. Be it labour of the body or labour of the mind—the man, who being used to labour, loves labour, in his *spare* time, be it ever so small, will do more than the man, who, being unused to labour, hates labour, will do in his *whole* time.

Opulence, indolence, intellectual weakness, cowardice, tyranny! Oh, yes; these five are naturally in the same person. From opulence proceeds indolence—from indolence, intellectual weakness—from intellectual weakness, cowardice—from cowardice, tyranny. A phantom of danger presents itself; could this man of wealth but fix his attention upon it, and look steadily at it, the phantom would vanish; but, being unexercised, his mind is weak; he has no such command over it. The phantom haunts him; it continues terrifying him; it plants an ague in his mind; in his delirium he catches at every straw that presents to his eyes the image of a chance for stopping his fall into the gulf which he sees yawning for him; his bowels wither; to his sick mind no feelings but his own present any tokens of existence; no barbarity, no wickedness comes amiss to him, so it but afford the glimmering of an addition to the stock of accumulated securities with which he has overlaid himself. Frantic at the thoughts of the danger to *himself*, he gives his *fiat* to the cluster of tyrannies by which the security of the *whole people*, his own along with it, is destroyed. Trembling with terror, and rage, its offspring,

“question we must decide, Aye, or No. To do nothing is to do every thing. If we forbear to reprobate this traffic, we give it legality and sanction.”

[And they did give it legality and sanction, for nothing did they do.]

“And we shall have brought a greater scandal upon Parliament, and the Nation, than this country has ever known since Parliaments have existed.”

After speaking of the just influence of property, he proceeds:—

“But, that, abandoning all these legitimate rights of influence, and laying aside all the virtuous and generous motives of friendship, affection, and the fair preference of talents and integrity, to fill places of such high public trust, they should go to a shameless and open market; that they should sell the attachment of their friends, neighbours, and dependents, for dry and sordid gain; and sell it to utter strangers, of whose qualities they can have no other estimate than the weight of their purses; this does indeed appear to me to be a great political evil, and a great public grievance. It degrades and debases the habits of the HIGHER ranks of life, who confess their own sense of the nature of these transactions, by the concealment with which they seek to cover them.”

Speaking of Elections, he says:—

“It is essential to the very idea of Elections, that they should be free. Force, fraud, corrupt practices, and undue influence of any sort, by which the freedom of Elections is controlled, have been reprobated in all ages.”—EDITOR.

he lends his hand to the opening of the Pandora's box and pours forth the contents of it upon the heads of the whole people*. And thus by this course, by the groundless fear of *its* destruction, *security* may be destroyed. May be? Yes; and, by that, and sinister interest in all its shapes together, if it be not already, is, while this pen is moving, on the very point of being destroyed.

Yes; you men of wealth, you pillage them; you oppress them; you leave them nothing that you can help leaving them; you grant them nothing, not even the semblance of sympathy; you scorn them; you insult them; for the transgression of dozens, you punish them by millions; you trample on them, you defame them, you libel them; having, by all you can do or say, wound up to its highest pitch of tension the springs of provocation and irritation, you make out of that imputed, and, (where in any degree real) always exaggerated irritation, a ground and the only ground you can make, for the assumption, that, supposing them treated with kindness, all their grievances redressed, relief substituted to oppression, they would find in this very relief, an incitement to insurrection, to outrage, to anarchy, to the destruction of the supposed new and never yet experienced blessing, together with every other which they ever possessed or fancied.

Levelling? Destruction of all property? Whence are they to learn it? What can they get by it? Who ever taught it them? Whose interest is it, whose ever can it be, to teach it them? How many of them are there, who would be so eager to lose his all? The all of a peasant, how much less is it to him than the all of a prince;—the all of him whose means of livelihood are in his labour, than the all of him whose means of livelihood are in his land? To whom again is it that, in your notion at least, they are at this moment so earnestly looking for instruction? Is it not Cobbett? With all his eccentricities, his variations, and his inconsistencies, did he ever attempt to teach them any such lesson as that of equal division of property—in other words, annihilation of it? In the whole mass of the now existing and suffering multitude, think ye that one in a hundred, not to say a thousand, could be found, so stupid, so foolish, as either of himself or from others, to fancy that, if without other means of living, he had his equal share in the whole of the land to-day, he would not, twenty to one, be starved upon it before the month were out? Oh! if the men, in whom they behold their friends were not better instructors, as well as better friends, to them than you are, or than it is in your nature to be, long ere this would the imputation you are thus so eager to cast on them, have been as substantially grounded, as it now is frivolous.

No, no; it is not *anarchy* ye are afraid of: what ye are afraid of is *good government*. More and more uncontrovertibly shall this fear be proved upon you—proved upon you, from the sequel of these pages, even to the very end.

CHAP. IX.

Freedom of Suffrage further explained; the manner in which, and the persons by whom, that Freedom is destroyed.

In Chapter V. has been shewn the necessity there is, that a vote should be free, in order that it may be useful; and that a vote given under any influence but the will of the voter, is spurious, and the giving it an act of

* See an enumeration of some of the dreadful contents of this box—of the cluster of tyrannies by which the people are oppressed, page 43.

imposture: and a promise was given that this subject should be further considered; in the present chapter, therefore, it is intended to shew

The efficient cause by which freedom of suffrage is destroyed, and its opposite spuriousness of suffrage produced.

The motives by which freedom of suffrage is destroyed, and its opposite, spuriousness of suffrage produced.

The influential persons by whom freedom of suffrage is destroyed, and its opposite, spuriousness of suffrage produced.

The modes in which freedom of suffrage is destroyed, and its opposite, spuriousness of suffrage produced.

The situations in, and by which freedom of suffrage is destroyed, and its opposite, spuriousness of suffrage produced.

The instruments by, or with which freedom of suffrage is destroyed, and its opposite, spuriousness of suffrage produced.

I. *Efficient cause.* *Seductive influence* is the efficient cause by which freedom of suffrage is destroyed, and spuriousness substituted: and by influence, in this case, is meant, not the influence of understanding upon understanding, that is, the convincing a man by *reason*, but the influence of will upon will, that is the convincing a man by *force*.

II. *Motives.* The motive through which seductive influence operates, is either of the nature of *hope*, or of the nature of *fear*: in the first case the motive is *pleasant* and *alluring*, in the other *painful* and *terrific*: of these two motives every body feels that the *painful* and *terrific* is in its general nature the more powerful in its operation, and in the case of parliamentary electors, it is *that* motive by which far the greatest part of the mischief is produced*.

* *Gratitude* may here be named as a *motive*, which, though not of the nature of either terror or bribery, frequently produces the same effect.

But, in the instances in which there is at bottom no motive but of the *selfish* kind, *gratitude*, the *social* motive, is a *cloak*, which is sure to be employed as a covering for the selfish motive.

From the situation of Elector, turn now to that of Representative.

In the motive of *hope*, with or without *fear*, and with a covering of *gratitude* more or less sincere, may be seen the seductive influence, by which, under the dominion of C——r-General, the conduct of members of parliament, both houses included, is, to so vast an extent, determined. To this case may be referred the gratitude found under the sort of robe, the sleeves of which are of *lawn*. “*When I forsake my King may my God forsake me!*” was the once famed speech of a high-seated and notorious profligate, to whom for once it seemed good to play the hypocrite. But in this case *lawn* was not the material of the sleeves.

Between *individual* and *individual*, if gratitude exercises itself to the *benefit* of one individual who is the object of it, it is a virtue; but, when exercising itself to the benefit of the one, it exercises itself to the *injury* of any other, instead of being a virtue, it is a vice. And how much more, if, being between an individual and the whole community, that gratitude be exercised to the still greater injury of the universal interest. Can gratitude be a virtue, by which, at the expense of the universal interest, the private interest of the C——r-General is served? Yes; if stealing money out of the Exchequer or the Bank, to slip it into the Privy Purse, would be a virtue—not otherwise.

Behold a man eight-and-thirty years in Parliament, three-and-thirty of those years in office: in all those three-and-thirty years, not to speak of the other five, though the measures of the monarch were ever so mischievous, never in any instance failing to give his vote (not to speak of his speeches) in support of them; and, in a life of him, written in lawn sleeves, by a brother of the Right Honourable person in question, this habit placed to the account of *virtue*! In respect of extent, as well as malignity, see the character of this mischief admirably displayed in the Edinburgh Review, No. xlix. *Lord Viscount Barrington's Life*, by his brother, the Bishop of Durham*, p. 169 to 192. *Time*, that of the American war. In October, 1775, Letter to the King, desiring leave to resign, is sent by Lord Barrington, but no notice taken. June 7th, 1776, for the first time, conversation on the subject with the King in his closet. Year of Lord Barrington's age, the sixtieth—of his official service, the thirty-first. Hear Lord Barrington: this from his own manuscript:—“Many difficulties,” (I answered) (p. 174) “in respect to the House of Commons, were of the most serious kind, as they affected my conscience and my character. I have, said I, my

* Annual income more than 30,000, and this to a Christian Bishop!!!

III. *Modes.* The ways in which seductive influence operates to the destruction of freedom of suffrage, and to the introduction of spuriousness, are two—*direct* and *indirect*:—*direct*, when the seductive influence applies itself in the first instance to the situation of *electors*, by obliging them to vote contrary to their reason; *indirect*, when applying itself to the situation of *candidates proposed*, or *proposable*, by deterring them from offering themselves when their opponent has either more land or more money.

“ own opinions in respect to the disputes with America: I give them, such as they are, to Ministers in conversation as in writing. I am summoned to meetings, where I sometimes think it my duty to declare them openly, before perhaps twenty or thirty persons; and the next day I am forced either to vote contrary to them, or to vote with an Opposition which I abhor:” viz. not that particular opposition alone, but every Opposition whatsoever.

Judge whether this be not true: view him in the year of his age the twenty-ninth; of his parliamentary service, the fifth or sixth (p. 12, anno 1745). Then, to his perfect astonishment, he discovers, that, in one instance, opposition in Parliament had given a certain degree of encouragement to rebellion; as if it were possible, that, where rebellion is in contemplation, opposition could in that place be made, without contributing more or less to that effect. This profound discovery, thus made, suffices of itself to produce, on his part, a determination never to be in opposition in any case whatsoever; and to this determination he most heroically adheres for such a number of years together, the whole time against his most decided judgment, to the support of one of the most tyrannical and disastrous measures—(disastrous to the country that wished to enslave, but to the country intended to be enslaved, how happy!)—ever contemplated. Speaking of the rebellion in 1745, “he had seen,” (says his Right Reverend biographer and panegyrist) “with some degree of remorse, how much the conduct of Opposition had encouraged that enterprise. He perceived” (continues he) “that appeals to the people against the Parliament and the Government contribute towards anarchy; and that Ministers are more frequently deterred from right than from wrong measures, by the apprehension of opposition. Possibly” (continues he) “some may think, that his having an employment in administration might have contributed to his adopting these sentiments; being once, however, offered to his mind, the force and truth of them became irresistible.” Yes—“the truth of them,” says the good Lord Bishop.

Behold then the scrupulous Viscount, with his tender conscience. Thus, according to his own shewing, was this man, and for so many years together, in the unvaried habit of voting against his own conscience, contributing in one of the most influential situations to the commission of legalized murders (to speak according to his opinion) committed in the wholesale way: and why? Because, had his votes been given according to his conscience, and against these murders, he would have seen other votes operating in aid of his, and contributing to the efficiency of his, by being given in favour of the only system his conscience could approve. After this comes the determination expressed to the King, over and over again, the determination thus to continue voting, and at the head of the War Department as well as in Parliament, acting to this effect against his conscience; and this to the end of his days, unless it should please his Majesty to consent to his ceasing so to do. P. 179, June 1st, 1777. “Your Majesty knows the very bottom of my mind: if, after that, you order me to remain as I am, I will obey you. I find I cannot force myself from you; and, whenever I go, your Majesty must voluntarily tell me that I may leave you.” After, as well as before this, from p. 167 to 169, see passages, reporting conversations or letters out of number, all to this effect. “The King thanked me warmly,” (viz. for continuing to operate towards the perpetration of the legalized murders, against the declared dictates of his conscience), “and said” (continues his Lordship) “it was impossible to act a more handsome part than I had done throughout.” Thus it went on, the King still refusing dismissal or permission to act according to conscience; the War Secretary still obsequious; till almost three years after the date of the letter, by which, for his conscience sake, the desire to resign was made known: the 16th December, 1778, on which day, with this lesson before his eyes, Mr. Jenkinson, father to the present Earl of Liverpool, to whom his paternal care could not but have transmitted it, kissed hands as successor to the present Earl, who said, on the 15th June, 1809 (Cobbett’s Debates, p. 1033*), “from long, deliberate, and mature consideration, I am convinced, that the disfranchisement of the smallest borough . . . would eventually destroy the constitution.”—N.B. On this same 1st June, 1777 (p. 179), King to Lord Barrington:—“I will give you a mark of my favour at parting: but I wish much to keep you at present,” &c.; and, during all this conflict betwixt gratitude and loyalty on the one side, and conscience on the other, the amount of this mark of favour remained to be determined; it was settled at 2,000*l.* a year pension (King’s Letter to Lord Barrington, p. 191), “until” (says the letter) “he shall be appointed to some other employment.”

Thus much for King and Ministers. Now for Bishop:—“Perhaps,” (says he, p. 169) “the reader may be disposed to interrupt my narrative, by observing, that if Lord Barrington objected to the general system, which administration had adopted, and which they continued to act upon, notwithstanding his remonstrances, it was his duty to have resigned his

IV. *Influential persons.* There are three descriptions of influential persons, by whom freedom of suffrage is destroyed, and its opposite spuriousness produced, divided as follows:—

1. The Proprietor. The seat belonging to him termed *proprietary seat*—his office termed *proprietorship*. The proprietor may either be *sole proprietor*, or *joint proprietor* of the seat; *land-holding proprietor*, or *place-holding proprietor*.

2. The Terrorist. The *terrorist* is he who obtains his seat by the motive of *fear*. This system may be called *terrorism*. The terrorist is either he who compels the *voters*—call him the *vote-compelling* terrorist, or he who *repels, quells, subdues, or excludes* any competitor for the seat—call him the *competition-repelling* terrorist, the *competition-quelling* terrorist, the *competition-subduing* terrorist, the *competition-excluding* terrorist. The terrorist may do this either by the great extent of his *landed possessions*, or by his *ready cash*; call him in the first case the *land-bestridding* terrorist, in the other the *purse-brandishing* terrorist.

3. The Corruptionist. The *corruptionist* is either the *bribe-giver*, or the *bribe-offerer*, and the bribe may be either *money*, or *money's-worth*, that is,

“ appointment, and not to have taken any further part in measures which he disapproved.
 “ The answer is in itself complete. As soon as Lord Barrington found these measures would
 “ be persevered in, he tendered his resignation: but he did it in that candid and consistent
 “ manner which became Lord Barrington. He did not make his difference of sentiment the
 “ subject of appeal to the public* favour, or the means of thwarting national efforts, and em-
 “ barrassing the King and his Ministers; but he submitted it in a private letter to his Ma-
 “ jesty, as early as with propriety he could, in the beginning of October, 1775; and he re-
 “ newed his instances, until his retirement from public life could be permitted, without incon-
 “ venience to his Majesty or to the interest of the public.”

Behold in this one frame three portraits; the *King's*, the *Minister's* and the *Bishop's*; drawn by the pious hand of the original of one of them. In these three behold, moreover, a family picture of our matchless Constitution: Monarchy and Aristocracy above; sham Democracy beneath—a slave crouching under both. But the sample afforded by this trinity, is a favourable sample: the King, a bettermost kind of King; the Peer and War Minister, a bettermost kind of Peer and Minister; the Bishop, a bettermost kind of Bishop: all agreeing in this—that when a King is pleased to express a wish, be it even ever so faint a one, no part but obedience can be left to conscience. Note well—this from among the bettermost sort; what would be to be expected from the ordinary sort?—Answer. Exactly what we are now experiencing. These portraits are from a *partial* pencil—what would they have been, if from an impartial one?

Walk in and see Church and King! Walk in and see Church and State! After this, what need can there be of libels? This, if it were not the work of a Bishop, would it not in itself be the quintessence of all libels? a libel on every thing that is most excellent? a libel accompanied with the most flagitious of all aggravations, the facts unquestionably true?

Here behold legitimacy naked and undisguised. Behold not only passive obedience and non-resistance, but active obedience, active obedience to the monarch, whatsoever be his measures, professed and preached without reserve. If it be possible that any more profligate servility should be inculcated, any more profligate despotism invited, one should be curious to see it. And while the pen is writing this, comes from Durham the intelligence, by which a practical comment on this theory is brought to view.

Turn back now to Chapter VIII.—one more glance at *Westminster* Election management. Behold there Democracy, representative Democracy, in its lowest stage, not, as in America, erect and independent; but as in Britain, ever threatened and ready to be crushed. Say now whether *property* is honesty; say whether *Kingship* is honesty; say whether *Peership* is honest; say whether *Bishopship* is honesty; say whether (if every one of these is honesty) *Tradesmanship* honesty, as exemplified for these ten years past in Westminster, is not worth all such other honesties put together.

* Learn hence, that, in the opinion of both brothers, *public opinion* (notwithstanding the whole force of seductive influence), was really against the American war.—N.B. *Public favour* would not have given him the 2,000*l.* a year, or any part of it.

power, place, or dignity. The ordinary bribe may be termed the *bribe-royal**.

V. *Instruments.* *Free-suffrage, proprietorship, terrorism, and bribery,* are the four instruments, by one or other of which every vote given by an elector is produced; and by these four instruments together, the whole 658 seats in the House of Commons are filled. Upon each election, the number of votes which are really *free* is the number *left*, after those rendered *spurious* by the other three instruments is deducted from the *whole* number of votes.

In comparison with the whole number of seats, the proportion of those, in the filling of which *free suffrage* performs the greater part, is probably very small; and there is perhaps scarce one in which it performs the whole.

Free suffrage is sufficiently explained by saying, that it consists in the absence of all the other instruments.

The proprietor, is he who possesses what the terrorist and corruptionist only aim at. Proprietorship is the effect of terrorism and corruption consummated; and freedom of suffrage perpetually excluded.

Now, when a disagreement takes place between joint proprietors, as to the person to fill the seat, a contest may take place; and then room is left to employ either or both of the two remaining instruments, *terrorism* and *bribery*.

VI. *Situations.* The situations in which proprietorship, terrorism, and bribery act to the destruction of freedom of suffrage, and the production of spuriousness, may be explained as follows:—

1. *Proprietorship.* The operation of proprietorship is confined to the *proprietary seats*.

2. *Terrorism and Bribery.* The *county seats* are those, in which the operation of terrorism is most conspicuous and most extensive.

The subject of the oppression exercised by it are, in the *direct* mode, the *electors* alone; in the *indirect* mode, the *candidates* proposed or proposable, [see modes III.] and from this indirect oppression of the candidates proceeds another oppression upon the electors; that is, by the exclusion put upon the multitude of those, the worthiest of whom might otherwise have been chosen by the electors.

The shape in which terrorism operates in preference in the county seats, is that of *land-bestridding* terrorism.

It is in this shape alone that it operates, where there is no competition. The electors being driven to the polling-booth by the vote-compelling influence of the oppressive instrument, and rival candidates driven from it by its competition-excluding influence. If there comes a competition, then, in aid of *land-bestridding* terrorism, bribery and *purse-brandishing* terrorism are called in. The self-same money, while operating on electors in the shape of *bribery*, operates upon rival candidates in the shape of *terrorism*.

Thus stands the matter, when the vote-compelling power of the instrument upon electors is deemed to be strong enough to operate upon candidates with such effect, as not only to repel, but to exclude competition.

But, when the opposite is the case, the instrument of *bribery* is called in as an auxiliary to terrorism; the new instrument operating in an *alluring* shape upon the electors, and in a *terrific* shape upon the candidates. And,

* *Bribe royal*, is a term that may be employed to signify all and each of the good things, applicable at the pleasure of C——r General, in reward for parliamentary service, certain or contingent, past or future; good things, some *transferable*, as offices and contracts; some *untransferable*, as knighthood, ribbons, baronetcies, peerages; the two last *descendible*.

indeed, it is only the expectation of the overpowering force of the instrument, by its allurements on the *electors*, that gives it so great a force, as to operate on the *candidates* in the character of *competition-excluding terrorism*.

In the case of these *county seats*, if we look for the persons on whom, as *electors*, the seductive influence operates in the shape of *terrorism*, we shall find them in the first place, *tenants*; in the next place, *tradesmen, shopkeepers, artificers*, and other persons of all sorts, who consider themselves dependent on the good will of the rich man, either from *hope* of his custom for goods, or labour, or his good offices in general; or by a more irresistible motive, namely, the *fear* of losing any such profit or benefit, as in any way had already been in use to be derived from the rich man's expenditure.

In this case, the instrument of force by which the voter is compelled and the vote extorted, is, on the part of the dependant elector, the fear of giving offence to, and thereby losing the *good offices*, and, perhaps, suffering under the *ill offices* of the terror-inspiring candidate. In so far as the force is sufficient to engage the elector to take upon himself the expense of journeys to and from, and delay at the election town, *terror*, as being a force, which in this case costs nothing to the person by whom it is applied, is the seductive force called into action. But when the quantity of force, which in this shape is at the disposal of the candidate, is regarded by him as not sufficient; then, seductive influence in the opposite and *alluring* shape of *bribery*, is called in and employed, in aid of that which operates in the *terrific* shape; and *indemnification* against the expense of *journeys* and *delay*, is the cloak in which the bribery is wrapped up.

Thus much as to the situation of *elector*. Look now to the situation of *candidate*, and the money spent in bribery which you have just seen operate upon electors, as an instrument of *alluring* seductive influence, you may now see as an instrument of *terror*, operating upon the situation of *candidate*; and, according to the degree of its efficiency, to *repel, quell, or exclude competition*.

In the election town itself, and in the environs, all demand for expense of journey and delay, and consequently all pretence for indemnification is excluded; and the terrorism, in the *purse-brandishing* shape, finds no place in which it can operate; and, as to rival candidates, proposed and proposable, the greater the distances between the election town and the abodes of the voters thus purchasable, the more strongly coercive will be the force of the rival and terror-inspiring purse*.

* It has happened to me, more than once, to hear spoken by various persons as a fact, that in Mr. Wilberforce, as a veteran Member of Parliament, might be seen a person, from whose declared judgment a greater number of derivative judgments had been drawn, than from any other person's. Well; not many years ago, by the mere force of competition-excluding terrorism, was this man driven from the seat, that with the effect just mentioned, he had so long filled. And this seat was one of the two seats of the County of Yorkshire; a county, in which by its great extent, the joint power of *land-holding*, and *purse-brandishing* terrorism is swelled to the greatest. 120,000*l.* I have heard mentioned as the sum, which on one Election was expended, by one only of the two victorious competitors for the two seats; but the victory had complete conquest for its fruit. To the condition of a proprietary Borough, held in *joint tenancy*, is that vast county reduced.

This is not all. For, by the same instrument by which the disease is produced and fixed, is all remedy barred out. Petition, if it aim at any thing better than the continuance of the disease, is by this same instrument nipped in the bud. And thus, so long as peace and union shall continue to flourish between the two high allies, the peace of the county (for such is the appropriate phrase) remains secure; the peace of Yorkshire secured, and by the same instrument, which, under the auspices of the new invented Christianity, is, with such irresistible effect, securing the peace of Europe.

The effect of *terrorism*, in its two modes, of *compelling votes* and *excluding competition*, and particularly in regard to the last, appears to have attracted

Behold accordingly in this note the following instructive particulars: 1. The existence of *terrorism* recognized, and, in so far as exercised by *Peers*, not approved of by *Earl Grey*, at that time *Mr. Grey*, a peerage not as yet in any near prospect. 2. The part borne by *terrorism* in the filling of the *County Seats* recognized, and therefore the *extension* of the number of those seats not approved of by *Charles Fox*. 3. The effect of *terrorism* in forming a squadron composed of *coroneted terrorists* and their *nominees*, listed under the banners and orders of C———r General, shewn by *Charles Fox*—and their numbers, as they stood at that time, mustered.

1. Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 383. *Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*. “*Mr. Grey*” marked, that “when *Mr. Pitt* moved for an addition of 100 Members to be added to the *Counties*, he could not carry his motion; and yet he had contrived to procure the nomination of 40 Members by indirect means; for he had added to the House of *Peers* 30 Members, who either nominated directly* or by irresistible influence;† that number of Members of the House of *Commons*, as appeared from the petitions then on the table, and which the petitioners were ready to prove.”

2. Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, p. 323. *Charles Fox*. “I submit however, to the good sense and to the personal experience of gentlemen who hear me, if it be not a manifest truth, that influence depends almost as much upon what they have to receive, as upon what they have to pay; whether it does not proceed as much from the submission of the dependant who has a debt to pay, as on the gratitude of the person whose attachment they reward? And if this be true, in the influence which individuals derive from the rentals of their estates, and from the expenditure of that rental, how much more so is it true of *Government*, who, both in the receipt and expenditure of this enormous revenue, are actuated by one invariable principle, that of extending or withholding favour in exact proportion to the submission or resistance to their measures which the individuals make?”

Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, p. 326.—*Charles Fox*. “A noble Lord says, that the county representation must be good, that must be approved of. Be it so; this proposes to leave the county representation where it is. I wish so to leave it: I think that representation ought to be of a compound nature; the counties may be considered as territorial representation, as contra-distinguished from popular; but, in order to embrace all that I think necessary, I certainly would not approve of any further extension of this branch of the representation.”

3. Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, p. 389.—*Charles Fox*. “There is one class of constituents whose instructions it is considered as the implicit duty of members to obey. When gentlemen represent popular towns and cities, then it is disputable whether they ought to obey their voice, or follow the dictate of their own conscience; but if they happen to represent a noble Lord or a noble Duke, then it becomes no longer a question of doubt; he is not considered as a man of honour who does not implicitly obey the orders of his single constituent. He is to have no conscience, no liberty, no discretion of his own; he is sent here by my Lord this, or the Duke of that, and if he does not obey the instructions that he receives, he is not to be considered as a man of honour and a gentleman; such is the mode of reasoning that prevails in this house. Is this fair? Is there any reciprocity in this conduct? Is a gentleman to be permitted, without dishonour, to act in opposition to the sentiments of the city of London, of the city of Westminster, or of Bristol; but if he dares to disagree with the Duke, or Lord, or Baronet, whose representative he is, then he must be considered as unfit for the society of men of honour? This, Sir, is the chicane and tyranny of corruption, and this, at the same time, is called representation. In a very great degree the county members are held in the same sort of thralldom; a number of peers possess an over-weening interest in the country, and a gentleman is no longer permitted to hold his situation, than as he acts agreeably to the dictates of those powerful families. Let us see how the whole of this stream of corruption has been diverted from the side of the people to that of the crown; with what a constant persevering art, every man who is possessed of influence in counties, corporations, or boroughs, that will yield to the solicitations of the court, is drawn over to that phalanx, which is opposed to the small remnant of popular election. I have looked, Sir, to the machinations of the present minister in that way, and I find, that including the number of additional titles, the right honourable gentleman has made no fewer than one hundred and fifteen peers in the course of his administration; that is to say, he has bestowed no fewer than one hundred

* i. e. by means of proprietorship of so many proprietary seats.

† i. e. by terrorism; with or without an admixture of bribery.

little notice, in comparison with its mischievousness*. In regard to *excluding competition*, this effect may be stated to consist in reducing the appropriate honesty, judgment and talents in the honourable House, from that *greatest quantity*, to which a regard for the welfare of the country would seek to raise it, to that slender scantling—a proprietorship in land, or a mass of property sufficient to operate with effect, either in the way of *terrorism* or *bribery*. In the latter case, a surplus of ready money, to the amount of from 4000*l.* to 5000*l.* over and above what is necessary for habitual expenditure, and ready to be employed in the purchase of power in this shape, and connexion with some person, who is himself in possession of a qualification in one of those shapes. These are the *conditions*, one or other of which is indispensably necessary, and at the same time altogether sufficient to the purpose of a man's being chosen to fill this most important of all offices. So as the *purse* be but *full* enough, no matter how *empty* the *head*.

Note well, that the *persons*, to whom in this instance the exclusionary force is in an immediate way applied, are not the *electors* themselves, but persons at large, considered in the character of *proposable candidates*.

The case of the *county* seats being thus explained, no further details can be necessary for conveying a correspondent conception of the case of the *borough* seats. In so far as, by *terrorism* applied to the electors, the effect can be produced, it is in this shape of course, as being free of expense to the seductionist, that the seductive influence is applied. At the same time, when the number of those, to whom in this unexpensive shape seduction can be applied with effect, is regarded as insufficient to carry the election, the assistance of bribery is regarded as necessary, and bribery is accordingly

“ and fifteen titles, including new creations and elevations from one rank to another;† how
 “ many of these are to be ascribed to national services, and how many to parliamentary interests,
 “ I leave the house to enquire. The country is not blind to the arts of influence, and it is im-
 “ possible that we can expect men to continue to endure them.”

In the *Statesman* for February 21, 1817, authenticated by the signature of Major Cartwright, may be seen a statement in these words:—“ The writer has seen a very numerous
 “ troop of tenants, holding under a placeman and sinecurist, conducted to a county election
 “ as swine are conducted to market, one steward in the front and another in the rear, as one
 “ hog-driver goes before the herd, and another follows after, to regulate the drift, and prevent
 “ straggling.”

Thus far the worthy father of radical reform. From the nature of the two corresponding situations, coupled with the circumstance of the two stewards, one behind as well as another before, let any one judge whether the surmise is likely to have been unfounded, or the parallel inapposite.

* The only instance within my knowledge in which, in any published work, any indication has been given of this circumstance, in the character of an imperfection attached to the constitution in its present state, is that which is afforded by a passage in *Mr. Wakefield's Account of Ireland*, vol. ii. p. 321. In it, after mention made of two names, think (says he) what must be the character and complexion of the constitution of this country, in so far as concerns the Commons' House of Parliament, when for such a length of time as they have been in existence, neither of those names has ever been found in the list of the members of this House. Of those persons, one was *Mr. Arthur Young*; the other was a person with whom, otherwise than by reputation, *Mr. Wakefield* had not any acquaintance; and of whom it is sufficient to say, that from early youth, throughout the whole course of his life (even at that time, anno 1812, not a short one) his time had been almost exclusively devoted to the endeavour to meliorate the condition of his fellow-creatures in all countries, but more particularly his own, by labour as unremitting as it could not but be thankless, applied to the field of legislation.

† Viz. in the compass of about thirteen years, from 1784 to 1797. In the subsequent twenty years down to this time, what may have been the addition? Enquire and report, ye good men and true, who have leisure.

applied : and here too, in so far as *bribery* is the force applied to the situation of *elector*, *purse-brandishing terrorism* is the instrument which (as before explained) applies itself to the exclusion of *rival candidates*.

CHAP. X.

Bribery and Terrorism compared.

In the present chapter it is intended to compare the mischiefs of *bribery* and *terrorism*. The *spuriousness* of the *will* that is produced forms the character of both these. In both cases the will, to which the effect is given, is not the will of the person whose will it appears to be, and in pretence is intended to be, and in reality said to be ; but that of some *other* person, whose will it does not appear to be, and in pretence is intended not to be, and accordingly is said not to be.

Well ; so much for the general character of the effect produced. Now as to the degree of *certainty* that belongs to this important and mischievous effect.

Suppose the *quantity of interest* at stake, be it money or money's worth, for it comes to the same thing, is, for example, 5*l.* ; for *one* instance in which you would find that sum producing this effect in the way of *bribery*, in *ten* instances perhaps you would find it producing that same effect in the way of *terrorism*.

There are two *situations* belonging to and producing this effect :—that of *Elector* to be acted upon, and that of *Representative*, by whom, or to whose use, the *Elector* is to be acted upon. Look to the first, that of *Elector*. Here, if *bribery* is to be the instrument employed, the obstacles and the opposing motives, which the seductionist has to overcome are these :—fear of punishment at the hand of the law—fear of reproach from *without*—and, in so far as *conscience* may be regarded as concerned in the matter, fear of reproach from *within*. On the contrary, if *terrorism* is the instrument, by no one of the above obstacles does the power of the instrument find itself opposed. In the case of *bribery*, the operation has an external tangible instrument, viz. the money or money's worth ; and the application of the instrument is rendered determinate by the circumstances of place and time, by the necessary acts of intercourse betwixt man and man for the purpose. To the case of *terrorism* belongs not any one of all these outward and determinate accompaniments : no such tangible instrument does it admit of : of no such intercourse is there any need in it : no external and determinate object does it present, to which any such inward sentiment as *fear of reproach* can attach. In this state of things, the two first of the three restraining motives cannot, and the other (generally speaking) will not, operate.

Look now to the situation of the proposed *Representative*—by whom, or to whose use, the effect is to be produced. To the production of it by *bribery*, special application is on every occasion necessary ; and *that* special application, attended with hazard in various shapes to him by whom, or to whose use, it is made ; hazard of scorn and reproach, instead of acceptance at the time ; in case of engagement, hazard of non-fulfilment ; in either case, hazard of disclosure, followed or not followed by prosecution. To the production of the effect by *terrorism*, no special application is, with any such constancy, necessary ; in many instances, it assuredly takes place—perhaps in most ; but there is no saying to what extent it may be produced. by the mere notoriety of the wishes of the person, whose power is the source of terror.

To effect the seductive influence in the shape of *bribery*—*wealth* in the shape of ready money is necessary ; and, in proportion as the endeavour

(successful or unsuccessful) to produce the effect is exerted—loss equal in amount to the expenditure is sustained. In the case where it is in the shape of *terrorism* that the seductive influence issued—though the quantity capable of operating towards the effect, has its limits; still it performs its seductive office without *loss* in any shape to him by whom the profit is reaped.

In a word, so far as bribery is the instrument, loss is certain, and profit precarious; so far as terrorism is the instrument, there is no loss; and if there be any effect, it is profit without loss.

In the case of *bribery*, the danger of punishment by law, together with the less uncertain, though less severe suffering of general disrepute, together compose no slight obstacle to the procurement of *agents*, such as to the requisite *disposition* shall add the ability necessary to produce the effect desired. On the other hand, in the case of *terrorism* operating in the way in question, it may very well happen that no application of any kind, whether of the terrorist *himself*, or by an *agent*, shall be necessary; yet in that same character, there will scarcely exist that well wisher to his cause, who would have any aversion to convey the appropriate intimation.

Thus much as between *bribery* and *terrorism*; now, to contrast two cases, in both which the force of seductive influence is supposed to be applied in the shape of terrorism; in the one case *by* the power of the law; in the other case *without* the power of the law. Suppose an *Act* passed (many a worse law has been passed, is passing, and will be passed) imposing a penalty of 5*l.* on every man, who, being tenant of the Duke, Marquis, or Earl of Mickleland, to his estate at Fearham, in the county; and having moreover a right of voting at all elections in and for the said county, shall, at any election of a Knight to serve in Parliament in and for the said county, refuse or omit to give his vote in favour of any such person whom for that purpose it shall please his Grace, or his Lordship, to nominate. Suppose for this purpose a Bill moved for; here would be an occasion for WHIG eloquence! here would be fretting and fuming, and vociferation! Even now, supposing any such Bill moved for (not that considering the more convenient shape in which the same effect is produced for the benefit of both parties, there exists in either, the smallest interest to move it), it might be highly questionable (*nay even now, while every thing that is most atrocious, and most fatally destructive of what little remains good in the constitution is passing every day*) whether a Bill to any such effect would make its way through the two Houses.

Well:—but, in a law to such an effect, would there be, in point of efficiency and thence of mischievousness, any thing comparable to what takes place in the existing and everlastingly praised state of things? Now, if the influence of *property* were thus *made legally legitimate*, would the force of its influence be equal to the already “*legitimate influence*” possessed by that same representative of, and substitute for honesty, judgment, and talents, in the present state of things?—No, it would not; the five pounds penalty would be little more than a dead letter. The profit of it, even if levied and received, would cover but a small part of the expense. The profit instead of being received by the angry Lord, would be received by the friendly man of law; or a flaw, such as all law proceedings are *kept* exposed to, might happen to be discovered: but, before this, by the very attempt, as shewn by the purchase of the first piece of parchment by which the proceedings were commenced, might such a storm of odium be raised, as the nerves of his Grace, or his Lordship—although he had been a *Sir James Lowther*, would not be able to stand.

So much for this supposed case, in which, neither by him whose endeavour it is to impose it, nor by him whose endeavour it is to avoid it, the loss is

any otherwise to be looked for, than through the ever-wavering and perpetually delusive hand of the man of law. Contrast it now with the present case, in which the source from which the loss is looked for, is a force, which, without need of any such treacherous and inadequate instrument, may be applied at pleasure. In the former case, odium is open and extensive; vexation and expense, certain; execution distant and uncertain; in this case, execution at pleasure; odium covered up; no vexation, no expense.

The establishing *vote-compelling* terrorism, by law, is (as above,) as yet but a supposition. But *competition-excluding* terrorism, has, as every body knows, been established by law for above this century past. In 1710, an act was passed, (Act 9 Ann, c. 5. § 1.) requiring a qualification of 300*l.* a year freehold landed property, to enable a man to sit in the House of Commons; and 300*l.* at that time, was equal to 1,000*l.* at the present time. As at that time, the monied interest was particularly strong among the Whigs, the landed interest among the Tories, and the Tories strong in the House of Commons; so Monarchy and Aristocracy acted together, in thus making property the substitute for honesty, knowledge, and talents. In the creed of both parties it was then a fundamental article, that property is honesty. But experience has completely demonstrated the absurdity of this idea. Pitt the second, and Charles Fox, the great leaders of the opposite parties, each, in his day, a minister,—a situation in which the demand for appropriate honesty should have been at the highest pitch,—what was the honesty of these men? The one, from the first, had but little, and that little to the last drowned in debt; the other never had any at all. Well: neither of them having on principle,—one of them not having even by law, a right so much as to sit in the house, how came they to be there? Oh! the difficulty had been removed by the usual instruments—*House of Commons' craft* and *lawyer-craft*. Lawyers had been to work, and set up a manufactory of sham qualification. Lawyers got their fees; disqualified men their seats;—the work which should have been performed by *sincerity*, was bungled out by the more acceptable hand of *fraud*:—and thus, in the *Blackstone* phrase, *every thing was as it should be*.

Thus much for the comparison, between the case of the seductionist whose instrument is *bribery*, and that of him whose instrument is *terror*: the situation in both cases being that of an individual.

Compare now the situation of the individual acting in the character of *terrorist*, with that of the *universal seductionist* C——r General; the seductionist, by whose hand, though by no means unpractised in the use of terror, the instrument of seduction most extensively and conspicuously employed, is that mostly known by the name of *bribery*, or *corruption*:—the instrument of *alluring* influence.

The same mighty mass of advantage is possessed, both by the individual terrorist, and the universal seductionist (C——r General), in which soever of his two shapes the latter may be found operating: in both cases the desired effect may be purchased, without personal application, without application so much as by agents—yet, with the sure assistance of agents, and these unpaid, in abundance. No expense—not so much as of thought: no exposure to rebuff and scorn:—no exposure to that sort of disappointment, which in case of engagement, is produced by the breach of it on the other side:—no exposure to legal punishment—to public reproach—nor so much as to the reproach of conscience.

But in all these cases the less efficient is the restraint opposed to the pernicious effect, the greater in each instance is the probability of its taking place: and the greater in *each* instance, the *probability* of its taking place, the greater is the *extent* to which, upon the whole, it will take place; and

thence, upon the whole, the greater its *mischievousness* : in each instance, in which it is efficient, the result being of the same nature, (*viz.* the giving effect to the will of some other man, instead of that of the voter, by whom the vote is given as the expression of his own free will)—the comparative mischievousness of the two practices is great in proportion to the *extent* in which they respectively take place.

Yes, compared with the system of *terrorism*, the system of *bribery* is virtue. Under the system of *bribery* both parties are pleased ; the *giver* of the bribe gets what *he* most desires ; the *receiver* of it what *he* most desires ; both parties are gratified, both parties are contented, in both situations you see smiling faces, indexes of contented hearts. Under the system of *terrorism*, whatsoever feeling of satisfaction there may be, look for it on one side only, and even on that side, scarcely can it be without having for its alloy the apprehension of just odium :—frowns above, gloom below :—sympathy or satisfaction, no where.

Note now, one of the *collateral* uses attached to the amplitude of the *extent of the right of suffrage*. In comparison of what takes place under terrorism, *urbanity*, though not so much cherished under the system of *bribery*, as under the system of *freedom*, finds a door open to receive it ;—not so under *terrorism*. Whence the difference ?—Answer, a man has no need of the benefit that may be acquired by the *receipt* of a *bribe*, equal to what he has of *that* of which terrorism threatens him with the *loss*. Whatsoever be the magnitude of the bribes of a corruptionist, yet, suppose him to a certain degree obnoxious, whether it be in public or in private life, and in particular if he have no terrorism at his command, he may experience the mortification of seeing them refused. Repression of insolence is, therefore, in his situation prescribed by considerations, and urged by motives, which have no place in the case of the secure *terrorist*, or the possessor of a *proprietary seat*.

Thus, each being considered separately, bribery, compared with *terrorism*, is a useful practice. Terrorism having place on *one* side, place bribery on the other, the lesser evil becomes positively *useful*, by the check it is capable of giving to the greater evil. By the terrors inspired by a full purse brandished on the other side, the vote-compelling terrorist may himself be either driven out of his seat, or so wrought upon, as to bear his faculties more meekly than he otherwise would. Suppose the terrorist *incapacitated* by *peerage*, or *disinclined*, the *nominee*, to whom, under the influence of this check, he has recourse, may be a person less unpopular than the person who, but for this salutary restraint, would have been the object of his choice.

No more than a slight hint can in this place be afforded of one mischief with which *terrorism* is pregnant, while *bribery* is altogether pure from it. The force of terrorism, at the same time that it produces with so much more efficiency, the same common disease (namely, spuriousness of suffrage) operates towards the suppression of the only remedy. By the same tyranny, by which the demand for *reform* is created, the *petition system*, in which alone it can originate, is endeavoured to be crushed. *Desperateness* is thus another symptom added to the malignity of the disease, a symptom which bribery does not tend to produce. By mere situation, the bare image of the frowning terrorist repels from the paper, in countless numbers, the hands by which, if free, it would have been signed ; while, strong as is the interest which is produced in so many places, by the disbursement of the money necessary to the purchase of *votes*, yet, on no occasion is any interest to be found strong enough to prevent men from giving their *signatures to petitions* for Reform.

Monarchy, and the Aristocracy that crouches under its feet, interested alike in the preservation and increase of abuse and misrule in all its forms, operate with united force towards keeping the door as closely shut as possible against the only remedy. And thus the misery of the situation of the aggrieved subject is aggravated, who, but for the frown of inexorable tyranny, would have become a petitioner; but who, by the spectacle of the united thunderbolts suspended over his head, finds his hand arrested, and the complaining paper prevented from receiving his signature.

But not satisfied with the quiet form of *restraining* signatures to petitions, coercion is at this moment employing itself in the more galling form of *constraining* men to sign under the colour of *declarations of loyalty*, what are in reality *declarations of abhorrence* against radical reform, the only possible remedy for all our grievances; and under the G——s, as under the Stuarts, woe be to the *petitioners*, grace and favour to the *abhorrrers* of Reform.

CHAP. XI.

Purchase of seats; in what cases mischievous; in what beneficial.

In comparison with the pure gift, is the nomination to seats in the House for *money or money's worth*, upon the whole a pernicious practice, a beneficial practice, or a matter of indifference?

Answer.—The manner in which the *universal interest* is affected by it, must decide in this, as in all other cases, which of the three qualities belongs to the act in question.

In comparison with the person, who but for the *sale* would have had the seat as a gift, will the course taken by the possessor by *purchase*, be *more* beneficial, *less* beneficial, or neither more nor less beneficial to the public interest?—In this question may be seen the answer to the last preceding one.

No answer to this last question can be drawn from any other source than from the consideration of the *quality* and *quantity* of the effective influence exercised by the individual in question, in all shapes taken together during his continuance in the seat.

Individuals being unknown, nothing as to the *quantity* of the influence can here be said. Quantity being supposed the same, as to the *quality* of the influence which depends on the *direction* taken by it, thus much only can be said, that of ascertaining it, in so far as it is capable of being ascertained, the only *criterion* which the nature of the case affords is, the consideration of the situation occupied by the individual with reference to *party*. *Tories, Whigs, People's men, neutrals*, taking him during the whole of his career together, with which of these classes has he acted?

In the course of this inquiry, the persuasion which the author has all along found pressing upon his mind with irresistible force, is—that the *Tories* or *King's men* add already to the *disposition*, not only the *power*, but the practice of driving the country down headlong in the descent that terminates in the gulph of pure despotism. **THAT THE WHIGS, WHETHER IN OR OUT OF OFFICE, ARE DRIVING, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DRIVE ON IN THAT SAME COURSE;** though in both situations with a degree of force and velocity, inferior to that which belongs to the nature of their almost constantly successful rivals. That if it be among the decrees of destiny, that in its way to that abyss, the country shall at any point be stopped, **IT CAN ONLY BE BY THE ENERGY OF THE PEOPLE**, headed and led by the few *People's men* to be found in the House, re-inforced by such of the Whigs, *if any*, in whose view, as the prospect of perdition comes nearer and nearer, the shares they respectively possess in the *universal interest*, may appear to exceed in value their

respective shares in the *particular* and separate interests, possessed by them in virtue of their connexion with the party to which they belong.

In this view of the matter, barring the application of the only remedy, a radical reform, the arrival of unmitigated despotism being, sooner or later, a result altogether certain, the only effect, which, in this respect, the practice in question, or any other, can produce, is that which respects *time*; the causing it to take place a little *sooner* or a little *later* than it would otherwise.

Is the *hastening* or the *hindering* of this catastrophe most likely to be the effect of the practice of *venal*, contrasted with that of *gratuitous* nominations? I answer—the hastening: and for these reasons.

From the nature of money, it follows, that the *venality* (that is, of the *purchases* made by means of it,) will be, in this case, to give to the party, by whom they are made, an accession of strength beyond what it would possess otherwise.

Now, by which of the several *parties* is the accession of strength, which may be derived from this source, likely to be derived in the greatest quantity? Answer—by the Tories: by that party, headed as they are, and supported by C——r-General, and their interest and their affections the same as his.

As it is, the number of *Members* belonging to this party (*corruption-eaters*, and *corruption-hunters* and *blind custom led* men, and *indifferentists* taken together) seems at present to be far greater than that of all the other parties put together: and, as despotism advances (and while this sentence is writing, it is advancing in seven-leagued boots), the number will be receiving continual increase. Proportioned to their number will be the amount of ready money in their hands, applicable to this convenient purpose: and (quantity of money in hand the same) the biddings of him whose prospect of appropriate return is nearest, will naturally be higher than of him whose prospect is more distant.

Thus much as to the *general* tendency of the practice. But, from this general tendency, supposing it admitted, does any such proposition follow, as that it belongs to the character of a true *People's man* to lay down to himself any such rule, as that of *abstaining* from it? No, surely: but exactly the reverse. The greater the velocity of the disastrous descent, the more strenuous are the exertions by which it should be endeavoured to be retarded.

For my own part, had I ten or twenty millions of money at my disposal, I would, though to an opposite purpose, effect the very monopoly, the mischievousness of which, in reference to the practice established at present, has just been represented as being in proportion to its *extent*. Instead of buying land with the money for my own kindred, I would buy liberty with it for the people. With that money, not only should I buy up all the existing *venal Borough seats* and *County seats*, as they came to market, but I should raise to the rank of venal ones many others which now are not so. With that money in hand, I could and would open Honourable eyes, in sufficient abundance: I would enable them even to see (oh, the astonishing sight!)—*that liberty is better than slavery, sincerity than imposture, good government than misrule, the absence of waste and corruption than the presence, dependance on the people than dependance on an essentially insatiable shark with his sub-sharks, and the love and respect of the people than their merited abhorrence.**

* The pace at which they saw the chariot of the State descending towards the gulph, was not yet rapid enough to satisfy the impatience of the *Phaëtons* from whom it receives its guid-

CHAP. XII.

Secrecy of Suffrage—its Importance further Developed.

In Chapter V. has been shewn, not only the utility, but, to a great extent, the necessity of secrecy, for *securing freedom*, and *preventing spuriousness* of suffrage; and also the security it gives against all seductive influence operating *from without*, whether as terrorism or bribery. In the Catechism itself, also these advantages of secrecy will be developed.

Turn back to Chapter X.—behold once more the troop of dependants, driven to the Poll-booth, with Stewards in front and rear, to prevent desertion. By the protecting veil of *secrecy*, suppose now the direction given to the vote completely hidden from all tyrant eyes, say, would any such trouble ever be given to Stewards? By terror may a man be driven to the place of Election—true: but, under the shield of secrecy, it is not, by terror, that, when he *is* there, the *direction* given to his *vote* can be determined.

But, as secrecy excludes terrorism, so does it exclude bribery; for, though by *gratitude* and *sympathy* alone, it *may* happen that a bribe shall in this case produce the desired effect, yet such is the feebleness of the

ance. Beheld one instance in which, on the spur of the occasion, to give redoubled energy to the indefatigable arm, the *surtout* of common decency was cast off as being a needless incumbrance.

A Bill for the more effectually preventing the sale of seats for money, and for promoting the monopoly thereof to the Treasury, by the means of Patronage—such was the title moved for by Lord Folkestone for the Act 49 G. III. c. 118. Out of 161, 28 voted for this amendment. (Cobbett's Debates, June 13, 1809.)—To *denounce* to the people, and in language so expressive, the true character of this measure, required the generous boldness of a Lord Folkestone. To *read* this character in it belongs to any man, to whom the words of it are not unreadable.

Would you form an adequate conception of the anxiety by which on this occasion that Honourable House was agitated? Read it in the anxiety expressed—not to say betrayed—by the Right Honourable Gentleman who is the head of it. Bursting the bond of those delicacies, which, but six days before (June 1st) had produced the well-considered and elaborate declaration, of the reluctance by which, down to that time, he had been restrained from “mixing in the debates,” twice in one day, viz. on the 7th of that same month, did he stand up and insist, that the word *express* (that being the word employed for the grant of the licence included in the monopoly) should be inserted. Inserted? and upon what grounds?—On grounds to which the absence of all grounds would surely have been an advantageous substitute.

In the determination of Honourable House to *establish* the monopoly at that time, (in that determination which he was thus labouring to produce) he saw an earnest of their determination to *abolish* it as soon as the occasion should require; and, in an imagined rule of *Common Law* already punishing the practice with an adequate punishment in *both* cases, he saw a sufficient reason for *adding* a regulation of *Statute Law* for punishing it in the *one*, and for *refusing* to add it in the other, of those same cases*.

* Cobbett's Debates, June 7, 1809, xiv. 926.—“The Speaker stated his wish on the first view to extend the provisions of this Bill to the purchase of seats in Parliament, as well by *office* as by money. The great rule was—to strike at the prominent and most flagrant points of offence. Amongst those, most certainly, was the proof of an *express* contract. These, he would state, always impressed him with the conviction, that this species of traffic, whether carried on by *implied* or *express* covenant, was an offence against the law of Parliament, and, in his opinion, *punishable* as a misdemeanour at *common law*. It was fully within the power of the House to provide any *future enactments* against *any future offences*, which in the course of the operation of this measure might subsequently arise.”

“Mr. Ponsonby, with considerable diffidence in his own opinion, when opposed to the very high authority of the Speaker, still contended that the insertion of the term “*express*,” in a declaratory Act of Parliament, conveyed the interpretation, that the penalty attached to *express* agreements, and that all of an *indirect* nature came *not* within its operation.”

“The Speaker considered, that the Resolutions of that House in 1779 bore fully upon a traffic carried on by an *implied* contract, and therefore he saw no reason to oppose the proposed clause, as now worded.”

chance, as to exclude all practical probability, and thence all adequate expectation of effecting by this means the desired purpose. Where the engagement is of such a nature, that the act of contracting it is a transgression against the laws of morality and political honesty, who is there that can fail to acknowledge that the fulfilling of that same engagement is not an *atonement* for that first sin, but a *repetition* of it? If this doctrine be just and true, nay, whether it be so or not, endeavours to instil this antidote into the mind, to which the matter of corruption has been applied, seem little in danger of being either deficient or ineffectual.

Now, suppose *universal suffrage* established, or suffrage to such an extent as to include *paupers*. Let but the direction given to the vote be completely unknown to all but him who gives it; and a pauper (having no prospect of gain in the event of his giving it in favour of the less fit candidate, nor of loss in the event of his giving it in favour of the more fit candidate) if giving his vote seemed to him worth the trouble, and if in his own conception unable to form a judgment of his own, would look out for those persons whose reputation in respect of the qualities of appropriate honesty, judgment, and knowledge stood highest, from *them* endeavour to learn which of all the proposed candidates was in their opinion the fittest, and give his vote accordingly. Such would be the case under the system of secrecy*. How would it be under the system of publicity? The subsistence, the very existence of the pauper, depends upon the pleasure of the local magistracy; his vote would be as absolutely at their command as the voting ticket at the command of the hand by which it is dropped into the box. Think of the proportion borne by those who already are in a state of pauperism, to those who are not yet fallen into that disastrous state. This vast part of the democracy would be completely in the hands of the removable nominees of the Crown. Yes, in the hands of titled Country Terrorists and corruption-eating and corruption-hunting Court Divines, ready to join hand in hand with hubble-bubble City Corruptionists, for the protection of a commissioned associate in the habit of exercising to his own use, (on condition of exercising other arts to the use of Court and Treasury,) the "*useful*" art of "*poisoning*," so long as it were upon such and such alone of his Majesty's subjects, as it should please them to consign to contempt and torment by the appellation of "*ale-drinkers*."

And thus by universal suffrage, if unprotected by the necessary shield of secrecy, without commotion or drop of blood shed, the constitution would be changed—changed from its present state, of an impure but not yet to a certainty unpurifiable mixture, into a pure and ever unamendable despotism.

In obedience to one of those solemn ordinances which have been so often passed for shew, (with the exception of the metropolis, at which it is kept collected in greatest quantity), all military force is at all Parliamentary Election times ordered at a distance from the place, as if there could be the slightest demand for any such instrument of terror as a troop of dragoons, by whose sabres the mask would be so effectually cut off, and by the smallest movement of which in this line of parliamentary service, the whole country (if it could be by any thing) would be thrown into a flame; when, without the stirring so much as of a finger or a tongue, the object can be and is so effectually accomplished by the invisible and motionless

* They, to whom the explanation of *derivative* judgment, in page 18, may have been obscure, will do well to read it over again, after the clear account of it in the paragraph above.—EDITOR.

spectre of *terrorism*. Thus are *gnats* strained out, that *camels* may be swallowed.

Such being the state of things, by what strange delusion can it be, that in the situation in which so vast a proportion of the whole body of the people are held down by the indissoluble bonds of civilized society, the necessity of secrecy as a shield to *freedom*, and as a security against *spuriousness* of suffrage (at any rate under the joint yoke of *Monarchy* and *Aristocracy*), can have been made to conceal itself from any eye? In such a case, how is it that a man can avoid seeing, that by *publicity* terror is armed, by *secrecy* disarmed?

Every man *ought* to sacrifice in every case (in this case in particular) his own personal interest to the universal interest. Good; there we have an antecedent; and therefore so he *will*; there we have the *consequent*. Well; if there be any truth in the consequent, we are already in *Utopia*; no need of *penal laws*;—no, nor so much as of *sermons*.

Call a man names, *slave*, *coward*, or if there be any thing worse, will he by any such insult be disposed to practise the self-denying lesson thus preached to him by a censor, who himself is all the while sitting upon velvet?

On this occasion (as on any other) if, in any imaginable way, without certain and over balancing mischief, means can be found for reconciling private with public interest, and thus saving both from sacrifice, can any valid reason be given why such means should not be employed?

Suppose that by any such expression of scorn, one man out of a hundred could thus be engaged to devote himself to ruin, or to the slightest inconvenience, how is it that by any such discipline the sum of happiness would be increased; while the useful and desired effect might as completely and surely be produced without inconvenience in any shape?

It is not easy to conceive, that any objections could be made to the use of the shield of secrecy, without which all pretence to freedom is imposture, by any other than the two following descriptions of men. 1. The man, whose whole dependence being in terrorism, in bribery, or a mixture of both, beheld in the freedom secured by secrecy a bar to his designs. 2. The man whose situation placing him above all such sensation as fear, should have no idea of any such sensation existing among the multitude whom he saw at his feet, or should look upon that sensation as a matter of indifference.

Even in a confidential conversation with a man now no more, ballot being mentioned by me as indispensable to freedom, he made wry faces, muttered out the word *nasty*, and turned off the discourse. He was a patron of seats; his votes wavering; he was a great landholder, and not the most popular among landholders.

Cowardly dogs! said an expert swimmer, who having crossed a deep river at his ease, looked back and beheld his companions, some of whom could swim, lingering on the other side;—*cowardly dogs!* are not ye ashamed of yourselves?

Any objection on account of any supposed difficulty with regard to the accomplishment of the purpose, would be altogether groundless. With notorious and undisputed constancy is the effect accomplished (for example, at the *India House*.*) And if in the situation *here* in question, any incon-

* Yet, as hath been seen, the supposed impracticability of uniting freedom with universality of suffrage could be urged as conclusive objection by Charles Fox, giving any such extent to the right of suffrage! See note, pages 31 and 35.

venience should be found to attend the mode *there* employed, others might and would be devised in plenty, every one of them exempt from inconvenience.

No; the difficulty lay not in the invention of a mode by which the purpose shall be *accomplished*; but in devising a mode, by which the purpose shall be made to *appear* to be intended and accomplished, to remotely situated as well as to conniving eyes, while in effect as well as design the *opposite* purpose is accomplished. Turn now to *Honourable House*, and in that seat of self-proclaimed honour, behold this difficulty, after having during a course of *ages*, been constantly surmounted, at last by miracle rendered for ever unsurmountable. Turn to *Morning Chronicle Debates*, and therein you may see that on the 6th of February, 1817, the time of *Honourable House* having already for a whole hour been occupied in *balloting* for a *Committee of Secrecy*, from the opposite side of the house, up starts Mr. *Brougham*, and with the exception of one out of one and twenty, reads the names of the members, the choice of whom was to be the result of all this secrecy.

On the next day, (7th Feb, 1817,) in speaking of the *ballot*, the noble Lord (Castlereagh) at whose motion this time wasting process has been carrying on, admits it to be *open to the insinuations* “*that had been conveyed;*” still however, (says the report) “he did not think that the House would join in reprobating a practice established by the *usage of ages*.” The most public detection of any imposture which for the delusion of the public, *Honourable House* had been used to practise, would not induce *Honourable House* to cease practising it. To *Honourable House* itself, such is the portrait given of the said *Honourable House* by a noble Lord, who, at that same moment, is occupied in giving direction to it, and whose intimate acquaintance with its true character could not be contested without injustice and folly.

In order to make a shew of argument in defending the excellence of this “*usage of ages*” (namely, ballot for committees in the House of Commons) the Noble Lord continues, “and it had been contended by many, that even the principle of universal suffrage would not be productive of a fair representation of the people without it?” True; but between the *many* and the *one* there was this difference, the ballot thus advocated by the *many* was a *real* one—the ballot advocated by the *one* was a sham one. And then, in a tone of scorn and sarcasm, the Noble Lord talks of the “*High Authority*” by which the use of this instrument of freedom is recommended—as though he would say, who dare consider it contemptible? Now, if there must be *contempt*, where will be the fittest object for it to be found? In the titled would-be impostor, who knowing a practice to be a *sham*, attempts to pass it off as *genuine*—or the untitled good man and true, who holds up to view as *sham* that which he sees to be *sham*, and as *genuine* that which he sees to be *genuine*?

For illustration, the effect of ballot, as applied to other situations, deserves notice. Whatever be the situation, and the *ultimate* effect of secrecy, its *proximate* result is the enabling the voter to give effect to *his own will*, to the exclusion of every *other*. This being true in every case, let it now be considered as a security for the faithful execution of his duty by a member of parliament in his situation of public trustee. In this situation, whatsoever be the nature of this public trust, and of the public interest for the support of which the trust has been instituted, if the member of parliament, this public trustee, thinks that his own individual interest falls in with the public interest, secrecy is the only mode that affords a sufficient assurance of the fulfilment of the intended purpose. Now mark, on the other hand, in the

present instance, the member of parliament is not only a superintendant of others, but is himself a public trustee to be superintended; and in this case, the danger is that he should think his own individual interest opposite to the public interest—to that public interest for which he is trustee. Now, he thereby stands exposed to the temptation of sacrificing such public to his own private interest; in any such situation, the greater the publicity given to his proceedings, the stronger is the check (such as it is) tending to restrain him from joining in such sacrifice; consequently, on the other hand, the more entire and assured the secrecy, the stronger the temptation, and the greater the facility afforded to such sacrifice.

Now transfer, in idea, the ballot to Honourable House: adjourned, suppose to *Utopia*, for the purpose of so ordering matters that on this one occasion the practice of Honourable House shall not be tainted with imposture. Suppose, at the same time, a member, in whose instance dependence and independence preserve both of them the customary relations; he is independent towards the swine who dare style themselves his constituents, and dependent (constitutionally dependent) towards the *Emanuel* of Judge Blackstone. First, let the case be one in which he would, in his own opinion, be a sufferer by the proposed measure if carried, (say a bad or needless *tax*)—at the same time, were he to oppose it, he would, from the resentment of the said *Emanuel*, in his own opinion, be in danger of becoming a sufferer to a *greater* amount; in this case, secrecy will in his instance operate with indisputable effect, as a shield to appropriate *honesty*. Now, let the case be one in which he would be a gainer—say, that of any one of the swarm of bills for the extirpation of English liberties; any bill, in a word, for the fastening, in a manner still more excruciating if possible, the joint yoke of Monarchy and Aristocracy upon the neck of the swinish multitude; in this case, instead of being a shield to appropriate *honesty*, secrecy would be a shield to the opposite *dishonesty*.

CHAP. XIII.

Exclusion of Placemen, &c. from the right of voting; Mischievousness and profligacy of the opposite and present arrangement.

Something has been said already on this subject in a preceeding Chapter, (V.) something also in the *Plan* itself, and surely in either of these places enough to satisfy any reasonable and unprejudiced mind: in a word any mind whatever that was not led blindfold, either by *sinister interest* or *interested* prejudice, or by an indiscriminating regard to *custom—custom*, that blind guide, to the guidance of which, if to the rejection of *reason*, none but the blind submit themselves.

What is proposed is, that there should be admitted to sit in the House, *with* right of speech and motion, but in every case, *without* the right of vote, placemen whom the King might chose to appoint, and placemen from all the departments of government, from which, at any time, information might be required*.

* The total number might be equal to the average number of Placemen who, since the Irish Union, have had seats in the House.

The Army and Navy Officers (nominated of course by the Monarch) should not be, as now, those actually engaged, or liable to be engaged in active service, which would be incompatible with that constancy of attendance, which ought to be the duty of a Member of the House of Commons; but veterans, whose service being at an end, would add to a body of professional experience, far superior to what is to be found at present, the requisite leisure to enable them constantly to attend in the House.

Now, examine the *existing* practice and imagine the consequence, if none of the members were permitted to vote who hold any place of emolument under the crown.

Let there be no mistake : by nothing that has here been said, or will be said, is any such foolish insinuation meant to be conveyed, as that the possession of an office under the crown (considered by itself) accompanied with appropriate profit, deserves any mark of reprobation. To the case in which it operates with the effect of a bribe, and to this alone, is every thing which has been, or will be, said of *offices* as masses of *corruption*, meant from first to last to be applied. No ; considered in its own nature—considered even in any other connexion, than that of the sort here in question—*office* is no more a bad thing than *money* is a bad thing. Censure passed on office thus connected, is no more a censure passed on office at large, than censure passed on a murder committed for the sake of money with a knife, would be a censure on the use of money or on the use of knives.

If sitting in perpetual judgment over the conduct of the several functionaries, possessors of offices in all the several departments of government, be not of the number of functions properly belonging to (and, in shew at least, exercised by) the Commons' House, what other functions are there that can be said to belong to that same House ? If, in so far as exercised with propriety and effect, this function of the House has not its use, to what good use can its other functions be exercised ?

It has, of course, sometimes happened to the *Judges* that a suit to which one of them was a party has been brought into the House of Lords, on the benches of which he has a seat. Of course, when the cause has come to be heard, he has been any where but upon that bench. What would his brethren—what would the bar—what would the audience—what would the public have thought and said, had he staid and voted there ? If, in a word, the principle of being judge in your own cause had been realized there ?

Suppose one of the superior judges (though it were on the occasion of but one single cause, and *that* between individual and individual) convicted of having received a *bribe*, what would be thought and said of him by bench, bar, audience, or public ? By the very height of its improbability (for assuredly few political suppositions can be more improbable) the case serves but the better, in the way of supposition, for the purpose of argument.

Well, is not this principle, so deservedly reprobated, of being judge in your own cause, exemplified and realized in the House of Commons, in the instance of every member, who holds at the same time, a political situation under the patronage of the Crown ?

In any instance, in which, in case of a division, a vote is given by any such member, the other situation having either money or money's worth attached to it—is the taint of *bribery* in any degree *less* strong upon such member, than if a bank note of a hundred pound had but just before been received by him, under an engagement (“*implied*,” or “*express*,”) that such should be the direction given to his vote ? Oh, no ; it is abundantly *more* strong ; for, in Chap. X. in which the comparison has been made between *bribery* and *terrorism*, this has been shewn already *. When a quarter's

The Officers would, of course, attend in their uniforms ; and if the Placemen were clothed in official uniforms, denoting the sort of information each was best qualified to afford, it would be of much practical advantage.

It is humbly supposed, that the choice of these uniforms would be a pleasing exercise of the taste and talents of the Prince Regent.

* See page 62

salary is put into his hand, is the effect of it in the way of seductive influence *less* than that which would be produced by money to the same amount put into his hand (suppose him not in office) under a stipulation, that during the next ensuing quarter, on every occasion on which a vote should be given by the Cabinet Ministers, his vote should be on the same side with theirs? *Less*, did I say? Not it indeed; but much greater. Why?—*Answer*. Because, in the case of a *bribe* so called, the amount of it is on each occasion *limited*; whereas, in the case of the bribe *not* so called—of the bribe received under the name of *salary* attached to an *office*, though that *one* office and no other is in the man's *possession*, yet in *prospect*, by the side of it, beneath it, and above it, each with its emoluments, is a cluster of other offices—a cluster, boundless in number and value, for self and friends.

In the highest and most important seat of judicature in existence, in which the lives and fortunes of all the inhabitants of the whole empire (not to speak of those of almost all other countries on this globe) are, day by day, if not actually at stake, liable to be at stake, the men, who (in a number, on almost every occasion, capable of deciding the part taken by the whole House, and thence by the whole government) as often as the conduct of the partnership to which they belong is called in question, sit and act, each man as judge in his own cause—are each of them, in respect of every vote he gives (I speak of those who to their seats add offices of emolument, from which they are removable at the pleasure of the Crown) tainted with *corruption*; and *that*, as hath been shewn, in a form, in comparison of which *bribery* is purity.

Suppose this told of a foreign country: with what horror would not the state of government in that country be regarded!—with what commiseration that of the wretched people!

Think then of the American United States!—think of the sentiments, with which (on so many accounts, and on none more particularly than on this account) the condition, to which *we* are doomed, cannot but be regarded by a citizen of those happy States!

Storm of indignation in the breast of Honourable Gentleman: at this page, should his patience have lasted him thus long;—down, not improbably, goes the page on the floor, and then the foot upon it. Never but of one complexion, and that the purest, are his *conduct*, his *intentions*, or his *motives*. *Self-interest*—the *motive* corresponding to that interest—never can any such sordid motive be found in so Honourable a breast!!

A hundred to one—for want of the habit of examination, no tolerably clear conception has he, on any occasion, of the *motives* by which his own conduct is determined; no tolerably clear conception of any thing that is passing in his own mind.

Now supposing he can endure the task of forming a comparative estimate of the degrees of mischievous efficiency, between *corruption* in the shape of *bribery*, commonly so called, on the one part, and *corruption* in the shape of *place-holding* and *place-hunting* on the other—in the following queries he may perhaps find some assistance, while occupied in that more instructive than pleasant process.

1. When the effect or intention of the measure brought forward by the minister be mischievous, or the measure opposed by him beneficial, in which case, his opposition if effectual is mischievous, could any means more effectual than the arrangement in question have been devised to produce the mischief, so far as it depends on the votes in that house?

2. Whether, in the case of punishable bribery, the *connexion* between

Suppose a prize offered to him, by the fertility of whose imagination that political arrangement should be proposed, which, with a view to justice and public utility, should be most flagrantly flagitious—could any *other* be found capable of making a match for *this*? Oh, no:—not although every man who ever gave himself to politics were to employ his whole life in the research. Suppose such a prize offered: would all the poetry, added to all the oratory of the Right Honourable the President of the Board of Controul, suffice him to win it?—No, not even though the Quarterly Review and British India were left to themselves, and the whole mass of his powers concentrated upon this one object.

A constitution, with this poison—slow, but not the less sure—in the bowels of it!—Rotten, even from the time that this poison was injected into it, must have been the matchless constitution—rotten at the core—and, of such rottenness, what we are now suffering is among the fruits.

As a match for *Utopia*, (or the imagined seat of the best government,) suppose a *Cacotopia*, (or the imagined seat of the worst government) discovered and described, would not filth in this shape be a “*fundamental feature*” in it?

For fear of the influence of the Crown in a relatively subordinate sphere,—Judges forsooth in certain Courts—though in certain Courts only—Judges, in Courts where *four* of them sit together, though not in the Court in which the powers of all four are condensed into one breast—Judges, in these relatively subordinate situations, fixed firmly on their benches—while on the benches on which the fate of those men and all others depends; the Judges, on whom the whole of the business depends, are thus kept—kept for ever—in a state—not only of dependency, but corruptedness! Behold here another gnat strained out, while Camels and Camelopards are swallowed.

Search the whole fabric through, where will an end be found to this tissue of hypocrisy:—to this mixture of sham securities and real mischiefs—of sham securities provided, and real mischiefs fostered?—*efficiency* to bad purposes, coupled with *inefficiency* to good ones?

Hypocrisy?—Yes: repeated Hypocrisy. Can any hypocrisy be more shameless, more transparent, than that which is manifested in marking *Bribe-taking* with *punishment*, and, as far as may be, with *infamy*—while in the person of a so styled representative of the people, Place-holding under the Crown is held in honour? The *Place-holding* held in honour?—Why?—Because the corruptors and the corrupted, the bestowers and the receivers of corruption have need that so it should be. *Bribe-taking* marked with punishment and with infamy?—Why?—Because the corruptionists, by whom corruption, together with the impunity and the honour, is given and received in that wholesale and so much more profitable shape, have no need of it in any such petty and retail shape. By vilifying it in the shape in which it is of no use to them, men think to earn the praise of virtue: of that virtue, when the opposite vice has taken such full and undisturbed possession of their practice and their hearts.

Limit the number of those pretended representatives of the people, of these real representatives of the monarch? Limit the number of those public trustees into whose hands, as sure as quarter-day comes, the bribe by which they are hired shall be paid? Limit the number of those men who, on the bench of justice, as often as they become malefactors, shall sit in judgment on their own conduct and that of their accomplices? Well:

when for this purpose a bill is ready for passing, tack on to it a *rider*, limiting the number of street-prostitutes, that shall be employed as teachers in any boarding-school for young ladies.

Once, and once only, a proposition for a limit to this effect peeped, and with congenial modesty, into one of the plans of *moderate* reform. Once, and once only; nor does it appear, that on that one occasion, a proposition so daring—so innovating—so Utopian—so near to jacobinical, found any one to second it*.

Oh, blessed constitution! that in which (for of this you will find men ready to assure you) *business could not go on*, unless, in this way, delinquents, and those upon the largest scale, were judges in their own cause! And thus, in the mind of every man who thinks *Impeachment*, the sole legal remedy against misrule, has been blotted out of the list of remedies.

Give me a place—give me a peerage—give me court favour—I will pocket 10,000*l.* of the public money—I will confess I have done so—and with honour on their lips—proclaiming each man his own honour—noble lords shall declare me innocent.

Oh, matchless constitution! And so, in this matchless constitution, (such is the nature and virtue of it,) business could not go on, unless, (besides being judges each in his own cause) those by whom every thing is done, were not corrupted throughout the whole course of their service—corrupted in a mode of corruption, beyond comparison more effectual and more mischievous than that of bribery!

Look now to the United States! Look to the General Congress! see whether in that head seat of democratic government, corruption in any shape is in any instance to be found. What? does not business then go in congress? In congress, where, in the very last year, there was a *surplus* to the amount of a *fourth* of the year's income, instead of a *deficit*, as here, to the amount of a *sixth*?†

Take the heir apparent of a *Duke* (alas! poor Duke!) and, having seated him in the House of Commons, put him into a coloured sinecure, to serve as a substitute to an automaton for signing papers: the *will* by which his hand is directed to the papers, together with the *judgment*, such as it is, that belongs to that will, safe lodged all the while in another place. In this one picture behold the anti-jacobin *triad*:—*waste*, *corruption*, and *oppression*; *waste* made of the *salary*; *corruption*, the purpose it is applied to; *oppression*, the channel through which for such purposes it is extracted. Behold the praised *preparatory seminary* for the training of young nobility to business. Behold a training school for young nobility, in the true *anti-jacobin* style. Behold in this *triad* the true and everlasting object of *anti-jacobin* worship. Behold now the *Royal Professor of Piety* in the Honourable House—should any such blasphemy as this assault his eyes—rending his heart—not at the sight of the *waste*—not at the sight of the *corruption*—not at the sight of the *oppression*—but at the allusion which, with the help of Mr. Attorney-General, he will have described; the allusion made to a something more sacred than the bible; to a substitute, which is put into the place of that old fashioned miscellany; a substitute which, in the

* See Chapter xvi. Moderate Reform, &c.

† See note, pages 18 and 19.

established church of *Scotland*, a man would no more rend his heart about, than in the established church of *Morocco*.

Reader, is the language here too warm for you? Turn to the *Plan* itself, there may you find the substance of it in as cool a state as the coldest heart can desire.

In any language, warm or cold, let him, who thinks he can, produce an answer to it.

Look once more to the United States: see whether in that seat of democracy—of representative democracy, where swinish rulers are chosen by swinish multitudes—see whether, in that seat of illegitimate incorruption and good government, any such monster is to be found, as a man constituted judge, perpetual judge, in his own cause?

O blessed constitution! a constitution in which it is become a fundamental principle (*become* I say, for for centuries it was otherwise*) that, among those who rule, there shall not be a man who is not judge in his own cause! Can it be matter of wonder, that among men thus self-qualified for the function of rendering justice, men, in whose instance the sacrifice of *universal* interest to *particular*, of *social* interest upon the *largest* scale, to *self-regarding* interest upon its own narrow scale, of *duty*, in a word, to *interest*, is matter of constant and universal practice, should not be to be numbered among those who are given to change?

And in this state is the constitution, which, in this very state, we are called upon and forced to love!

Say, Mr. Wilberforce, how long shall a state of things like this be looked upon with no other than a smiling and admiring countenance? How long shall *reform*, and not *abuse*, be the object of all fears? When immorality is thus operating upon the largest scale, say what in this world is *religion* good for, if, instead of a *check*, *immorality* finds in it a support? if, instead of a support, *morality* finds in it a *substitute*?

The man who, with open eyes, praises the constitution with these sins in it, circulating in every vein and tainting every fibre; the man who, with open eyes (and your eyes, Mr. Wilberforce, have they not had time to open themselves?) praises and cherishes all these sins, say where is the sin among them all, of which the guilt does not lie upon his head?

Sad, O sad condition of human nature! Conceive, if you can, the enormity so atrocious, that, so that it has been habitually practised with impunity by men in power, and under the protection of the law, will not (if by any strange accident exposed and complained of) find in that quarter a host of inexorable and indignant supporters and defenders;—and in that of the suffering multitude, alas! with how few exceptions!—so many indifferent and incurious observers, if not prostrate venerators!—Presented at first in its true colours, and by its proper phrase, it would not perhaps have gained acceptance. Presented in an improper phrase, dressed up in false colours, it passes without objection, and, for ages after ages, the country is tormented by it.

Ah! when will the yoke of *Custom*—Custom, the blind tyrant which all other tyrants make their slave—ah! when will that misery-perpetuating yoke be shaken off? When, when will *Reason* be seated on her throne?

* See Chapter xv. Representatives, Impermanence, &c.

CHAP. XIV.

The Importance of Universal Constancy of Attendance in the House.

The subjects proposed to be considered in this chapter are :—The actual state of things in respect of attendance :—Mischiefs arising from non-attendance, in respect of moral aptitude, in respect of intellectual aptitude*, and by securing greater attendance on the corrupt side.—The interests by which the numbers in attendance are determined.—The inconsistency between the licentiousness on this point in this situation, and the comparative strictness in other public situations.—Remedy from any exertions of individuals impossible ; the disorder incurable except by radical reform ; the constitution already subverted by it.—Whether abdication may not be more truly affirmed of the Honourable House than of James the Second.—The incurableness of the disorder, and the consequently incurable corruptness of the Honourable House, declared by *Hutzel*, Chief Clerk of the House.

Actual State of Things in respect of Attendance.

The power of the *Commons House*, instead of being what it is pretended to be—a check upon the power of the Monarch, is an instrument of misrule in his hands ; an instrument by which he has been enabled to sacrifice, and accordingly has sacrificed, the universal interest to a cluster of particular interests, of which his own personal interest is at the head†. Behold, in this state of things, the mass of abuse to which it is the object of parliamentary reform to devise and to apply a remedy. Among the requisites for accomplishing this object, is the detecting and holding up to view in its true colours, every particular abuse which shall have been found to enter into the composition of the mass ; every *arrangement*, every *custom*, which, as a co-operating cause, may be found contributing to produce the disastrous effect. Of such of the component abuses as have as yet been brought to view, not only the existence and the nature, but, to a considerable degree, the *extent* of the abuse has in general been notorious. So, in the present instance, the *existence*, and, in some measure, the *nature* of the abuse has been notorious, but assuredly not the *evil consequences* in all their magnitude and variety ; and, as to the *extent*, information on this head is a treasure that remains yet to be dived for in the ocean in which it lies drowned.

For taking and presenting a clear, a correct, and complete view of the state of the House in this respect, during a given period (say from the commencement of the present reign) the following present themselves as the heads under which matter should be collected.

[Sources of information, the *Journals* of the House, the Votes of the House, and such accounts as are extant of the *Debates* ; of the *incorrectness* or *incompleteness* of which no Member can have any moral right to make complaint, until he has done whatsoever may be in his power towards the removing, in the one only way, this inconvenience.]

1. Number of *days* on which, in the course of each *year*, the House was sitting, and *business*, in some shape, accordingly *done*.

* See these explained in the note, pages 41 and 42.

† See page 5, last paragraph ; 8, 3d paragraph ; 10, 2d paragraph ; 11, 1st and 2d paragraphs.

2. Number of *days* in which the *Speaker took the Chair*; but, for want of the requisite number of members (*viz.* forty) business could not be begun; whereupon, the hour being arrived, adjournment took place of course.

3. Number of *days* in which business having been begun, and the requisite number of members present complete at first, by the departure of members a deficiency in the number present, as compared with the number that should be present, having been produced, and notice publicly taken of it, the business was stopped, and an adjournment took place of course.

4. Number of *days* in which, a deficiency having taken place, the business went on notwithstanding; the *Speaker* sitting all the while and beholding the deficiency, but no other member standing up to notice it.

5. Numbers of the *Members* on both sides, on the several *divisions*, which took place. The list of these divisions, with the numbers, being rendered as complete as may be, then will come to be made a selection of *two* contrasted classes of cases; *one*, in which the *importance* of the question being in a remarkable degree *high*, the *numbers* were in a remarkable degree *low*; the other, in which, the importance of the question being in a remarkable degree *low*, the *numbers* were in a remarkable degree *high*.

6. Numbers of *Calls of the House* in each year, with the numbers in the *divisions*, if any which took place on the days appointed*.

There remain two other topics, in relation to which, any information (supposing it attainable) could not fail to afford additional instruction; but of which, so far at least as regards *time past*, the attainment presents itself as hopeless, unless possibly in a very small number of instances.

7. The absolute and comparative number of *place holders* and non-*place-holders* on each division. From a document of this sort, would be shewn with certainty, the number of the individuals who were *corruption-eaters*; but of the *corruption hunters*, no precise number could ever be distinguished; for under the influence of the ever attracting, and scarcely resistible rewards

* The importance of this body of evidence will, it is believed, be seen in a light continually clearer and stronger, in proportion as this inquiry advances. To complete any such task as that of collecting it, would require abundantly more time, not only than *now*, but moreover than at any *future* time, out of the small expectable remnant of my life it would be possible for me to spare. If, to any person who has sufficient leisure, it should appear that, in regard to the whole, or any part of this mass of information, the search would afford a sufficient promise of being productive of adequate use, the consciousness of rendering to the public that service will be his reward: and if, for the purpose of enabling me to give to the stock so collected such useful applications as may be in my power, he will have the goodness to communicate it to me by letter, he will be the object of an inward sentiment of esteem and gratitude in the breast of a man, from whom no outward demonstrations of it can, in the vulgar signification of the word, be of use to any one.

Under such heads as the above, with the addition of any such others as may suggest themselves as promising to conduce to the desired purpose, the matter, though it were but of a *single Session*, might, in the way of *sample*, be of no small use. Suppose it were the last session; and from thence the research might be pursued, according to opportunity, from year to year. Supposing the research carried through more years than one, in this case, for exhibiting such differences as, in respect of members present and other particulars, cannot but have been made by the Irish Union, it is manifest how much the utility of such a process would be increased, by taking for one of them a year before, and for another a year after that event.

So long as it may be my fortune to escape the doom with which, in proportion to his activity in the service of his country in this laborious and melancholy line, every man who dares to manifest his love for it, and for what remains undestroyed of the useful parts of its constitution, is at this time threatened; so long, in a word, as it shall be my lot to remain alive, unkilld, and UNBASTILED, so long will every such contribution find, in the quarter to which it is consigned, the sincere endeavour to make the most, and best use of it.

of Corruption, the difficulty would be, among the whole remainder of the numbers voting on this side, to find so much as the single individual, who did not belong to this class.

8. The number of members present at the time of the *division*, compared with the numbers present at different portions of the time employed in the debate. In ordinary tribunals, the two operations of *hearing* and *deciding*, being expressly included in the same commission, and *hearing* being regarded as a useful, not to say a necessary preparative to *deciding*—he who performs either of them, performs both. But in this extraordinary tribunal (as every body knows), the proportion is not small of those distinguishing, more than distinguished, Honourables, who, regarding *hearing* as a useless formality, come to the *deciding* at once; by which principle of dispatch, a proportionate saving of *time* is effected. *Quere*, on each division, the number of these economists, and the quantity of the saving effected by each?

Mischiefs from Non-attendance: 1. Mischief in respect of Moral Aptitude.

In the Plan itself, and in page 29, “5. *universal constancy of attendance*,” may be seen how, in the license given to neglect of duty in this shape, is contained a *license*, by which, without danger of shame or reproach in any shape, every man is empowered to produce exactly half the effect, which could have been produced by an uninterrupted series of votes, given by him in support of a series of measures, not only corrupt but scandalous: and so scandalous, that (whatsoever had been his wishes) had he been present, he could not have prevailed with himself to abstain from voting in opposition to them in every instance.

2. Intellectual Mischief; Deficiency in respect of appropriate Intellectual Aptitude and appropriate Active Talent.*

Suppose a man not to be deficient in honesty, the propriety of the direction given to his vote will depend principally upon the justness of his judgment.

If the measure (any measure) have not originated with him, the aptness of his speeches will depend principally upon his active talents. When a measure has not originated with him, its propriety, together with that of the occasional written instrument necessary to it, depends on his judgment—but the matter contained in them, upon his active talent.

It has been already mentioned, that a *want* of knowledge, judgment, and active talents, is among the unavoidable effects of the present system†.

In order to obtain knowledge, judgment, and talents, *hard labour* is necessary. But the titled and opulent are seldom given to hard labour, and therefore seldom possess knowledge, judgment, and talents; because, as the man of title and wealth, is already in possession of *consideration* from his rank and opulence, he is the less disposed to exert himself to furnish his mind with those endowments, which, of themselves, are sufficient to give consideration to other men—untitled, and ungorged with wealth.

Upon the whole therefore, the man of wealth and title is disqualified from using the power attached to the most important of all offices (that of representative of the people) with any benefit to the universal interest.

Of the ways by which a seat is obtained, *Connexion* is that by which the greatest chance is left, for a tolerable stock of these endowments. Why?

* See note pages 41 and 42 for an explanation of these terms.

† See page 50, paragraphs 3d and 4th; 58, paragraph 1st.

Because, in the instance of a patron (rendered so either by proprietorship or terrorism), it will sometimes happen, that (on failure of all persons connected by relationship) some person shall have been recommended to his choice as distinguished by the possession of the endowments in question.

In this state of things, such stock of these two intellectual endowments, as is to be found in Honourable House, will, generally speaking, be almost confined to men seated by *connexion*, with the addition of men seated by *profession*, but in a more particular degree to the latter. In that House, is not the term *Country-gentleman* a sort of by-word? Is it not commonly regarded as presenting, in one word, the idea of a sort of character compounded of mental indolence, mental vacuity, and mental weakness?

In those two quarters then, *connexion* and *profession*, the two intellectual endowments in question are almost exclusively looked for.

Well; and suppose them found in those same quarters—what is the consequence? Is the universal interest benefitted by this means? On the contrary, much more probably is it injured. It is only when these two endowments are united with honesty, that the universal interest will receive any benefit; for if the honesty be not united to these intellectual endowments, that interest will be sacrificed. But the higher the degree in which these endowments are possessed by any individual, the higher will be the price which they will fetch at the *open market* of which C——r-General is *Clerk*; the higher the price, of course, the greater the temptation, and the less the probability of resistance.

In this state of things, the multitude being prepared by their intellectual weakness, for receiving mental poison, observe what will be the effect of the superficial arguments employed for injecting it, by the select few.

Behold a man gorged with the public money obtained on false pretences out of the taxes; a man, whose whole political life has been employed in helping to give increase to waste, corruption, and the consequent oppressions; when the time comes, summoning up all his powers, to guard this complication of disorders against the only remedy, a radical reform; and the history of any one such individual, is the history of a class. To the pure, all things are pure, says Paul, in the Books of the Christians. *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*—says a maxim of the Old School Logic. The effect of whatsoever is received, will be correspondent to the constitution of that, by which, or him, by whom, it is received. Poison such as that would have no effect on a mind prepared by sound and manly instruction for the resisting of it; but those with which it has to deal, are minds that, by want of instruction, or by such instruction as is worse than none, have been prepared for yielding to it; instruction, by which the whole duty of man is summed up in the “prostration of understanding and will” at the feet of a set of men, tied by every bond that corruption can devise, to those habits of self-blinded partiality, with which all prudence and all justice are equally and utterly incompatible.

The more attentively the stock of evidence, which the existing state of things affords, is looked into—the more clearly will the operation of the above causes of unfitness be seen exemplified, and their efficiency demonstrated.

Look at the Debates; yes, and if your patience will suffer you, look *into* these same Debates.

Look *into* them, and what do you find. To a prodigious extent, not only no mark of talents, no mark of knowledge and judgment, but on the contrary, (even on the most important occasions) proofs, and those deplorably abundant, that no use has been attempted to be made of the intellectual

part of man. It is in the *will* alone, and the passions and affections, that put it in motion, that any marks of exercise can be discerned. Abuse, in the strongest and most unqualified terms that passion can supply, without stating any specific grounds for the opinions expressed by it, this, together with trivial fallacies,* constitutes Honourable and Right Honourable speeches in general, and particularly in the great subject of Parliamentary Reform.

With a degree of energy, proportioned to the dangerousness of the disease, and the salutary efficiency of the proposed remedy, *wild, visionary, impracticable*, mischievous, and so forth, are the imputations cast upon it—gross ignorance, conjoined with mischievous madness, the attributes ascribed to the authors and supporters of it.

By the barking of a dog, by the screaming of a parrot, might as much light be thrown upon the question, as by a vast proportion of the whole number of speeches, reported as having issued from the lips of Honourable

* The following note is much too excellent to be omitted, and at the same time, no alterations could have made it *generally* intelligible. It may be sufficient to say that those who are not in some degree familiar with logical tactics, may pass it by without in the least injuring the sense of the text.—EDITOR.

By an ingenious cultivator of the physical branch of art and science, *the clouds* have been endeavoured to be brought under the dominion of the tactical branch of logic. With somewhat better profit, in the shape of practical use, might the like useful operation be applied to the congeries of political fallacies—those clouds of the mental atmosphere. Take for an example of the *genera*, or some of them, suppose the following:—*argumentum ad verecundiam*—*ad quietem*—*ad socordiam, sive ignaviam*—*ad superstitionem*—*ad superbiam*—*ad metum, sive timorem*—*ad odium*—*ad amicitiam*—*ad invidentiam*; Of the *Classes*, under which these *genera* might be arranged—*argumenta ad affectus*—to the affections and passions as above—*ad imaginationem*, to the imagination—*ad iudicium*, to the judicial faculty. Example of a set of species under the genus *ad odium*: 1. *Bad-design-imputer's* argument. 2. *Bad-motive imputer's* ditto. *Bad character-imputer's* ditto. *Varieties* under the *Bad-character imputer's* argument. Imputation *à se ipso*—*à socio*—*à consentaneis*—*à cognominibus*.

A characteristic, which would be found common to by far the greater number of the articles in the system, is *irrelevancy*—irrelevancy with reference to the subject in debate. This character will, at a first glance, be seen to belong to the class commonly denominated *personalities*, to which belong two genera—the *argumentum ad odium*, as above particularized, and the *argumentum ad amicitiam*.

One day, by the sun of Reason, will all these clouds of the mind be dissipated.

Conceive in vision *Honourable House*, or any other place of debate (if any such there be) in which debates are free—conceive therein a complete list of these clouds of the mind, made out and digested in the form of a table:—conceive the Chairman, his hand provided with a wand, to be occasionally employed like that of *Don Pedro Rezio*, in the service of ridding the science in the most expeditious manner of all intruding superfluities. By a touch of this wand, applied to this or that article in the table, might any orator whose speech being, as at present, from beginning to end, as so many speeches are composed of elements no other than such in those speeches, by the whole amount of them so much worse than nothing—by one such silent motion—and without need of any such cry as *Order! Order!*—be put to silence. Continuing the vision, conceive in *Honourable House*, a table of this sort, and in the hand of Mr. Speaker a wand the usefulness of which would be rather more obvious than that of any of the wands and gold-sticks which are seen in other places—of such an instrument, aptly and steadily applied, what might be the effect? A *Meeting*, of which, with the exception of the quantity of sound employed in the giving utterance to *Motions*, and other instruments meant to be consigned to *Votes* and *Journals*, a *Quakers' Meeting* of the silent sort might serve as a prototype.

Awakening from these visions, of the set of fallacies above exemplified, conceive the list completed and systematized, how useful, as well as how abundant, might not the instruction be, which, in the published collections of *Debates*, might be afforded by a few words in the margin indicative of the *genera* and *species*, to which the several fallacies, employed in the course of the several speeches, were found to belong? In the shape of logical instruction, what a value might not thus be given to matter in itself so much worse than valueless!

Gentlemen, Right Honourable Gentlemen, Noble Lords, not to speak of Noble and Learned ones.

Let not this be misconceived. It is not the *weakness* of the arguments of these men that is intended to be exposed, but *the utter absence of all argument*—of every thing which even the individual himself who uttered it could have mistaken for argument. Ungrounded opinion, delivered in the garb of passionate will, is all we have from them. And with what sort of expectation is the passion manifested? With no other than this, that so great is the authority of the orator, that all must be convinced, by the mere knowledge of what is his judgment. What is then the cause of this expectation? Oh, nothing less than this—It has been already mentioned that honesty is an appendage of rank and opulence, but this is not all—wisdom is another. O, yes; he who has wealth and title possesses honesty and wisdom as matters of course, and thus the very causes that impede his possession of wisdom are the ones supposed—how falsely—to give it to him. Accordingly a man of *twenty thousand* a year will speak with twice the persuasive force of a man of *ten thousand* a year: a man who is everlastingly Noble, with some number of times the force of one who is but Honourable. Such is the expectation of the man himself, and unhappily, such is the force of inveterate prejudice; neither is that expectation by any means so groundless as it is to be wished it were.

3. *Mischief by securing greater Attendance on the corrupt side.*

A matter which henceforward should never be out of mind is this, that it is only on the supposition, that in the reformed state of things, there would be a sufficient number of members possessing the requisite honesty and judgment to cause them to vote on the proper side, to outnumber, on all occasions, such members as by sinister interest, interested prejudice, natural weakness, or adopted prejudice, are stationed under the dominion of C——r-General and Co.—and on this supposition only, that any such numerous attendance can be any thing but an object of comparative indifference.

On this supposition, as a necessary basis, must be considered as grounded every thing which in the course of the present chapter remains to be said.

In the present state of things, and under any other than what is looked for from the proposed radical reform, the existence of any such majority against corruption presents itself as being, even on a supposition of the most perfect constancy of attendance, altogether hopeless—(unless it be on some extraordinary occasion, on which, in the minds of a sufficient number of corruptionists—whether *corruption-eaters* or but *corruption-hunters*—it happens that some particular interests of their own, or their share in the universal interest, operates with such force as for the moment to overbalance the force of their partnership share in the corruption concern.) Thence the demand for the *other* proposed arrangements*.

But when the state of interests has been fully examined, it will be seen that the repugnance produced by all the other arrangements put together, would scarcely exceed that which this single one would of itself be sufficient to produce; and that by nothing less than the system of radical reform in *all* its parts could abuse in this *one* shape be excluded.

The mischief produced by the habit of non-attendance in its present shape and the sinister interest by which that habit is used and fostered, shall now be shewn.

* See Chapter V. pages 24 to 29, and Chapter VI. page 30, for a detailed account, and a list of all the arrangements of radical Parliamentary Reform.

The sinister interest which the Ministerial leaders have in the absence of members, whose votes and speeches would have operated on the opposite side, is too manifest to need explanation or comment.

This sinister interest may be divided into two branches: sinister interest *of the day* and sinister interest *of the Session*.

The sinister interest of the *day* is that which regards the business of the day; the fewer the adversaries present, not only is the victory more assured before hand and more signal afterwards, but the time consumed in making, hearing, and answering speeches, and the labour in making and prompting speeches is so much the less.

The habit of absence would be of no use to C——r-General and Co. if the number of absentees were as great in proportion on his side as on the opposite side. But of this there is never any fear; the means, that is, the sinister influence which they have in their hands, being adequate, not only to the purpose of securing conformity in case of attendance, but moreover to the more difficult purpose of securing attendance.

It is true that, in this instance as in most others, whatsoever the ministerial side, for the time being, has in *possession*, the *Opposition* side has in prospect. But, in this case, so mighty is the difference between *possession* and *prospect*, that compared with the substantial instrument of compulsion in the hands of the Ministry, that which the opposition leaders have in theirs is little better than a shadow of it.

In the sinister interest of *the Session*, note moreover two distinguishable branches, the *effective* and the *preventive*.

First, As to the *effective* sinister interest; it consists in the increased *facility* as well as *certainty* given to the adoption of all such measures as it may be the wish of the administration to see carried into effect. As the *Session*, and along with it the season, advances, the attractions of the town diminish, those of the country increase. The *inducements*, by the force of which *absence* is produced, gain strength; and the number of the individuals, in whose instance they preponderate, receives continual increase.

If the diminution of numbers produced by this cause were the same on both sides, there would be no such sinister interest on the Ministerial, any more than on the opposition side. But, for a counterpoise to the force of this cause of absence, the Ministerial side has a power of which their adversaries are destitute. With the highest degree of efficiency, as above shewn, the Cabinet Ministers command the attendance both of the removable *corruption-eaters* of the inferior classes, and the *corruption hunters*.

Second, The *preventive* interest consists in the certainty given to the defeat of all adverse measures on the other side. *Good* (says somebody); *but what are these measures, which, with reference to the side in question, come under the denomination of adverse measures?* Answer. All measures whatsoever. By every measure carried into effect by the adversary, be it what it may, if popular, *reputation* is gained; and whether popular or not, *power* displayed. “*There must not be two Chancellors of the Exchequer*,”—is one of the few sayings remembered of *Pitt the second*.

The same periodical cause of flight adds a further assurance from a still more advantageous source—*pre-occupation* of the House. Partly by the established rules of proceeding, partly by the majorities on the habitual existence of which their continuance in their situation depends, the members of the Cabinet possess at all times a comprehensive command of the business of the House, by which are determined, not only the *choice* of the parts to be admitted, but the *order* in which they shall be admitted—admittance for all *their own measures* is at all times of course

secured, and therefore command of the quantity of *time* necessary for that purpose. This portion being thus sure to them, it is therefore their interest to shorten whatever portion might otherwise be occupied by business not originating in themselves.

For this purpose *three* expedients present themselves. 1. *Deferring the commencement* of the session to as late a point of time as possible. 2. Inserting into the whole length of the allotted period, on as many pretences as can be found, times of *recess* as many, and each of them as long as possible. 3. Rendering as large as possible the number of the days, in which, by the original or incidental failure of the numbers requisite to give validity to the proceedings, the carrying on of the business is prevented.

Now, then, on every day, on which it suits their purpose, that the number of members necessary to give validity should be present, by means of their official *whippers-in*, it is evidently in the power of the Treasury to secure, and by circular letters and word of mouth applications, they accordingly do secure, the presence of that necessary number: this object thus secured, in the same hands, being likewise the legal powers of giving to the whole Session whatsoever length it may happen to their purposes to require, on every other day, it is therefore their interest, that there should not be a sufficient number of persons present. The sinister interest of C——r-General can sustain no loss from any barren day, or from any number of barren days; because for days thus lost at a former part of the session, it is in his power to add at the latter part as many as he pleases; that is at the part at which the ratio of the number on the opposite side to the number on his own side will be less and less.

It might sometimes happen by a conspiracy on the part of the opposition members, to flock into the scene of action in numbers greater than usual, that the Cabinet Junta would be taken by surprise; and, in this way something might happen to be done, which could not be undone by any succeeding majority; *evidence* for example procured, and admission thus given to lights which could not afterwards be extinguished. To obviate any such inconvenience, a sort of *rule of courtesy* has, with the concurrence of both parties, been established; that no motion of considerable importance shall be made without previous notice. In this rule however it does not appear that motions for *official evidence* have been considered as included: hence an accident which is said to have sometimes happened, is that evidence, which in case of an attendance sufficiently full, would with the most inexorable effrontery have been refused, has by surprise been extorted. One mode of denying justice, and by far the most effectual, is the denial of the evidence necessary to the obtainance of it; because by the mere production of the evidence, justice, in so far as it depends upon the *tribunal of public opinion*, will frequently be done. It may therefore be taken for a *general*, not to say *universal* rule, that, whenever denial is opposed to a motion for special evidence, that denial has self-confessed delinquency at the bottom of it. By the *tribunal of public opinion* it ought to be taken for *confessional* evidence of guilt, and that evidence *conclusive*; and *judgment* for the utmost possible amount of the thus concealed guilt pronounced accordingly.

In this way, many useful measures are prevented from being brought forward, and others are prevented from being productive of the desirable and desired effect. There is another set of means in the hands of the Minister, of which neither the existence nor the efficiency depend considerably upon any exertion of *his*, but which, together with the system under which they are bred, will of course find on his part a degree of protection propor-

tioned to the service derived from them by his own sinister interest. To this head may be referred—

I. The avocations produced by the *separate*, and consequently with reference to the public service, the *sinister* interests appertaining to the several professions: those of—1. Lawyers—practising Lawyers; 2. Army Officers; 3. Navy Officers; 4. Diplomats; 5. Governors, and other persons in office, in any of the distant dependencies.

II. The avocations, specially incident to the situation of the Members for Ireland.

Thus the *universal* interest is made to give way to each *particular* interests; and not only is absence produced on the part of the individuals, but, in many instances, and to a considerable extent, not only for the accommodation of individuals, but for the accommodation of a whole professional class, particular business is put off. Thus, by means of *terms* and *arrests*, it having been originally contrived, by and for the particular interest of the *Lawyer-class*, that during certain periodically-recurring-portions of every year, denial of justice should take place, so it is, that for the incidental accommodation of an individual partner in that separate and sinister interest, the whole business of the nation moreover is incidentally put off. And, forasmuch as in their situation of *corruption-eaters* (among Lawyers) the Crown Lawyers, essentially acting partners in the firm of C——r-General and Co. are constantly in the number of the members, while *corruption-hunters* are naturally more numerous on the prosperous, than on the unprosperous side of the House, here may be seen another advantage, which the great sinister interest of C——r-General and Co. draws to itself from the cluster of the lesser interests with which it is surrounded.

Interests, by which the numbers of Members present are determined.

The whole collection of interests, by which the numbers of the members present in the House are determined, may be divided into two heads:—

I. Interests which tend to *clear* the House, or *diminish* the attendance of members.

II. Interests which tend to *fill* the House, or *increase* the attendance of members.

The **FIRST** of these heads may be divided in the following manner:

1. Interests peculiar to those who hold the situation of ministers.
2. Miscellaneous interests.

The *Miscellaneous* interests may be divided thus:—

1. Interests incident to all men—which are these:—

Interest created by the aversion to labour.

Interest created by miscellaneous private business.

Interest created by the love of pleasure.

2. Interests peculiar to professions, offices, and counting-houses; that is, when the profit to be obtained by attending to the profession, office, or counting-house, is greater than could generally be expected from an attendance in parliament.

The **SECOND** of these heads may be divided in the following manner:—

1. Interests peculiar to those who hold the situation of minister.
2. Miscellaneous interests.

The *Ministerial* interests may be divided thus:—

Interest created by the *pleasure* of exercising power.

Interest created by the *fear* of losing it, by want of attendance in the House.

Interest created by the *hope* of increasing, or giving stability to it.

The *Miscellaneous* Interests may be divided thus:—

The Interest created by the hope of strengthening a man's own interest, by raising himself in the public opinion.

The Interest created by the hope of serving a friend, expecting, of course, a return of the like good office.

The Interest created by the hope of serving his party.

The Interest created by the hope of witnessing an interesting debate.

Well: and in the whole of the entire list of the causes of attendance thus professed to be made out, is no place to be found for that cause, which consists in a sense of duty? Candour! what is become of Candour? Charity! what is become of Christian Charity? Answer.—Misrepresentation is not at all prescribed by either of these virtues.

If in any degree worthy notice, any such virtuous motive operated, when the number of members is 658, the House would never present the appearance of a desert.

Unhappily, in fact and experience, not a session perhaps was ever seen, in which a number of such universally assumed holidays have not been, in that high school of self-licensed truantism and indiscipline.

Now, in addition to each man's particular interest, there is his share in the universal interest; but, if with the aid of all the particular interests, (as above) the House is not regularly filled, much less would it be so by this alone. Not, that in default of all these other interests, the machine of state would be in any great danger of falling to pieces; there is no fear, but, that in some way or other, it would be kept together, and some interest created for the special purpose.

Would you see an example of such factitious interest—look to the House of Lords. For giving exercise to that branch of the supreme power (which is so useful, not only to the high branch, by which it is exercised, but to *one still higher*)—*three* is the number of persons that has been made necessary and sufficient. Now, of what persons is this *triad* composed? *Answer.* Of the Lord Chancellor—of the Noble Chairman of Committees—and of a Prelate—out of the thirty Prelates, Right Reverend and Most Reverend, some one by whom the blessed comforts of religion have just been administered to the congregation so composed. And, what is the immediate cause of the care thus taken by each of his own share in the universal interest? In the instance of the *Lord Chancellor*, his office of Speaker, with the mass of emolument in the shape of salary fees, and patronage, attached to it: in the instance of the *Noble Chairman of Committees*, his salary with its *et cæteras*. Remains the *Prelate*—the only person of the three, for whose benefit to pay him for the care thus taken by himself of himself, no special immediate interest is created (as above) at the expense of swinish multitude.

From the example thus exhibited in the Lords, learn how, in the Commons the immediate interest, necessary to preserve the machine from falling to pieces, would in this supposed case be created. Power without obligation in the rulers, corruptors and corrupted;—obligation without power in the swinish multitude—such is the scheme of division carried into effect. To the Dives's, the good things; to the Lazarus's the evil things. Propose that, in this his high situation, Noble Lord or Honourable Gentleman should stand engaged to take care of his own interest without being paid for it, Noble Lord or Honourable Gentleman would stand aghast at the injustice.

Inconsistency of the unlimited Non-attendance in this, in comparison with the indispensable Attendance in other Offices.

How is it, that in this office of representative (unless that of the monarch be excepted) beyond comparison the most important of all offices—the office before which the business of every other office is liable to be brought, should be the office in which neglect of duty is at the same time more extensive, more habitual, more constant, more manifest, more manifestly mischievous, more scandalous than in any other? This is a sort of riddle; but the solution comes along with it. The possession of supreme power unincumbered either with obligation or responsibility, is quite sufficient to account for it.

Look at the situation of the twelve Judges: look at the situation of the eleven Masters in Chancery; look at the situation of the Commissioners of the Excise; look at the situation of Commissioners of the Navy—in all those offices, so comparatively narrow in respect of their field of action, so inferior in respect of the extent and importance of their business, where will you see any thing like it?

In the situation of Member of the House of Commons, a man may remain for a whole Parliament; no efficient obligation for so much as a single day's attendance, sees M.P. written after his name—swaggers, and franks letters:—throws upon the shoulders of the swinish multitude the burthen of payment for his private correspondence. This and more is what in that public situation a man may do for his private benefit, without rendering to the public, in any shape whatever, an atom of service*. *Call of the House:* yes, if so it be that he is within call, and grudges the trouble of sending a false excuse. But more on this head a little further on.

In one point of view, this abuse is even more flagrant than *sinecurism*. By a *sinecurist*, as such, nothing at all is done: nothing is there, so long as that title belongs to him, that can be done by him. But if not any thing at all, so neither can any mischief be done by him.—Thus as with *sinecurist*.—How is it with *Honourable Gentleman*? For no one good purpose is he under any obligation whatever to bestow a single moment of attendance: while, for all bad purposes, he may attend as often as he pleases.

Professed sinecures being thus disposed of, look through the whole scale of office:—begin at the bottom, end at the top; see whether at any one point in it any such monstrosity is to be found.

Look at the *Exciseman*. Were but a small part of that truantism which is committed by Honourable Gentleman manifested by the Exciseman, dismissal (*unless he had good borough interest*) would be his portion, nor that portion undeserved.

Speak of me in the same breath with a fellow such as that? (cries Honourable Gentleman, swelling, strutting, and making up to the glass, to view himself):—*compare me to an Exciseman?—a man of my "PROPERTY?"—a man of my "influence?"* and that "*influence,*" all of it so legitimate? Chair! Chair! Look to the Chair! Sir, is it not legitimate? Have you not told us so?

Oh, yes, Sir! all of it legitimate; the influence of your property, if you have any, and that property of the right sort. But this property of yours, is it of the right sort?—is it of any sort?—Was it really by property that you forced your way in?

* Some fifty or sixty years ago, a Mr. Luther sat for Essex. Report of the time, 20,000*l.* the expense; staid out his six or seven years, and but once in the whole time took his seat. All this cannot but be more particularly known to Mr. Conyers.

was it not by connexion that you crept your way in?—and whatsoever it was that brought you in, are you now really worth a groat? No: nor yet half a groat, if your name be Sheridan, or . . . (But for proving the species here, one name is enough.)

An Exciseman! Compare you to an Exciseman? Sir, if your title to respect were as sure as that of an Exciseman, much surer would it be than it is. Of an Exciseman two things are sure to be true: 1. that in a shape appropriate to the situation in which he has procured himself to be placed, he possesses in some degree the connected qualifications of appropriate intellectual aptitude, and appropriate active talent*; for without them he could not be what he is: 2. that, by means of these same endowments, service to the public is, in a certain shape, and a certain quantity, actually rendered by him. In his instance, both these good things are sure to be true:—in yours, which of them?—Sir, neither the one nor the other: no, nor any other whatsoever.

Up now to the opposite end of the scale. Lift up your eyes to the throne:—behold the MAN that sits on it. In principle or practice, even in that situation, is any such monstrosity to be found? In that situation, assuredly there are few, if any, who would deny, that in their ever legitimate situation, the power belonging to it is a trust. Here, in this country, by our own Monarch, by our Prince Regent, in so many words,—while Fox was the word of words—was it not declared to be?

So much for principle. But in this case—what unhappily is not true in every case, we have not only acknowledged principle, but in some degree even accordant practice. To papers upon papers does the Monarch give his signature: to papers, not for his own benefit merely, but for the people's likewise: to papers to which his signature must be given, and is given, or the machine of the state would fall to pieces: to papers for every body's use: not like Honourable Gentleman's signature, for his own use, or that of his own connexions merely, and to save them the expense of postage.

Let there be no misconception. Mark well the point that is here in question. It is not the *quality*, not the *goodness*, not the *value*, of the service performed; but the fact, the mere fact—that service is performed: not the propriety of that, which, in cases of attendance is done, but the fact, the mere fact of the attendance.

Individual Delinquents blameless—who, in reality, are blameable.

What is the practical object of the view thus given of the state—not of the *representation*—not even of the *misrepresentation*—but of the *non-representation*—the habitual and established *non-representation*—together with the causes by which it is produced? To induce individuals to perform their duty, by a strict attendance in the House—from a sense that it is their duty? No, no, indeed: as well to the deaf adder, or to the congregation, to which no minister but *Saint Anthony* ever preached, might any such sermon be addressed. The answer, that would be given by an individual to whom, any reproaches or exhortations were addressed, with a view to induce him to attend the House more frequently, is obvious.

By no vote of mine—(would he say)—unless accompanied by an adequate number of other votes on the same side, would any effect be produced. But, with the exception of the Ministry, of no such requisite number can any sufficiently grounded assurance be ever entertained. In their hands is seen and felt a mass of power, of which, to a sufficient extent, the efficiency is certain:—power exercisable at all times: to the pack which they keep belongs an establishment of whippers-in, to whose voice all such dogs as have a certain collar about their necks are instinctively obedient: to them it does belong to compel them to come in: to them? yes: but to no one else: in their hands is the already sensible and tangible whip: to the opposition leaders, nothing but the shadow of it: to no others so much as that shadow.

Under such circumstances, where is the individual to be found on whom

* See note, pages 41 and 42.

reproach can ever attach itself with any decided force? "Every body's business is nobody's business;" not less true than trivial is that familiar adage.

Honourable House incorrigible : this Disorder incurable : the Constitution subverted by it.

Well, now, note what has been seen:—1. The nature of the species of delinquency in question.—2. The vast, the undeniable mischievousness of it.—3. The impossibility of the mischief's ever finding a remedy in the exertions of individuals on individual occasions.—4. The sinfulness of the sin, in the breast of every individual who, after proof of its sinfulness, shall forbear to contribute his best endeavours, by whatsoever sweeping measures may be most surely effectual to clear the House of it: and if he himself is of the number of sinners, thus to bring forth the only fruits meet for repentance. All these things being seen, can there be any man found who can expect that the House will reform itself? If so, his mistake is but too plain.

On this occasion, as on all others, before you put yourself to any expense in *argument*, look first to *the state of interests*: think to overcome the force of interest by the force of argument? Think as well to take *Lisle* or *Mantua* by pease blown out of a pea-shooter. The man who hastened to *Rome* to convert the *Pope* to Protestantism—never let him be out of mind. When the *Pope* has put on Protestantism, look then to Honourable House: then it is that your eyes shall behold Honourable House putting on *uncorruption* in the room of that *corruption* which sits now so easy on it. Think then whether there be any shape in which uncorruption would sit upon Honourable House more gallingly than in that of *universal constancy of attendance*! a shape, under the pressure of which (unless they respectively gave up their seats) the *Land Officer*, the *Sea Officer*, the *Diplomatist*, would have to give up their *commissions*—the *Governor*, or other *Office-bearer* in the distant dependencies, his *office*—the *Lawyer* his *practice*—the *Official Lawyer* his *office* and his *practice*—the *Fox-hunter*, for months together, his *dogs* and *horses*—the *Opera-fancier* his *Operas*—the *Bond-street lounge*, his *lounches*.

Address yourself to the man who sits by *propriatorship*—address yourself to the man who has come in by *terrorism*—address yourself to the man who has come in by *bribery*—address yourself to the man who, through *propriator*, *terrorist*, or *bribe-giver*, has come in by *purchase*: with the exception of half a hundred or thereabouts, address yourself to any one of the 658—tell him that his situation is a *trust*; that to fulfil that trust is a *duty*:—tell him that the situation of Monarch is a trust—that the *Prince Regent* has declared it so to be, and that in the hands even of the *Prince Regent* it never has been, nor ever can be, a perfect sinecure. Talk to him in any such strain—so you may if you please, but first prepare yourself for a horse-laugh in your face. *The Prince Regent, indeed? yes, to him it is indeed a trust: it is not for him to do nothing but what he pleases. O yes; duty, and duty enough, has he to do: papers upon papers must he sign when the time comes: it is for that that he is where he is. Sir, my case, be pleased to understand, is quite a different one. At this time, and at all times, I can do, Sir, and I will do, Sir, as I please. When it is more pleasant to me to go in than to stay out, I go in: when it is more pleasant to me to stay out than to go in, I stay out. This, Sir, it is to be independent: this, Sir, is the duty of an independent Member of Parliament: this, Sir, is the use of a man's being a Member of Parliament.*

Well, now, honest reader, what you are supposing all the while is, that

principles such as these are but the principles of *individuals*, which (in so far as they are really harboured and acted upon) are but the accidental result of individual profligacy and insolence; principles, too, which, in the representation thus given of them, are in the heat of argument more or less exaggerated. Alas! if such be really your thoughts, in sad truth you are in an error—an error which you will be but too deplorably liable to fall into, should any expectation be entertained by you, that on that seat of self-proclaimed honour any real regard, even for acknowledged duty, is to be found. Duty as to constituents? Duty as towards swinish multitude? Oh, no, (cries Honourable House) leave that duty to the swine. Duty to Honourable House, yes, on this occasion, at any rate; that duty, and no other, is the duty Honourable House knows of. Now in all this is there any thing wrongly stated—any thing exaggerated? Read now, and judge.

Honourable House has its rules and customs: behold now one of them. Unless forty Members or more are present, business cannot be begun upon: here you have a rule. But, when honourable House so pleases, a motion having been made and seconded for that purpose, what is called a *call of the House* is made. A day is named; and, on that one day, attendance on the part of all the Members is commanded. Constituted by this rule, here you have a duty, an obligation established. Aye, and as often as Honourable House shall so please, enforced; for, not a Member is there who, should he fail of paying duty and homage to Honourable House, either by attendance or excuse, may not, by order of Honourable House, be imprisoned—imprisoned and squeezed for patronage-swelling fees. Well, then, in the obligation either to attend or send excuse, here you have an obligation, as often as it shall please the Honourable House, made *perfect*: here you have *indeed* a duty. A duty? but towards whom? even towards Honourable House, by whom, and by whom alone, it has been created; by whom, and by whom alone, when enforced, it is enforced. But in this very duty you have the *abrogation* of all duty as respecting the service at large—of all duty as towards the people in the character of constituents. The obligation to attend being confined to one particular occasion, what is this but *licence* as applied to all other occasions? Thus it is the law, the will, the pleasure, the constantly entertained and frequently declared pleasure of Honourable House, that, in regard to attendance, except in obedience to command issued by Honourable House, Honourable Members shall at all times do as they please. *And this is what was to be proved.* Now, in this is there any thing misrepresented? any thing exaggerated? Not so much as the weight of a feather of obligation towards constituents, as towards swinish multitude.

Proposing at the same time that all other things shall remain as they are (and therefore as “they should be”) in or out of the House, suppose then a man to stand up and propose, that on the part of Honourable Gentlemen, *attendance* (a duty not occupying half the year) should be rendered as constant and universal, as on the part of soldiers, who, the whole year, and on every day in the year, risk their lives by it. To any such effect, would any such proposal be endured? Would not the whole House be in an uproar? A voice crying, *make a stand! make a stand!* aye, and with echoes too—echoes from both sides, would it not once more be heard, and from the *sham reforming or Whig side* of the House? Would not the preacher of this part of the *Whole Duty of Man* be as surely an *Atheist* to the pious among Honourable Gentlemen—to the political, a *Jacobin*—as if his motion had been for *universal suffrage*? Say, how should it be otherwise, when, by the one measure as by the other, the *best* interests (as the phrase

is), on both sides, would alike be elbowed out, and made to give place (oh, intolerable thought!) to the universal interest.

No; these arguments, or any part of them, are assuredly not addressed to Honourable House; their interest is to remain as they are and what they are, so long as the injured people and their brave defenders shall behold them sitting there. No; any such charms as can be contained in argument will not be addressed to the deaf adder, to that deaf adder, whose deafness has been produced by the charms of sinister interest. These arguments are really and sincerely addressed only to those ears, which, by the voice of honest interest—that interest which is in unison with the universal interest—are prepared to listen to arguments pleading the cause of that interest.

Abdication may be more truly affirmed of Honourable House, than of James II.; whether or no forfeiture may also.

Think now of James the Second: every body knows how *he* governed. Think how he fled from his trust, and how by Honourable House he was declared to have abdicated it. Well then, by what sort of conduct on his part was it, that he *abdicated* this, his trust. In every other instance in which an office of any kind is mentioned, does not the word abdicate mean giving up intentionally and from choice? And would any thing short of the most unsurmountable necessity have ever forced that tyrant—one of the most tenacious of all tyrants—to give up either the office, or so much as a single atom of the power belonging to it? So much for him whose name was King: turn now to (*HIM* or) *them*, whose name is Legion. See whether from that time to the present, the exercise of the whole trust belonging to the House, has not been deserted by the vast majority among the Members of the House—and if desertion be abdication, abdicated? If, in spite of all his endeavours to continue in the exercise of the functions belonging to a trust, a king may thus legally be said to have abdicated it—and be dealt with as if he had abdicated it, how much more truly, how much more justly, where the forbearance to exercise them is, most notoriously, their own free act.

If, the word *abdicated*, be not of itself yet strong enough, take the word *forfeiture*; take along with it the word *non-user*; consult Mr. Justice Blackstone; see whether (be the office what it may, private or *public*, and if *public*, “whether it concerns the administration of justice or the *commonwealth*), of two causes of forfeiture, *non-user* be not one; yea, and “of itself a *direct* and “*immediate* cause.” In all this is there any thing of *subversion*? any thing of *sedition*? Be it so; but on whom shall fall the punishment? On me? It is not I that have made the sedition; all that I have done is to *find* it; even where myriads have found it before me. I am not the delinquent, the seditionist, the enemy of government. I am the informer, the servant of government, the unpaid as well as spontaneous informer, which is more than all informers are. If you want the seditionist, you have him in Judge Blackstone; let Lord Sidmouth take up his body, and set to rot along with the living ones—unseen and unseeable, in one of his *Bastilles*.

Yes; if Parliamentary doctrine is to be taken for authority, and that authority decisive, who is there that does not see, on how much better and truer ground, than the power of the Monarch in that day, may the power of Honourable House in these our days be deemed and taken to have been forfeited, to and for the use and benefit of the people.

Let me not be mistaken. What I mean here to say is, *not* that the Honourable House is, exactly speaking a *Corporation*; *not*, that the instrument, in virtue of which it is what it is, is, exactly speaking, a *charter*, *not* that

It belongs to the *King's Bench*; (the judicatory by which Corporations are purged, and persons wrongfully acting as Members of them ousted) to purge Honourable House. No, if it should ever fall to the lot of Honourable House to be *purged*, the judicatory by which the purge is administered must be of a constitution, and above all of a complexion, somewhat different from that of the *Court of King's Bench*. At present, all I mean is, to point the attention of the proper judicatory, (whatever it be,*) to the description of the *case*, which, according to Mr. Justice Blackstone, justifies a purge of this sort.

The incurableness of the disorder, and the consequently incurable corruptness of Honourable House, declared by Hatsell, Chief Clerk of the House.

Is not this yet enough, after what has already been seen; can any suspicion still remain, of misrepresentation, of exaggeration, of rash and ungrounded inference, of any such imputed result of audacious hostility? Well then call in *John Hatsell*. Call in the man, who has long by his works descriptive of the practice of the House, and published for the use of the Members, been looked up to as the oracle of Honourable House. To a man in his situation, will any thing of hostility or partiality on the adverse side be imputed?

Hear then what is said by him of the *Non-Attendance* and its consequences.

"It not being customary of late years" (says he, vol. ii. p. 68 to 72), "to enforce the calls of the House, by taking Members who do not attend into the custody of the Serjeant: in the twenty years that I have attended at the Table," (date of this second edition, 1785), "there has not occurred a single instance; although at the time of ordering the call, there is always a resolution come to, 'that such Members as shall not attend at the time appointed, be taken into custody.' It does not become me to determine, how far this lenity of the House, in admitting every trifling excuse that is offered, conduces to the end proposed—or whether it would not be better not to order a call, than to make it nugatory by not enforcing it." Such, then, in the thus honestly published as well as declared opinion of the most competent of all judges, was at that time the state of the disorder itself. Behold now what in the same opinion are among the *effects* of it.

"The controul which the INDEPENDENT Members of the House ought to have over the conduct of the MINISTERS is (says he), "ENTIRELY LOST."

Well, if this be not a subversion of the Constitution, what else can be? If it were not by the fact, that a body of men chosen by the people, and independent of the appointed servants of the Monarch, once possessed "a controul over" those same servants of the monarch; if it were not by this, that this constitution was distinguished from other governments, by what else was it ever so distinguished? Well then, in the thus declared opinion, of this official and intelligent, as well as assiduous observer of the conduct of the House, already in the year 1785, was this "*controul....entirely lost.*" This disastrous truth proclaimed by whom? by an adversary, a hostilely partial adversary? No; but by a most faithful, zealously attached, universally respected, and not too sparingly rewarded, (howsoever richly deserving) servant. In what way too? in the way of speech spoken; spoken in the heat of debate, and without time for reflection? no: but in a cool

* And what can it be but the power of the people.—EDITOR.

didactic and written treatise, the result of the twenty years lucubrations he had just been speaking of; and this, republished without alteration, in a *second* edition, after the opportunity taken of receiving any objections, could any objections have been made, to what he had thus been saying in the *first*.

If then even at that time (in 1785) even before the Pandora's box* was opened upon it, which was opened by Pitt the second, and now again, and with additions, re-opened upon it, if even then the Constitution was "*subverted*," in what sort of plight is it now? But, if the subversion had already taken place, *IS NOT THE SUBVERSION OF SUCH A SUBVERSION RESTITUTION?* Is it not among the objects, which by every safe and legal means, every true lover of his country ought to contribute his utmost endeavours to accomplish? When *subversion* is the calamity that has taken place, what better can happen to it than to be *subverted*. When *captivity* was the calamity that had taken place, what better could have happened to it than to be *led captive*? Suppose a weaker man set with his feet where his head should be, by a stronger; what better could happen to him than to find himself set on his legs again?

The day of the declaration made by Honourable House of the forced *abdication of James the Second*, is no secret. The day of the declaration voluntarily made by the same Honourable House of *its own* voluntary abdication (as above,) is equally certain, Thursday, the 10th of May, 1744, there it is. *Commons' Journals*, Report that day from "Committee appointed to consider of the most proper methods to enforce a more early and constant attendance of the Members upon the service of the House."

Resolutions, five in number: whereof three were on the subject of *constancy* of attendance, meaning of course on the part of every one as well as of every other of the Members. Of these three (had they all been carried into effect, inadequate) the first and third put aside, this was the only one agreed to be never acted upon, never from that time till the present, "That no Member do absent himself from the service of the House, without special leave of the House †."

Thus in the opinion of this faithful servant, but not less intrepid and still unquestioned censor of the House, the constitution had even then been *subverted*, and in the disorder mentioned by him, *non-attendance*—in this free and generally prevailing abdication, the subversion had its cause. Well then; in this same opinion, was this cause in the number of those which are capable of being removed?—Not it indeed: for thus do these *OBSERVATIONS* of his conclude. "It appears from the Report of May, 1744, how inadequate every measure has been, that has been hitherto proposed, to prevent

* See p. 43, last paragraph, p. 50, last paragraph.

† *Commons' Journals*, Anno 1774, 10th May, p. 685.

"The Committee came to the Resolutions following:—

"Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the House be called over within fourteen days after the meeting of every session of Parliament; and that every Member then absent be taken into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms attending this House, unless such Member be employed in the service of the Crown abroad, or is incapable to attend by reason of want of health, or some other extraordinary occasion.

"Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that no Member do absent himself from the service of the House, without the special leave of the House.

"Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that every Member who shall absent himself from the service of the House for the space of two months, without the special leave of the House, be taken into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms, attending this House.

“the evil : *nothing can correct it entirely*, but a *sincere desire* in the Members themselves to attend to that duty, for which they were elected and sent to Parliament.” *Nothing* (says he) *can correct it*, but, what ? a sort of *desire*, the existence of which, to any such extent as would be necessary, would be an effect without a cause : for, in the situation in question, so long as man is man, the existence of any such desire, has been shewn to be impossible.

Now, is either the existence or the cause, or the intended perpetuity of this neglect of duty, this most deliberately determined, most perseveringly maintained, and still maintained neglect of acknowledged duty open to dispute ? The *existence* of it you may see in the Journals of the House. The *cause* of it, is the undue independence of the Representative towards the people, and his undue dependence towards C——r-General.* And the *perpetuity* of it is secured by the nature of the cause. Does not this determination perpetually to neglect an acknowledged duty, afford of itself an indisputable demand for a remedy from *without*, by which the determination shall be put an end to ? for a remedy by which the cause will be removed ? —for the only remedy by which, in the very nature of the case, it ever *can* be removed ? and that remedy—A RADICAL PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

CHAP. XV.

Representatives—the Importance of the Impermanence of their Situation. The Groundlessness of objections to this.

Much matter that had been collected for this chapter, must be omitted from want of *time* and *space*.

To the two heads of *utility* and *usage*, may be referred whatever matter can be here introduced.

Utility, as deducible from the unquestionable principles of human nature, as manifested by universal experience ; *usage*, a useful source of argument, partly from the connexion it has with *utility* through the medium of *experience* ; partly from the means of defence it will be seen to afford against adverse prejudices and fallacies†.

* For further explanations of this, see p. 17, last paragraph, p. 24, 1st and 2d paragraphs.”

† *A gag for Scorners.* On three several subjects, viz. for *Standing Armies* and *demand for Revolution*, as well as *Annual Parliaments*, behold the opinions of *Dr. Swift* :—Opinions, not thrown out on the sudden, for a party purpose, or in the heat of debate ; but, in a state of retirement, after a long course of *experience* in the very *arcana* of politics, and a long course of *subsequent reflections* on the subject of that experience—poured forth into the bosom of a most confidential friend. From Balfour’s edition of *Pope’s Works*, Edinburgh, 1762, vol. vi. p. 153. From *Dr. Swift to Mr. Pope*, Letter V. Dublin, January 10th, 1720-1. “You will perhaps be inclined to think, that a person so ill-treated as I have been, must, at some time or other, have discovered very dangerous opinions in government ; in answer to which, I will tell you what my political principles were in the time of her late glorious Majesty, which I never contradicted by any action, writing or discourse.

“As to what is called a *Revolution principle*, my opinion was this :—That whenever those evils, which usually attend and follow a violent change of government, were not in probability so pernicious as the grievance we suffer under a present power, then the public good will justify such a Revolution ; and this I took to have been the case in the *Prince of Orange’s* expedition, although, in the consequences, it produced some very bad effects, *which are likely to stick long enough by us.*

FIRST, as to utility.

In the *Plan* itself, *four beneficial consequences*—uses, in a word—are stated as resulting from *impermanence* in general, and from *annual elections* in particular: whereof *three* having more particular respect to appropriate *probity*; the *fourth* to appropriate intellectual aptitude, and appropriate active talent.*

I. Consider the case of each Member, taken individually.

1. In the first place, the *shorter* the term he has in his seat, the *sooner* in cases of imputed misconduct, may any mischief produced by such misconduct, be made to cease; and, in the way of example to others, the sort of punishment, involved in a removal produced by such a cause, is the more impressive†.

2. In the next place, by lessening the inducement which a candidate could have to launch out into expenses too great for his circumstances—the danger of his coming into the House in a *venal* state, is lessened in proportion.

II. Next, consider the case of the *whole House*, taken together.

3. The smaller the length given to that service, the smaller will be the length of sinister service which a corruptly disposed majority will have to sell; and the smaller, consequently, the length which it will be in the power of C——r-general and Co. to purchase.

4. The greater the number of the parcels, into which the present length of service (seven years) is broken down, the greater will be the number of those lengths of service, which, for the continuance of a given length of corrupt service at the hands of a majority of the members, C——r-general and Co. will have to purchase; and thence the greater the chance, that the number of masses‡ of corruption at his disposal will prove insufficient for that pernicious purpose.

5. The proof of the utility of the proposed shortness as a security for appropriate *intellectual aptitude* and appropriate *active talent* §, will not, it is imagined, be much in danger, either of meeting denial, or so much as escaping notice. By discourses indicative of ignorance, by constant silence and inactivity, by absence or slackness of attendance, the unfitness of any

“I had likewise in those days a mortal antipathy against *Standing Armies* in times of *Peace*; because I always took *Standing Armies* to be only *servants hired by the Master of the family for keeping his own children in Slavery*: and because I conceived that a *Prince who could not think himself secure without Mercenary Troops, must needs have a separate interest from that of his subjects*: although I am not ignorant of those *artificial Necessities which a corrupted Ministry can create, for keeping up Forces to support a Faction against the public interest*.”

“As to *Parliaments*, I adored the wisdom of that *Gothic institution, which makes them annual*; and I was confident, our *Liberty could never be placed upon a firm foundation until that ancient Law were restored among us*. For, who sees not, that, while such *Assemblies are permitted to have a longer duration, there grows up a commerce of corruption between the Ministry and the Deputies, wherein they both find their accounts, to the manifest danger of Liberty? which traffic would neither answer the design nor expense if Parliaments met once a year?*”

Well now, who was this Dr. Swift? an “*ignorant, wild, visionary Enthusiast?*” a Jacobin? an Atheist?”

* See note pages 41 and 42.

† For the difference in this, and all other particulars, between triennial and annual elections, see Chap. xvi. *Moderate Reform, &c.*

‡ Useless places, needless places, overpaid places, unmerited pensions, sinecures, peerages, &c.

§ See note pages 41 and 42.

Member may be betrayed to his constituents. In this way, partly by *original* exclusion, produced by self-conscious inability, partly by *subsequent* exclusion produced by the light of *experience*, may the House be cleared of those real incumbrances and nuisances, with which it is, under the existing system, to so great a degree infested: viz. empty-headed idlers, who, in default of all other means of consuming time, drop in now and then, and, to save themselves from the trouble of thinking, throw themselves into the ever-extended arms of C——r-General and Co. thus giving their support to misrule—saying, and perhaps fancying, they are *supporting government*: thus (and even without need of being purchased) contributing to the formation of the waste, corruption and oppression producing majority. And, at the same time, by leaving undiminished what might have been their share of the spoil, they increase the mass of corruption in the hands of the Arch-corruptionist, in readiness to be employed in the purchase of such other Members, who either *demand* the rewards of corruption more importunately, or are capable of making a more valuable return for it, by pernicious service.

Under the existing system, C——r-General has not only no interest in the *largeness* of the number of Members, endowed with a more than ordinary share in these accomplishments, but, on the contrary, he has a positive interest in the *smallness* of that number. In addition to those measures which must be carried into effect for keeping the machine from falling to pieces, the object he has to accomplish is, to carry into effect, to the greatest extent practicable, such others as shall in the highest degree conduce to the advancement of his separate interest. Now, for this purpose, it is true that men provided in the highest degree with these endowments, as well as at the same time prepared at all times to make the requisite sacrifice of honesty, are, in a limited degree, necessary. At the same time, for speech, motion, and occasional penmanship, suppose this number completed, every individual above this number is a nuisance; the greater the value of his talents, the higher are his pretensions raised, and the greater the danger, lest, by inadequacy of the quantity of corruption at command, he should be disappointed, and by discouragement driven to the other side.

Annual Elections forsooth a *wild* a *visionary* arrangement! *Wild* and *visionary*, when, within the view of those by whom it is thus called, stands the vast metropolis—its population little less than the tenth part of all England—the great seat and example of *representative democracy*—in which, for so many centuries past the vision has been realized (in the instance of the *Common Council*) without the shadow of inconvenience!

But here, perhaps, lest argument should be altogether wanting, comes a sudden turn to the opposite side.

Cases may be shewn (it has been said), in which, under annual election, the same person has been seated for life: here then, where change has been the object thus aimed at, not *change* but *perpetuity* has been the result.

Be it so; but what is proved by this result, that the power of change is a bad arrangement? By no means; but rather that it is a good one. Why? Because, under this instrument of good discipline, so good has been the behaviour of the functionary, that no fault has been to be found in him; and no hope of supplanting have been conceived by any body else.

SECOND, as to *usage*.

For age after age, a degree of impermanence greater than that which is here proposed, had place. And, during all that time, what was the effect of this same impermanence—confusion, instability? No; but, on the contrary, the very result, which is here proposed as the *proper object to be aimed at*,

—viz. on the part of *the Representatives of the people*, dependance on the people, and independance towards the Monarch; on the part of the *Monarch*, dependance on the people—in a word *democratic ascendancy*.

Thus did matters continue, until, by the *civil wars* between the Houses of *York* and *Lancaster*; by the successive *conquests*, and abject and universal *subjection*, to which those wars gave birth; by the final triumph of Henry the Seventh, his unexampled rapacity and frugality; by the vast mass of treasure thrown into the coffers of his son and successor, by the still more enormous mass of treasure, absorbed from the patrimony of the Church, (a mass of landed property, which, so long before as the year 1362, had been computed to amount to one-third part of the whole kingdom *) and at the same time, with a correspondent profusion, scattered abroad by that furious and sanguinary tyrant, by the united force of terrific and alluring influence, every such sentiment as that of independence towards the Monarch, wanted but little of being eradicated from every English breast.

In regard to the *duration* coupled with the *frequency* of Parliaments—the following are, in general terms, the results already obtained, from a yet uncompleted search, now making by a friend, (on whose accuracy and judgment as well as candour, I have a well-grounded confidence,) into the several authentic sources of information already published, with the addition of others, as yet unpublished and unnoticed. When the search has been completed, I hope and believe it will be laid before the public in all its extent.

I. *As to frequency.*

1. That, from the year 1258, (42 H. III.) down to the year 1640, (16 C. I. c. 1.) the Monarch was bound by an Act of Parliament, to hold a Parliament once a year at the least.—Thus far as to the *law*.

2. That, as to the *usage* that had place in pursuance of the law, from the year 1265 (49 H. III.) down to the year 1484 (1 R. III.) (the extent of the search at present) being a period of upwards of two hundred years, small is the number of years in which a Parliament does not, from the documents, appear to have been summoned; and in those instances, the omission may, with few or no exceptions, be accounted for, either by the absence of the Monarch in a foreign country (France or Scotland), or by the existence of a civil war in the heart of the kingdom.

II. *As to duration.*

3. That in all that time there is but *one* instance, in which the same parliament appears to have continued *so long as a year*; and, that, in *that* one instance the duration was not so long as thirteen months.

4. That in that time it appears that in a number of instances, within the compass of one and the same year, *two, three*, and even as many as *four* different Parliaments were held; so that the clause *and oftener if need be*, was not a mere random anticipation, having no ground in experience.

5. That the earliest instance that has been found of what is now understood by a *prorogation*, is one which took place anno 1407 (8 H. IV.); that, in some few instances before that time, it appears as if, during the Christmas or the Easter Holidays, something of an adjournment took place; but that in some even of *these* instances, the Parliament that met was a fresh Parliament; fresh writs of summons having in these instances been issued.

6. That none of these cases of *prorogation* are material; inasmuch as whatsoever may have been the number of these prorogations, in no instance

* See Barrington's Observations on the Ancient Statutes.

does it appear that the same Parliament continued in existence so long as a whole year; *that* one excepted, in which the extra duration was not more than a few days.*

Speaking of the Parliament that was held anno 1407 (8 H. IV.). "*This*" (observe the authors of the *Parliamentary History*, vol. i. p. 306.) "*is the longest Parliament we have yet met with* :—it was continued nearly a year, "which was an INNOVATION on the ancient constitution, *taken notice of by several historians* as a great blot on this reign."—There—Honourable Gentlemen—behold in those grave and universally respected Authors of the *Parliamentary History* (the history so much praised by the late *Judge Barrington*, brother of the existing Bishop of Durham†) another set of *Jacobins*, to be added by you to *Dean Swift*,‡—and to those *your predecessors*, who, so lately as in the last reign, were so near making a majority in favour of *annual elections*.|| Where, in their view, was the *innovation*?

Now, when it has thus been seen, that it was by a course of tyranny and misrule, that the better, though more early state of government was subverted.—What is the consequence?—That as it was for the benefit of the present race of Monarchs, that, a reign of manifest usurpation is regarded as blotted out from usage—so for the benefit of a nation, a like usurpation, though committed by Monarchs, may be considered as blotted out. A happy, and therefore *legitimate* course of government, obscured only—but not blotted out, by an unhappy, and therefore *illegitimate* course of government. In this way, why should not *usage* so long continued, so extensive, and so steady—be regarded as creative of *right*? and *that right* suspended only in its exercise—suspended and not destroyed—by the intervening interval of *wrong*?

If so, then for the claim made to the benefit of short Parliaments, to the ground of practical and manifest utility, may be added the ground of constitutional right. If *Usage* be disregarded, *Utility* remains sole judge, and annual elections triumphant. If *Usage* be regarded and consulted—and

* By the researches above mentioned *three* other instances have been found of Parliamentary acts ordaining the annual, or oftener than the annual, holding of Parliaments, over and above those which are to be seen in the current editions of the Statute Book; these are—1. One in *Henry the Third's* reign, anno 1258, (42 H. III.) seven years before that (1265, 49 H. III.) in which, for the first time, deputies from *Boroughs* were summoned, viz. by *Simon de Montfort*. Reference for this is to *Rymer's Fædera* and *Annales Monasterii Burtonensis*. 2. One in *Edward the Second's* reign; anno 1311, (5 E. II.) [Lately published *Statutes of the Realm*, i. 165. cap. 29, 34.] These two before those printed in the common Statute Books, viz. among the Statutes of *Edward the Third*: 3. One after ditto: viz. in *Richard the Second's* reign; anno 1377 (1. R. III.): for which see *Brady*, and the Monkish Historian, *Walsingham*.

Before the year 1265, (49 H. III.) in which deputies from *Boroughs* were first summoned, viz. by the Rebel, *Simon de Montfort*, comes a year (1264,) (48 H. III.) in which Writs are, by the King, sent to the Sheriffs of *Counties*, commanding them to return each of them *four knights*. [*Brady—Parliamentary History—Report on the Public Records.*]

In several of the instances in which more than one Parliamentary Session appears to have been held in the compass of the same year,—the evidence, by which the diversity of the Parliament is proved, consists of divers existing lists, of Members returned to serve in Parliament, in one and the same year, by one and the same County, City, or Borough.

† See note, pages 52, 53, 54.

‡ See note pages 43, 94.

|| See note, page 28.

Right considered as created by usage—then, to the ground of *utility* is *super-added* the ground of *right*.

If two or three centuries of right, are followed by two or three centuries of palpable wrong;—is it not high time—that *right* should be *restored*—that *subversion* should be *subverted*?—Does a *Monarch's legitimacy* stand upon ground so substantial in ANY case—as the *people's right*—in THIS case?

A point which is to be proved, is—that, in the early times in question, not only was the degree of impermanence in question in a state of habitual existence,—but that it had for its *cause*, and for its *consequence*, that very state of things—that very *democratic ascendancy*, for the re-establishment of which it is here proposed in these latter times.

Assuredly, no great difficulty will be found to prove this. For what purpose was a *Parliament* (including the assembly composed of Representatives deputed by the people) wont to be called together by the Monarch?—*Answer*: to get money. Well: and if, without the trouble of calling together and treating with these deputies, he could have got the money he wanted, would he at the same time have subjected himself to all that labour and to the risk of finding it to be—(what it is sometimes actually proved to be)—labour in vain? Not he indeed. That he should have done so, is not in human nature. Well, then: so often, and so long, as he was at all this pains to prevail upon the people to supply him with money, so often and so long did he feel himself towards the people—the great body of the people—in a state of dependency; and, for centuries together, this state of dependancy was one uninterrupted state of dependency—not as now, towards a comparatively small confederacy of men,—the majority of them falsely pretending to be Representatives freely chosen by the great body of the people, and acting in a state of corrupt dependency under C——r-General.—Well:—this, and nothing more, is what has been meant by *democratic ascendancy*: the sort and degree of democratic ascendancy, for the establishment or re-establishment of which, it is, that the system of arrangement here proposed, under the name of *radical parliamentary reform*, is contended for.

With relation to these *our* times, the appellation of *old times* belongs without dispute to both those *other* times—but to which shall be given, the appellation of *good old times*. Shall it be to those later times, when, for the gratification of thirst for money and thirst for power—oppression was constant, universal, and unchecked—waste always unchecked, and, except in those reigns in which frugality was stained by oppression, raging*—and corruption, if less abundant than at present, rendered so, because superseded by the more efficient and, to a tyrant hand, more pleasant instrument—terrorism?—Shall it not rather be to *those* old times, in which due dependence was so firmly established in both its indispensable branches—dependence of the Monarch on the people's Representatives—dependence of the people's Representatives, on the people their constituents: due dependence every where; corruption no where; unchecked waste, unchecked oppression, no where?

* Prosperous as it was in all transactions with foreign powers, the long reign of Elizabeth, see Neale's *History of the Puritans*, by Toulmin) was a reign of grievous oppression, to all those who would not sacrifice to her thirst for power the religious part of their consciences. Those who, with such undisturbed complacency, view the majority so long since established, little think by how grievous a course of oppression it was obtained. The state of Scotland shews what, had it not been for that oppression, would in that respect have been the state of England.

CHAP. XVI.

The inadequacy of the Arrangements of Moderate Reform.

The subjects to be considered in this chapter are ;—

The arrangements which have been proposed at different times, comprised under the denomination of *moderate reform* :—

The inadequacy, and uselessness of them, even supposing that all of them are brought forward together, comprised in one proposal, and carried into effect—

The greater inadequacy of them, taken singly, or in any number less than the whole—

Supposing *moderate reform* thus inadequate,—supposing *radical reform*, as herein described, the only adequate remedy :—whence happens it, that a set of men, professing themselves “*Friends of the People*,” and as such, enemies to corruption, (the radical disease, for which *reform* has all along looked to as the only remedy,) have all along been rejected the adequate remedy, and brought forward the inadequate one.

The state of interests will be the principle employed for a solution of this problem.—But this will be the business of the next chapter.

For a general conception of all the arrangements, entitled to a place in the *Moderate Reform System*,—take, in the first place, the following table of the several proposals for Parliamentary Reform, brought forward in Parliament since the commencement of the present reign ;—moderate and radical taken together.*

Total number of the occasions, on which Reform has been advocated in Parliament	15
Deduct number of occasions, on which no specific proposition has been brought forward†.	3
Remains the number of the occasions, in each of which, specific propositions, have been brought forward	12
Deduct number of occasions, on which the reform proposed has been <i>radical</i> .‡.....	2
Remains, the number of occasions on which the reform has been of the <i>moderate</i> cast.	10

HEADS, TO WHICH THESE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE REFERRED.

Arrangements applying to the Situation of ELECTORS.

I. *Arrangements, giving extension to the Electoral franchise, or right of suffrage, and thus making advances towards virtual universal suffrage.*

1. In the case of a County seat, admitting Copyholders to vote.

* For the matter of this list, see Mr. Meadly's paper, as reprinted in the Appendix to this work.

† App. Hon. W. Pitt., 1782 ; Alderman Sawbridge, 1784 ; Mr. (now Earl) Grey, 1792.

‡ App. Duke of Richmond, 1780.

App. Earl of Chatham, 1770 ; Alderman Wilkes, 1776 ; Hon. W. Pitt, 1783 ; Rt. Hon. W. Pitt, 1785 ; Right Hon H. Flood, 1790 ; Mr. (now Earl) Gray, 1797 ; Mr. (now Earl) Grey, 1800 ; Hon. T. Brand, 1810 ; Hon. T. Brand, 1812.

The basis of the Moderate Reform System, may be seen in the paper originally printed in 1793, by the Society formed in 1792 ; principally of Whig Members, under the name of *The Friends of the People*, and reprinted by Mr. Evans, in his *Parliamentary Reform* pamphlet, just published.

2. In the case of a County seat, admitting Leaseholders to vote.
3. In the case of the proposed number of *additional Borough seats* (or in ALL *Borough seats?*) admitting *Householders at large* to vote.

Arrangements applying to the Situation of REPRESENTATIVE.

II. *Increasing the number of seats regarded as not venal:*

1. County Seats.
2. Seats formed by Division of Counties into Districts.
3. Populous Town Seats.

III. *Lessening the number of Seats regarded as venal:*

1. Suppression of such seats without compensation proposed.
2. Suppression of such seats with compensation proposed.

IV. *Excluding from all Seats part of the Members regarded as sold to the C——r-General, by the circumstance of their holding situations of profit, from which they are removable by him at pleasure,*

V. *Reducing from seven years to three the duration of a Seat.*

Proposed Arrangements applying to the situations of ELECTOR, and CANDIDATE.

VI. *Diminishing the expenses and other inconveniences of Elections.*

1. By causing the Poll to be taken in Districts of small extent, by dividing the Electoral Districts.
2. By causing the Poll to be taken for *all places* on *one* and the same *day*.
3. By forbidding an Elector from giving his Vote in *more* places than *one*.

Now, consider these six sets of arrangements in relation to their respective bearings upon the two situations of *Elector* and of *Representative*: including in the latter case that of *Candidate*.

I. *As to that of ELECTORS.*

In the account given of radical reform, (see chaps. V. and VI.) four arrangements we stated as essentially necessary. These are, *Virtual Universality* of suffrage. *Practical Equality* of suffrage. *Freedom* of suffrage. Thence, as an indispensable instrument of freedom, inviolable *Secrecy* of suffrage.

1. *Secrecy of suffrage.* Upon the effect given to this principle depends, as hath been so often observed, *freedom of suffrage*, against *terrorism*, and against *bribery*.

In no scheme of moderate *reform*, is any such proposition in favour of *secrecy of suffrage* to be found.

2. Consequently, no security is afforded against *spuriousness* of suffrage.
3. *Virtual universality of suffrage.*

It has been shewn, (chaps. VII. and VIII.) that the efficiency of virtual universality of suffrage, in giving force and effect to the *universal interest*, in the struggle which it had to maintain against all partial interests in general,—(and in particular against the hitherto irresistible separate and sinister interest of C——r-General and Co.) would be altogether precarious,—without the assistance of *freedom*, and thence of *secrecy* of suffrage. Without that shield to freedom, it would be uncertain, whether, with reference to

the universal interest, service or disservice would be the effect of any plan, by which any advance were made towards virtual universality of suffrage.

4. *Practical equality of suffrage.*

Referring to the existing state of things,—an advance towards this equality would be made by *virtual universality of suffrage*. Still, however, without a separate provision, *practical equality*, would remain in a state very far from complete. Take for example *Old Sarum* and *Galton*,—the contrast, which the state of those two seats of snug proprietorship would form with the state of *Yorkshire*,—would be no less striking than at present.*

In any comprehensive advance made towards this equalization, would evidently be included the breaking down each of the Counties, into two or more *less extensive* Electoral districts.

In no plan of *moderate reform* have I been able to observe any such division advocated. This division is indeed mentioned distinctly by Mr. Brand, but no less distinctly rejected.

But, in chap. X. in which *bribery* and *terrorism* are compared,—it has been shewn how, (as well by *vote-compelling* as by *competition-excluding*) the seductive force of terrorism is increased, in proportion to the extent of an Electoral district:—in proportion to remoteness from the Poll-book,—*expense* of money and *time* increased thence, to a proportionate extent. Electors are excluded, when the *repelling* force of those inconveniences is not overcome by the *compelling* force of terrorism; *oppression* and *spuriousness* of suffrage in the case of all those who bear the expense and labour of the journey, and are forced to contribute by their suffrages to the advancement of a Candidate, to whose advancement they are averse.

Such, then, is the inefficiency of the *three first* of the *six* above stated sets of arrangements proposed by moderate reform, viz. 1. those having for their object, to *extend* the *Electoral franchise*; 2. those having for their object, to *increase* the number of seats regarded as *not venal*; 3. those having for their object, to *lessen* the number of seats regarded as *venal*:—and in these three groups will be found comprised all those which have immediate relation to the situation of *Elector*.†

The CONTRAST.

* *Old Sarum*, no houses, less than 10 voters, 2 Members to Parliament.

Galton, 6 houses, 1 voter, Sir M. Wood, 2 Members to Parliament.

Yorkshire, 188381 houses, 973113 inhabitants, 2 Members to Parliament.

This is what the determined Enemies to Reform call *virtual* Representation. Why do not the Oligarchy, form themselves into a Grand Eating Club, to eat for the whole nation, and then *tell the starving people they are VIRTUALLY fed*? Editor.

† The representation upon its present footing possesses one practice which is eminently prejudicial to equality of representation, and which, whatsoever use it may at one time have had, has for centuries had none.

This is, that every county in England, and excepting five, every borough, send two representatives;—that is, each electoral district fills two seats.

I know not whether any rational cause has ever been assigned for this sort of duplicity. Was it for provision against *sickness*? Was it that, in the negotiations with the Crown, the *fidelity* of each Agent might find a safeguard in that of the other? Note, that by the want of the *press*, and even of the *pen*, the negotiations in question were rendered comparatively secret and unchecked.

Suppose each County divided into *two districts*, with a seat allotted to each,—here would be some advance made towards *practical equality* of suffrage, but that advance still far from adequate.

It does not appear, that under *moderate reform*,—even this first step towards the equality in question, has ever found favour among the advocates of Moderation.

II. *As to the Situation of the REPRESENTATIVE Body and its MEMBERS.*

2. In this part of the Election system, there are three arrangements, which, in the present plan of *radical* reform, are proposed as essential arrangements, necessary to establish in that quarter the union of *due independence* with *due dependance*: 1. *Exclusive of Placemen* from the right of *voting*; (leaving them always in possession of the right of *speech* and *motion*;) 2. Such measures as shall be necessary for the securing, on the part of each Member, a constant and punctual *attendance* on the service of the House: 3. *Impermanence* of the situations respectively occupied by the Members in virtue of their respective seats, by the *annual* recurrence of the Election process.

Observe, on this occasion, the object and use of these several proposed arrangements.

1. By the *first* of them, a correspondent degree of *independence*, towards C——r-General, is produced on the part of the Members *individually* considered.

2. By the *second* of them,—(beside the additional sureties afforded for *intellectual aptitude* and *active talent*,)—a *remedy*, in the nature of a *check*, is provided, against that disorder, which (in addition to the dishonesty it gives birth and assistance to, on the part of Members *individually* considered,)—gives birth and support to the various *devices*, by which C——r-General and Co. contrive to obtain majorities: viz. by keeping out of the House, on the several particular occasions, a number of the Members, by whom, if present, a check might be opposed to their particular measures.

3. The *third* has for its object—giving the necessary strength, to those ties by which the dependance of Representatives on their constituents is established.

Of the three arrangements belonging to the general head in question, the *two first* are for *due independence*, the *third* for *due dependance*.

Observe now what appears to be the habitude of *moderate* reform, as towards these last mentioned arrangements.

By Mr. Brand in particular, whose plan of *moderate* reform seems to have come nearest to *radical*,—the idea of thus dividing Counties is brought forward and rejected.

But, I cannot discover any determinate inconvenience, in the circumstance by which this rejection is stated, to have been produced.

The result stated by that gentleman, as the ultimate inconvenience, is—that, on such a plan, some inhabitant of a *Town* comprised in the *County*,—in contradiction to some inhabitant of the *Country* part of that same *County*,—would be generally returned. So far the Honourable Gentleman. But, under a system of *free* suffrage, supposing the result to take place, I can find no inconvenience in it. Neither the inhabitant of the country part, nor the inhabitant of the town part would be chosen, unless by the majority of the Electors he were deemed fitter than any other person they could choose: and, so long as they chose the fittest person that was to be had, whether a town or the country were the seat of his residence—would for any reason I can see, be a matter of complete indifference.

In the next place, I can discover no cause sufficient to produce that same result.

“The freeholders of the Town,” (says Mr. Brand), “would uniformly prevail over the freeholders of the County, because they could almost always outnumber them at an Election.”—Yes, at present, while the only territorial districts, viz. the *Counties*, are, most of them, so excessively extensive. Yes: under the *existing* state of things.—Scarcely, however, in the state of things which he himself proposes: *Hertfordshire*, for argument sake, he supposes to be divided into *four* districts. But, so small is the extent of that county,—that if divided into four equal districts, and the *Poll-booth* placed in a central spot of each,—small indeed would be the number of Electors, that, by remoteness from that spot, would (one should think) find themselves excluded from the exercise of their right of suffrage.

1. In relation to the *first*,—Exclusion of Placemen from voting, it seems rather difficult to say, whether *Moderate Reform*, considered in its present state, ought or ought not to be considered as taking any part.

For the purpose of shutting the door of the House against actual corruption-eaters—a proposition, as above noticed, (in chap. XV.), was indeed, in one instance (in 1810), brought forward. But, by the Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Brand) by whom, on that occasion, it was brought forward, it was, on the next occasion (in 1812), abandoned.

Supposing its title to a place in the budget of *Moderate Reform* admitted,—reference to what (in chap. XIII.) has been said on the subject of its inadequateness may here suffice. By the place it leaves to the “*Great characters*,” among the corruption-eaters,—while the acknowledged *thieves* are excluded,—the principle, instead of being *reprobated*, is *approved* and *confirmed*.

2. As to the second point, *Attendance*. In no one of all the several proposals, included in the *Moderate Reform* system, are any symptoms to be found, of the slightest glance, having ever been directed towards the disorder, produced by the violation of this duty,—nor consequently to any arrangement, considered as presenting the prospect of a remedy. On this subject, *Moderate Reform*, in every one of its plans, maintains complete silence.

3. As to the *third* point, *Impermanence*: of the situation of Representative, by *annual* Elections.

For the purpose of reducing to the lowest, the length of the term, and thence raising to the highest, the degree of *due dependance* on the part of each Representative, toward his Constituents,—under *radical* reform, *annual* Elections are insisted upon, that is the reduction of *septennial* Parliaments as at present, to Annual Parliaments.

On the other hand, moderate reform insists at stopping at *triennial* Parliaments:—*Triennial Parliaments* it admits of and calls for: against *annual* Parliaments it insists on shutting the door.

That the remedy that might be afforded by triennial, is inadequate, in comparison with that which would be afforded by Annual Parliaments; and in what respects, and degrees it is so,—are subjects that will afford matter for a separate chapter (XVIII.)

Two proposed arrangements remain, the utility of which, as far as they go, is here admitted: but, in relation to which, the doubt is—whether having been deserted by the men who at one time were their advocates, and who still continue to belong to the denomination of *moderate* reformists,—they can with propriety be at present regarded as having a place in the moderate reform system: whether, from having in FORMER DAYS been *sound*, *practical*, and *necessary*, they may not, in the eyes of EXISTING *moderation*, have become *wild* and *visionary*. These are, 1. The *Householder Plan*, as above-mentioned;—which applies more especially to the situation of *Electors*. This, as far as it goes, is an advance made towards *virtually universal suffrage*: and, in that character, has been mentioned, as an arrangement, which, (though not completely adequate,) might, by *radical* reformists, for the present at any rate, be acceded to without much reluctance.*

* See note, pages 40 and 41.

But, by a *radical* reformist, the Householder plan could not be refused to any Electoral District;—to any part of the population: whereas, by *no Moderate Reformist*, by whom it has ever been advocated, does it appear that the application of it has been proposed—any further than to such *Town Electoral Districts*, as upon his plan were proposed to be established: at any rate, to some of the *Counties* in their capacity of *Electoral Districts*.

Lastly, as to the plan for exclusion or reduction, of the expense, delay, vexation, and disorder, at present attendant on, or incident to, the Election-process: viz. 1. Voting by districts. 2. Carrying on the process in all places on the same *day*. 3. Arrangements to prevent the same person from giving his vote for *places* more than one.

I do not find any mention in my own Plan (drawn up in 1809) as herein printed: either of the second, or of the third, of these proposed arrangements. Regarding at that time their importance, as being, (in an *absolute* view considerable, but,)—inferior, in a comparative sense, viz. as compared with the others herein brought to view,—it has never yet happened to me to apply to either of them any considerable portion of attention; in so far as practicable, the character in which they have, on each occasion, presented themselves to a cursory glance is, that they are useful and unexceptionable.

In regard to *voting by districts*,—in the ensuing Plan of Radical Reform it may be seen presented in a shape rather more determinate, it is believed, than in any of the Moderate Reform plans:—but, in none of them, does it seem to present itself in a form sufficiently *determinate* for contrast and discussion.*

CHAP. XVII.

Triennial Elections inadequate;—Annual Elections necessary.

Now, comes what remains to be said on the subject of *impermanence*.

The conflict is between *annual* and *triennial* Elections.

Compare then the two degrees of impermanence—in the **FIRST** place, with a view to appropriate *probity*.§

1. In the event of misconduct, the remedy is by a better choice. In the case of annual Elections, the promptitude of the remedy is three times greater than in triennial Elections.

* For the sake of distinction and clearness of conception, I employ the appellation of *Sub-districts*: for any such districts as, for the purpose of the more commodious *collecting of the votes*, may be proposed to be carved out of the *Electoral Districts*.—Understanding all along, by *Electoral Districts*, those which correspond to, and in number agree with, the number of the *seats*:—or, in contradistinction to the *Electoral Districts*, these *Sub-districts* might be termed *Voting Districts*.

To express what is here expressed by *dividing the country into districts* (some of them, in the ensuing Plan, *Territorial*, others *Population*, *Districts*),—the phrase employed by an Honourable Gentleman* is, “*making the Return by Districts*”: to express what is here expressed by *voting*, or *collecting the votes* in *Sub-districts*, to be called *Voting Districts*, he says, “*taking the Votes by Districts*.” The occasions,—for speaking of the *Districts* which, upon the *Plan* in question, would have to correspond with the number of the *seats*, presenting themselves so continually,—hence the necessity of providing a *name* to speak of them by. As to the phrase employed by the Honourable Gentleman,—though the propriety of it may be considered as unexceptionable, yet, as it affords not any *name* for the *thing* I had such frequent occasion to bring to view, it could not, on every occasion, be rendered applicable to *my* purposes.

† Mr. Brand—Cobb. Deb. xvii. 131.—Anno 1810, May 21.

§ See note pages 41, 42.

2. So, in respect of *removal*, considered as a *punishment*, operating in the way of *example* to others.

3. In respect of *expense*, from whence proceeds, in case of excess and consequent embarrassment, *temptation to venality*; in the case of *triennial Elections*, the temptation *thrice* as great as in *annual Elections*.

Under annual Elections, for the purpose of corruption-hunting, it would scarcely be worth the while, of a man deficient in honesty, to offer himself a second time, thereby exposing his character to scrutiny: at any rate, small is the price which C———r-General would be at the same time able and willing to give him;—prompt the time at which his power of doing mischief might be put to an end.

Under triennial Elections, *three years* is the term for which every man may sell himself:—three years the term for which his service may be bought by C———r-General:—three years, the time given to him to remain in a complete state of *independence* towards *constituents*; and thence in a state of complete *dependance* and mischievous obsequiousness, (as at present) towards his *purchaser*. Trampling on his duty—doing the work of political uncleanness with greediness, during the whole of the two first years, with a part of the last,—just at the close of the term—(adequate active talent being supposed to be in his possession)—by some dashing and momentary display in the exercise of the art of popularity-hunting, the corruption-hunter may have promised himself—and perhaps not altogether without success—the satisfaction of thus atoning for his past misconduct, in the eyes of a never-sufficiently-or-constantly-attentive, and thence for ever too indulgent, people.

Even under a system of *radical reform*—in all other particulars such as here proposed—such sometimes, in this particular, may be the result of an unfortunate choice once made. But, in other particulars,—for want of other arrangements essential to radical reform—whether virtual *universality* of suffrage, practical *equality* of suffrage, or *secrecy*, and thence *freedom* of suffrage,—suppose the system so constructed, as that it shall be in the power of any individual to secure to himself the perpetual command of a seat;—on this supposition,—if by indolence, by unpopularity, or by any other cause, it should happen to him to have become disinclined to occupy the seat in his own person any longer,—there remains the seat, which he may find himself in a condition to give or sell to some Honourable, by whom the like pernicious use may be made of it: and so—Parliament after Parliament—so long as the seat continues in his hands.

Exactly in this case would the Representation continue to be,—supposing *that* mode of *moderate* reform adopted, of which the reduction of septennial to triennial Election is the principal, if not the only, feature.

SECOND as to appropriate *intellectual aptitude* and *active talent*.*

In the case of annual Elections,—in the event of deficiency,—in respect of these endowments,—the *promptitude* of the remedy is three times greater than in the case of triennial Elections.

Here then is a three years' term—during which a man, whose appropriate talents are, all of them, (with or without his probity,) either in his *acres* or

* By the *secrecy of suffrage*, here proposed as an arrangement essential to the utility of radical reform, the temptation to expense being altogether, it is believed, taken away,—if this be admitted, the advantage attached to annual Elections, on this score, will be to a considerable portion to be left out of the account.

* See note, pages 41 and 42.

purse, may fill a seat with useless matter as at present:—matter at best useless, and naturally prone to become worse than useless: for, generally speaking—(though, alas! in one way, exceptions are not altogether wanting)—the more destitute a man is of *natural* dignity of character—of natural title to estimation and respect—the stronger his inducement to sell himself to C——r-general;—purchasing in exchange *factitious* dignity, in the shape of baronetcy or ribbon,—for self, or for relative, friend, or dependant, in any one of those, or of *some other more substantial* shapes. And howsoever the least valuable of these implements may be deemed too great a price, for no more than a single vote, with whatsoever constancy and punctuality repeated,—yet, if by one such article bestowed upon one individual, seats more than one should be to be commanded, the bargain may sometimes be found convenient, by both parties.

Referable to this head, comes now an objection ascribed to Mr. Brand. Under annual elections, the term not long enough for gaining the requisite stock of *experience*: under triennial, the term long enough.*

Answer. 1. In this respect, during the whole of the first year, *annual* and *triennial* elections are exactly upon a par. Under *annual*,—in the election of the *second* year, every Representative, who has served the first year, will, in respect of presumable fitness, have, in this respect, the advantage of every candidate, or proposed candidate, who has not as yet served. And by this consideration, in default of determinate considerations pleading on the other side, it seems natural that the choice of Electors should be determined.

But, by the bye, in either case, of what avail is *opportunity* of acquiring aptitude, any further than as the opportunity is improved? And, under the existing system, unless it be on the part of a dozen or two, where is the *motive*?†—And what, accordingly, the *disposition* and the *habitus*? See the Chapter on Attendance.‡

By detaching the right of *speech* and *motion*, on the one hand, from the right of *vote* on the other;§ (and by that means securing, even on the part of the ministerial side, a supply, so much more to be depended upon than at present, of appropriate aptitude in the shape of *active talent*) the men for whose decision the arguments on both sides are presented, will be a set of men, who have no interest in a wrong decision: and, in default of *self-formed* judgment, the opinion from which their *derivative* judgment will be derived, will, wherever in the balance of reason and argument, the scales hang tolerably even, be most naturally the opinion delivered by the members of the Administration:—by those members, to whom not only *speech* but *motion* is proposed to be so extensively and uniformly secured.||

* Cobbett's Debates, xvii. 131.—May 21, 1810.—“Annual Parliaments would be found exceptionable, from the shortness of the period, by leaving the representative too little accustomed to business to be competent to his duties in that House.”

† See page 50. p. 78. “2 Intellectual Mischief,” &c.

‡ See page 79, two last paragraphs, p. 80, last paragraph, p. 81, 1st paragraph.

§ See page 29, “4 Exclusion of Placemen,” &c. See chapter xiii. page 69.

|| Cobbett's Debates, xvii. 130—May 21, 1810.—*Hon. T. Brand.*—“Other gentlemen might consider other objections to the existing state of the representation of the people of more importance, and particularly that respecting the duration of Parliaments. Upon this question he had bestowed much and earnest attention, and he found it one of *enormous difficulty*, but of *extreme interest* and equal importance. Septennial Parliaments had a tendency, from the length of their term, to weaken the relation between the Elector and the Representative, and to shake the dependence of the one upon the other;—while Annual Parliaments would be found not

In the imputation meant to be conveyed by the words *wild*, and *visionary*, and so forth—(for by Honourable Gentlemen the charge of finding sense for their eloquence has, along with so many other burthens, been left to us of the swinish multitude) are we to place the charge of tendency to produce *disorder*? But if to Parliamentary Elections of any sort a change of this sort attaches, it must assuredly be to Elections of that sort, which would have place under the system of virtually universal suffrage. Under that head, (see chapter viii.) the proof, it is hoped, will be found tolerably sufficient that, there would be no reasonable ground for apprehending the mischief of *disorder* under that system. But, if not even on the supposition that the widest possible extent were given to the right of suffrage, still less on the supposition of any less narrow extent: and if not in any one year, then not in three successive Elections for three successive years, any more than in one such Election having place in the first of these same three years.

If, either in the case of *annual*, or *triennial*, Elections,—under radical reform—or even under virtually universal suffrage,—tendency to disorder were worth a thought,—rather on triennial than annual Elections, should the thought be bestowed.—Why?—For this plain reason:—because, the longer the term in the seat, the greater the value of the seat; the greater the value of the seat, the stronger the incitement in the situations, both of Candidate and of Elector; the stronger the incitement, the greater the temptation to disorder in every shape.

On this occasion likewise, if it be worth while, I look once more to experience. During the ancient period above-mentioned*—while Parliaments were changed, not merely every year, but oftener—in what instances does inconvenience appear to have ever had place? from impermanence, even when carried to that degree,—in any way like *disorder*.

Nay, but, it may be said, no wonder. During all that period, parliamentary service was a service of burthen:—not, as now, of profit: the object was not to get into it, but to keep out of it.

Answer. Yes, accidentally, but not uniformly: *especially considering that in those days the SERVANTS were paid for the service, and that by the PROPER hands—their MASTERS; and as to disinclination, it was—not on*

“less exceptionable, from the shortness of the period, by leaving the representative too little accustomed to business to be competent to his duties in that House; and from the too frequent recurrence to the troubles and contests of Parliamentary Elections. The one term was too long to please the people; and the other too short to satisfy the Members. He, for his own part, would be inclined to take a middle course between the extremes of Annual and Septennial Parliaments, and to recommend Triennial Parliaments; which, without the evils of either, would possess all the advantages of both.”

Advantage to the Member?—Yes: plain enough: advantage to the people still to seek. But mind this—Members’ interest set in the balance against the people’s interest, and the scales, it should seem, hang even.

Consider, however, *where* this was spoken. The supposition that, when set against the interests of those trustees of the people, the interest of the principals should suffice to make the scales hang even—hazarded in that place, was not a supposition to any such effect, a daring one? By the Honourable Gentleman “the question” had been “found”—thus frankly he confesses—“one of enormous difficulty, but of extreme interest and equal importance.” Of enormous difficulty?—of extreme interest?—O yes: no doubt it had. But the difficulty? where did it lie?—In the “interest.” And in what “interest?”—in the interest of the Members.

All this while let it not be forgotten, that —to keep out *improbity*—*corruption-hunting* *improbity*—is the capital object.

* See page 96.

*the part of servants, as toward the service—burthen and pay together—but on the part of the masters, as towards the expence of paying for it. As to the statute of Henry the Sixth, though by it great concourse is proved—(competition the probable cause of it) disorder, instead of being proved, is disproved.**

Well, if this *ancient* experience will not suffice—and small indeed to the present purpose must be confessed to be its value—look to ancient and modern experience combined in one—linked together in a long and uninterrupted chain, having for its last link, *present* time. Look to the Metropolis:—look to the *City of London*:—look to the *Common Council*:—Electors the whole body of Householders, in number several thousands: Elections annual. In what shape was disorder ever seen *here*?

Nay, but (says the adversary) this sample of yours is not a fair one. Your universal-suffrage men—or even your Householders—speak of them in the same breath with the London Householders? men who are not only Householders, but such substantial Householders?

I answer—not in the poorest classes, any more than in the richest, will disorder in any shape have place, where no cause of disorder in any shape has place: and, by the means so often brought to view, every imaginable cause of disorder has been shewn to be removed. Even in the present disastrous times—under the pressure of such unexampled cause of irritation—in the vain hope of obtaining mercy and relief at the hands of their oppressors—what multitudes have we not seen collected together—multitudes in ten times the number that would ever be present at any such Elections as those here in question,—and yet—to the sad disappointment of those tyrants, by whom disorder is so eagerly looked for, as a pretence for tyranny—not a spark of disorder visible.

Will not that suffice? Look then to Westminster; number of inhabitants, 162,085:—number of Electors, at least, 17,000.—Voters, not distributed among *Sub-districts*, but driven all together—into one and the same Poll-booth: compared with the case of *annual* Elections, existing interests rendered the more stimulating by the superior value of the object of competition, and by the rareness of its recurrence. (once in seven years) Freer from disorder in every shape is it possible for Election to be, than (see page 46, and Note, pages 47, 48.) in this great city, (its population—part of the contiguous population of more than a million) it has been for these *ten* years past?

Well—to secure, and for ever, the same undisturbed tranquillity all over the three kingdoms,—nothing on the part of Honourable House but the *will*—so it be but sincere—is necessary.

On the ground of general principles, were the advantages on the side of *annual* Elections ever so slight—before, with any colour of reason, or pretence, or any hope of the reputation of sincerity, *triennial* Elections can continue to be set up in preference, can it be otherwise than that some specific and determinate grounds, must in support of such alleged preference, be produced?

Towards the close of the reign of Charles the First, (16 C. I. c. 1.) at the opening of the Long Parliament—the so often repeated and so long observed engagement, for the annual holding of *fresh* Parliaments, having been so long and so continually violated as to have become in men's conceptions obsolete,—*triennial* Elections were, for the *first* time, established by law in-

* See note, pages 32, 33, 34.

stead of it. *Triennial* and not *annual*? Why? Because at the commencement of the struggle Parliament did not feel itself strong enough to exact any thing more: to exact the restoration of the original and so thoroughly approved but unhappily so long despaired of state of things.

In Charles the Second's time, (16 C. II. c. 1.) the legitimacy and despotism, which led to the Revolution, having for four years been re-seated on the throne,—the provisions extorted from the piety of the father being found too efficient, were repealed: and others, the merit of which consisted in their inefficiency, substituted.

In William's time, (6 W. and M. c. 2.) the inefficiency of the provisions dictated by Charles the Second having been so fully and so superfluously proved by experience, others less inefficient were substituted. Here too, however, instead of being *annual*, the duration was made *triennial*. *Triennial*? Why? because by this time the value of a seat to the occupant was pretty fully understood: and, for giving to it the utmost duration, and thence the utmost value which at that time had ever presented itself as endurable, the two above-mentioned precedents furnished Honourable Gentlemen—the Honourable Gentlemen of those days—with a pretence.

Comes the new dynasty of the Gwelfs, and now ONE OF THE FIRST ACTS OF THE FIRST OF THEM (1 G. I. c. 38.) WAS TO POISON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRY: of that country, the voice of which had called him to the throne. Most probably the scheme was in the greater degree, if not exclusively, the scheme of the Honourables among his advisers: the benefit to them being as manifest, as to the ill-advised Monarch it was uncertain. Their *constituents* had seated them for three years; they seated *themselves* for four years more. An analogous retaliation would have been another Gunpowder plot, not contrived only, but executed. How long shall *principals* continue bound by chains of iron, *trustees* by nothing but cobwebs? According to these men, to such a degree was the nation adverse to the new King,—that all the Official Establishment, added to all the Army and the majority of the Peerage, would not, without the continued service of these Honourables, have sufficed for his support. Well then—if it was so—what was he better than an Usurper, fenced about by this guard of petty tyrants? The Monarch was no usurper: he was fairly seated. Not so *Honourable Gentlemen*. What shall we say of their successors? successors seated by the original sin of their forefathers: seated by the same breach of trust.

Remains one short observation, by which much sad matter is brought to view. In the situation in question, only in proportion as it contributes to strengthen the ties of their dependance on the people, is impermanence, and thence annual in comparison of triennial Elections, of any use: only therefore in the case, and to the extent, of that portion of the whole population of Honourable House, who are in any degree dependant for their seats on the good opinion of their constituents: *and how small that minority is, which is composed of the PERSONS WHOSE PRESENCE IS NOT A NUISANCE AND AN INSULT TO THE WHOLE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED EMPIRE, let them say to whose industry the melancholy secret has been revealed.* Before the Irish Union, according to the Society of Friends of the People, in 1793, the Representation was as follows:—

Seats filled by 154 Patrons	307
Seats not known to be so filled	248
	— 558
Known majority of Sham Representatives	56

After the Irish Union, according to Mr. Brand, in 1812:

Seats filled by 182 Patrons	326
Seats filled by Compromise, between 40 pair of Terrorists	80
	Total Sham 406
Seats not known to be so filled	252
	658
Known Majority of Sham Representatives	154

CHAP XVIII.

Interests adverse to adequate Reform—Support given by them to Moderate, to the exclusion of Radical Reform; Tories—Whigs—People's-men.

A sort of riddle here presents itself. Behold it in the following train of conflicting circumstances.

The sole use of the function of the Members of the Commons House—the Representatives sent, or supposed to be sent, by the body of the people, to officiate in the character of their Trustees and Agents, is the securing on the part of the servants of the Monarch a due dependance on the will of the whole body of the people.

The seductive influence of the Monarch and his servants is a *bar* to that use.

The *removal* of this bar is the proper object of every change that under the name of *Parliamentary Reform* can be proposed.

The mode of Reform called *Radical*, as above explained, is the only change by which that removal can be effected.

Moderate Reform is therefore a change altogether inadequate.

Such the state of things which has been all along lying open to the eyes of the set of men in question.

Now as to the line of conduct pursued by them under and in relation to this same state of things.

The confederacy of leading men, styling themselves Friends of the People, (in 1792-3, and at that time, by one great preliminary service of unspeakable use, really acting as such) and professing themselves Advocates of Parliamentary Reform—have always been, particularly those in the House, in declared *hostility* to *adequate* reform, and at the same time, have exclusively preferred *inadequate* reform. Under the state of things thus described,—in the repugnancy between profession and practice—professions so universally kept up by so vast a body, composed of men of the most respectable characters, in the highest walks of life—in this repugnancy—in this sort of inconsistency—lies *the riddle*.

Here then we have the riddle. In the *state of interests*, on the part of the body of men in question—in this source and no other—will the *solution* of this riddle, by any person whose curiosity may happen to have sent him in quest of it, be to be found.

Now follow the subjects under which the matter of this chapter will be found.

I. Sole clue to political conduct, interest.

II. Tories—Whigs—People's-men:—General coincidence of interests between Whigs and Tories.

III. Particular points of Radical and efficient Reform, by which the joint interests would be affected.

IV. Reforms to which they would be equally irreconcilable, though contributing nothing to democratic ascendancy.

V. Country Gentlemen—Opposition of their particular interests to efficient Reform, and thereby to the universal interest.

VI. Options—Compromises—Experiments—Postponements.

VII. Uses of this exposure.

1. *Sole clue to political conduct, interest.*

In this public situation, or in any other, be the *individual* who he may, have you any wish of possessing either a clue to his conduct in time past, or a means of foreknowing his conduct in time future? Look to the situation he is in, in respect to interest.—Have you any such wish in regard to a *body* of men? Look still to interests:—look to the situation in which the whole or the majority of that body are in respect of interest.

In the case of an individual *unknown*, it is your *only* clue: in the case of a body—meaning the governing part of it, it is a sure one.

Yes: in this one short phrase, *the state of interests*—every man has at hand a glass, in which,—when set up in the field of *morals*—and more particularly in that part of it which embraces *politics*,—any man, who is not afraid of seeing things as they are, may at all times see, what it will not at all times be equally agreeable to him to see. Where the object or objects which it presents to his view have something more or less of unpleasantness in them—where the effect of them is to check the vivacity of that swaggering and strutting pace, which when in their vibrations before a looking-glass pride and vanity are so apt to assume,—nothing is more natural than that the eyes should have a tendency to close themselves.

In the case of a man, by whom a public situation in any way efficient is occupied,—the correctness of the conception which *he himself* has of what is passing and about to pass in his own mind,—and in particular of the *springs of action* by which his own conduct has been and is in a way to be determined,—is to the public at large, a point as indifferent as it is unascertainable: but, to that same public, a conception as correct as can be formed in regard to these same springs of action,—and the share they have respectively had, and are in a way to have, in the production of the several effects, is frequently a matter of no inconsiderable importance.

In the view of giving what facility it may be in my power to give to an inquiry of this sort, I will notwithstanding the repetition involved in them, venture to submit two *rules* or *directions*: the one positive, the other negative.

1. **POSITIVE RULE.**—*To satisfy yourself beforehand, what, on a given occasion, will be the course a man will take, look to the state of interests: look out for, and take note of, the several interests, to the operation of which the situation he occupies stands exposed.*

2. **NEGATIVE RULE.**—*In your endeavour to satisfy yourself, what, on the occasion in question, is the course he will take, pay no regard whatever to professions or protestations:—to protestations, by whomsoever made, whether by the man himself or by his adherents: never to professions and protestations, directly made and in that very shape: still less to professions and protestations muffled up in any such disguise, as that of a storm of indignation poured forth upon the malignant and audacious calumniator, by whom any such expectation is held up to view, as that the conduct of the men in question will be in any degree likely to receive its direction, from those *springs of action*, on the *predominant* force and efficiency of which the preservation of every individual is dependant every day of his life.*

The application of the above rules, it may sometimes happen to a man to be led into an erroneous conclusion, in the case of an *individual*. For, in

the case of an individual, the most correctly framed general rules will sometimes fail.

Far otherwise is it in the case of a body of men; more particularly in the case of a body, the motives of which are in so great a degree open to universal observation as those of a political party. The larger the body, the more unerring the indications afforded by those rules.

Take for example the case of *universal suffrage* and the late Duke of Richmond. By what tolerably intelligent mind, knowing nothing of him but that he was a *Duke*, could any such expectation have been entertained as that of finding in this Duke an advocate—a zealous and persevering advocate—for universal suffrage. Yet, by this or that incident in the interior of his life—some temporary heart-burning for example between this great Aristocrat and his Monarchical cousin—the apparent mystery might perhaps have been—may still perhaps one day be explained,—the paradox removed, the riddle solved.

Accordingly, that there shall never again be a *Duke*, in whose instance universal suffrage shall find a zealous advocate—is a prediction, which the observation of that one case should suffice to prevent a man from being forward to utter. But that there never will be a time, in which *all* Dukes, or so much as a majority of the fellowship of Dukes, will under any other impulse than that of fear, join in advocating any such arrangement, may without danger of error be pronounced with unhesitating confidence.

So in the case of the *Whigs*, considered with a view to radical Parliamentary Reform. That, among those Members of Parliament, who at present, on the occasion of a party-question, are in the habit of voting with the party so denominated, there are not *any*, who, at *any* time, will be found advocating this only efficient bulwark against the ocean of deeper misery with which the country is threatened—is a prediction happily no less improbable than it would be uncomfortable. But that by any other impulse than that of *fear* (by any impulse other than that by which the conduct of their more prosperous antagonists, the *Tories*, will be directed) neither the whole body, nor so much as the majority of the numbers of the party in question, will ever be engaged in any such self-denying course,—is a prediction, which, by a short glance at the state of the interests bearing upon the situation in which they stand, any man may feel himself compelled inwardly to join in, as well as warranted in uttering, with an unhesitating, howsoever melancholy, confidence.

That a representative democracy should be established by an absolute Monarch—not only *under* him, but even *in the place of him*—this, even this, is upon the cards. By no other means, could so heroic an act of beneficence be exercised:—by no other means, could so vast and unperishable a treasure of love and admiration be collected and laid up;—by no other means, could so novel and striking a manifestation of talent and genius be displayed:—by no other means, could even so vast a mass of power be exercised: power exercised, and for ever, over posterity.

Of voluntary surrenders of *monarchy* into the hands of expectant and Monarchical successors, there is no want of examples: not even in modern;—not even in European history: *Charles* the Fifth of *Germany*, Monarch of so many vast Monarchies:—*Christiana* of *Sweden*;—*Victor Amadeus* of *Savoy*;—*Philip* the Fifth of *Spain*:—here, in so many different nations we have already four examples. But, on the part of an *Aristocratical* body, where is there as much as any one example to be found of the surrender of the minutest particle of power which they were able to retain?

II. *Tories—Whigs—People's Men* :—General coincidence of interests as between *Whigs and Tories*.

All, in whom in all its several forms Parliamentary Reform finds opposers, may be considered as belonging to the class of *Tories*.

All by whom *moderate* reform is advocated or supported, to the exclusion of *radical* reform, may be considered as belonging to the class of *Whigs*.

Those by whom the exigences and demands of the *universal interest*—of the interests of the whole people, and those demands a Radical Reform, may, for distinction sake, be termed *People's-men*.

Now, then, both *Tories* and *Whigs*, acting under the dominion of the same seductive and corrupt influence, will be seen to possess the same separate and sinister interest ; AN INTEREST COMPLETELY AND UNCHANGEABLY OPPOSITE TO THAT OF THE WHOLE UNCORRUPT PORTION OF THE PEOPLE.

That which the *Tories* have in *possession*, the *Whigs* have before them in *prospect* and *expectation*.

I. In the first place, as to *waste and corruption, corruption and waste*. It ever has been, and ever will be, the interest of the *Tories* to keep that portion of the substance of the people, which is expended in waste and corruption, as great as possible: so of the *Whigs* likewise. Under *non-reform*, this quantity will be left untouched: under *moderate reform* the reduction in it, if any, would be *little*; under radical reform the reduction would be *complete*.

In the next place, as to *seats*. It is the interest of the *Tories* that the power belonging to the seats which they have at their disposal should remain undiminished, and therefore the number, as well as value, the seats themselves. On the part of the *Whigs*, so far as concerns the seats at *their* disposal, behold the self-same interest.

Partly to *proprietaryship*, partly to *terrorism* (not to speak of bribery) are the *Tories* in the greater proportion indebted for *their* seats. To the same instrument of subjection, to the same extinguisher of freedom, without any ascertainable difference in respect of proportions, are the *Whigs* indebted for *their* seats.

In respect of their seats, it is the interest of the *Tories* to be *absentees at their own pleasure*; absentees for the purpose of half the effect of corruption as before explained*; absentees, for the purpose of private interest, dissipation, and idleness. On the part of the *Whigs*, with the exception of that corrupt purpose, in which none but those in power can be partakers, still the same sinister interest.

Among the *Tories*, it is the interest of all persons who have seats at command, to enjoy, clear of *obligation*, the full private benefit of those situations, and of the *power* they confer; clear of obligation in every shape, and in particular, clear of all such obligations as that of possessing the smallest grain of *appropriate aptitude*. In respect of interest, the *Whigs*, if taken individually, will be seen to be in that same case.

Not having in possession, nor in any probable and near expectancy, any share in the existing mass of corruption; no public money at their disposal, no peerages, no factitious dignities; hence, (setting aside their private

* See page 29. 5. "Universal constancy of attendance."---78. "Mischiefs from non-attendance."

property,) they behold the sole efficient cause of whatever pre-eminence they can hope, as a party, to possess in the scale of influence, in the power attached to the seats they possess in the two Houses; but more particularly in the most efficient of the two. In the eyes of the people at large, the sort of union they have been wont to obtain among themselves, presents itself to them as securing to them a sort of chance, of entering, once more, on some unknown occasion, be it for ever so short a time, into the possession of efficient and profitable power. Impossible as it is for them, incompatible with their distinctive character, to outbid, or so much as to come up to the present occupants in that auction, at which by greater and greater manifestations of obsequiousness, the favour of C——r-General must by all competitors, be at all times bid for. It is not in the nature of things, that any possession, which it may be supposed possible for them to attain, should be of any considerable continuance: of any continuance beyond that of the longest of those short-lived ones, which past experience has brought to view.

But if ever, as a body, the Tories go out altogether, the Whigs as a body, being the only formed body in existence, must come in; and, being a body, come in together. Here then, such as it is, is a chance; and that of which it is a chance being, so long as it lasts, a mass of power *never much less, and now not at all less, than absolute*. Thus it is that, being their every thing, were it even much less than it is, it could not be prized at any thing less than the full value. And the smaller the portion which is thus left to them, it being their all, the more, rather than the less, pertinacious will be their determination to preserve it undiminished.

Thus, without any need of *concert*—most probably, therefore, without any instance of actual concert—has a sort of tacit *co-operation* been kept up between the two contending parties: *an alliance in form but defensive, but in effect but too offensive, against the people and their interests*.

III. *Particular points of Radical and Efficient Reform, by which the joint interests would be affected.*

In regard to *seats*, it is required by the interests of the *Tories*, that as well in respect of the *number* of seats in their possession, or within their grasp, as also in respect of the *value* of those several seats, that if things in the sense of sinister interest cannot be made *better*, they should at any rate continue as they are. Without the smallest difference, all this may be affirmed of the interest of the *Whigs*.

1. As to the *number* of these seats.

The following arrangements, included in the *present* plan of radical reform, will be seen to concur in lessening the *number* of the seats in the possession of the present possessors; meaning by present possessors not merely the existing individuals, but, moreover, all others whose possession will be the result of the same causes. These are—1. *Virtual universality of suffrage*—2. *Practical equality of suffrage*—3. *Secrecy of suffrage*—thence, 4. *Freedom of suffrage**.

As to the particular means by which this general effect will be produced,

* For a general account of these arrangements, see Chap. V. pages 24 and 25. For a particular account, see Chap. VII. pages 32 to 38. Chap. IX. pages 51 to 59. Chap. XII. pages 65 to 69.

they will not be far to seek. By the *virtual universality*, in conjunction with the *practical equality*, the present possessors, together with those who would have been their successors, would be excluded from the *proprietary* seats: by the same causes, with the addition of the *secrecy* and its fruit, the *freedom*, all those to whose possession either *terrorism* or *bribery* would be necessary, would in like manner be excluded.

All seats being thus laid open to all candidates, self-proposed and pro-posable, whatsoever advantage would remain to the existing occupants, would be the result either of habit on the part of Electors, or of good reputation already acquired.

II. As to the *value* of these same seats.

By the operation of the following arrangements—1. Impermanence of the situation—2. Necessity of constant attendance—3. Exclusion from official situations, unless on condition of losing the right of voting*, would the value of all seats be reduced: the reduction therefore attended with a correspondent sensation of *loss* by all existing occupants of such seats.

By the *first* set of arrangements, thus applying to the situation of *Elector*, would the existing seats be slipt from under the individual by whom they are at present filled: by the *second* set of arrangements, thus applying to the situation of *Representative*, would be stript off a great part of the value which might otherwise have been found attached to such newly furnished seats, as by the operation of the first-mentioned set of arrangements, would be substituted to its existing ones.

Annoying, lamentably annoying, would all these several innovations be to the Tories: little less so would they be to the Whigs. The only difference being the difference between possession and expectation.

IV. *Reforms to which they would be equally irreconcilable, though contributing nothing to democratic ascendancy.*

By *triennial* Elections alone, nothing would be done.

Even by *annual* Elections alone, little more: the application of it would in England be confined to the small number of cities and boroughs, in which the number of individuals, participating in the right of suffrage, is considerable enough to operate as an antidote to the poison of corruptive influence.

* For a general account of these arrangements, see Chap. V. pages 28 and 29.

For a particular account, see Chap. XII. pages 69 to 75. Chap. XIV. pages 76 to 93. Chap. XV. pages 93 to 98.

TABLE, shewing, on a rough calculation, from Mr. Oldfield's History of Boroughs (first edition), the respective Numbers of Electors in the several Cities and Boroughs in *England*, the Parliamentary Seats of which are ordinarily regarded as open to competition: also (from the second edition of that work) the Number of Counties, Cities, and Boroughs in *Ireland*, regarded as being in that same condition: together with a Calculation of the Population, as well as the Numbers of the Voters in the instances under-mentioned.

ENGLAND.		IRELAND.			
	Voters.	Places.	Voters.	Popula- tion.	MEMBERS return- ed Freely.
1 Westminster ..	17,000				
2 London	7,000				
3 Bristol	6,000				
4 Norwich	3,000				
5 Gloucester....	3,000				
6 Coventry	2,400	1 Cork (County)	20,000	416,000	1
7 Liverpool	2,300	2 Tyrone (County) ..	20,000		1
8 York	2,233	3 Tipperary (County)	12,000	170,000	1
9 Southwark....	1,900	4 Galway (County) ..	4,000	140,000	2
10 Lancaster	1,800	5 Cavan (County)	3,000	81,000	1
11 Worcester....	1,700	6 Limerick (County).	3,000	170,000	1
12 Nottingham ..	1,700	7 Waterford (City) ..	3,000	110,000	1
13 Hereford	1,200	8 Dublin (University)	441		2
14 Durham.....	1,200	9 Dublin (City).....		190,000	2
15 Exeter	1,200	10 Roscommon }		86,000	1
16 Hull	1,180	(County .. }			
17 Lincoln	1,100	11 Kildare (County) ..		60,000	1
18 Leicester about	1,000	12 Sligo (County)		60,000	1
19 Yarmouth	787	13 Carlow (County) ..		44,000	1
20 Bridgenorth ..	700	14 Drogheda		20,000	2
21 Ipswich	623	15 Meath (County) ..		4,000	1
22 Shrewsbury ..	600	16 Carrickfergus			2
23 Maidstone....	600	17 Monaghan (County)			1
24 Southampton..	600				
25 Abingdon	600				
26 Reading	600				
27 Tewksbury ..	500				
28 Barnstaple....	450				
29 Stafford	400				
Electoral Districts 29;					
Seats 61. London hav-					
ing 4; Abingdon but 1.					

MR. OLDFIELD'S RECAPITULATION.

(Part II. Vol. IV. p. 300. Ed. 1816.)

Members returned by 87 Peers in England and Wales....	218
by 21 Peers in Scotland	31
by 36 Peers in Ireland	51
Total returned by Peers.....	300
Members returned by 90 Commoners in England and Wales ..	137
by 14 Commoners in Scotland.....	14
by 19 Commoners in Ireland	20
Nominated by Government.....	16
Total returned by Commoners and Government..	187
Total returned by nomination	487
Independent of nomination	171
Total of the House of Commons	658 *

* Majority of sham representatives, 316. Compare this with the numbers in 1793 and 1812, and note well the rapid increase of Corruption, and then expect that Honourable House will reform itself.—EDITOR.

Two arrangements might be mentioned, by which, taken together, much more would be done than by *annual Election* taken by itself: viz. 1. *Exclusion of Placemen's votes* (*speech and motion*, as proposed, reserved).—2. *Universal constancy of attendance*, supposing it really effected.

By neither of these arrangements would the slightest ground be afforded for the imputation of *Jacobinism*; by neither of them would the slightest advance be made towards the restoration of democratic ascendancy; by neither of them would any extension be given to the right of suffrage.

Still, however, in whatsoever degree efficient, deplorably short of adequate would be the above pair of remedies, without the addition of that other, which in the late reign was so near being applied, viz. limiting the prerogative in respect of the right of creating Peers. Part of the legitimate influence of property when swollen to a certain bulk, is that of conferring on the possessor a sort of *right* to a Peerage; a sort of constitutional, customary, half-legal right, subject of course to the universal condition of being in league with the party in power at the time being. Thus it is, that on one side or the other all the families in the three kingdoms, within whose field of vision this highest lot in the inventory of corruption is included, are everlastingly enlisted in a state of irreconcilable hostility with the universal interest. If neither *Pulteney* nor *Pitt the first*, each the first man of his time, could withstand the temptation of this bait, think how it must be with the herd of fox-hunters! Within the circle thus marked out, suppose one man proof against the force of the enchantment—suppose this one miracle—comes the next generation, the miracle is at an end. And, while the as yet uncoroneted class of seat-owners and irresistible terrorists are thus held in corrupt thralldom, by a coronet with no more than four balls on it, the already coroneted proprietors of the same integral parts of the mass of corruption in the hands of despotism are kept in the same state of fascination by coronets of superior brilliancy.

In the last reign but one, a concurrence of circumstances, never renewable, gave to reform in this shape the concurrence of two out of the three branches of the legislature. In the minds of the Peers of those days, the consideration of the deduction, to which the value of the honour would be subjected by every increase given to the numbers of the sharers; this interest, minute as it was, obtained by the advantage of nearness, the prevalence over the remote, but so much more valuable interest, in respect of which that order of men are sharers with the whole body of the ruling few in the profit of corrupt misrule. Taught by so long a course of intervening experience, the Peers of present time are better calculators. Jacobinism would be descried by the Lords temporal, Atheism by the Lords spiritual, in any attempt to deduct the smallest atom from that part of the mass of corruptive influence which operates in this shape.

As to the *exclusion of Placemen's votes*, the celebrated *self-denying Ordinance*, by which, with the exception of *Cromwell*, the Members of *Charles the First's Long Parliament* were reduced to the same sad dilemma, of making each of them his option, between two incompatible offices, was scarcely more fully entitled to its name. In that way was corruption at that time rooted out, because there existed a *Cromwell*, and there existed *Puritans*: neither in that way—nor, much it is to be feared, without convulsion, in any way, will corruption at this time be rooted out, for we have now no *Cromwell*: we have now no *Puritans*.

Oh, but this is nothing but your own surmise—your own ungenerous and groundless surmise: one of the fruits of your own selfish, and wild and visionary, and Jacobinical and Atheistical theory.

Good Gentlemen—If I am indeed so ungenerous as to behold men as the Almighty made them, and as they must be, on pain of ceasing to exist—if such is indeed my theory, it is neither in any respect without its sufficient warrant in the universally, and necessarily, and undeniably prevalent principles of human action, nor yet without its grounds, in the shape of special evidence, applying to this particular case.

Would any of these securities against corruption be found endurable by the Whigs? Not they, indeed.—*Annual Elections* with all its *wildness* and *visionariness*, would be far less intolerable. How should it be otherwise? By *Exclusion of Placemen's votes*, prospects would be destroyed—by *obligation of attendance*, ease would be transformed into hard labour—by limiting the number of Peerages, the triumph of *property* over *honesty* would be arrested in its course.

Exclusion of Placemen's votes might be submitted to by such of them by whom indolence or want of talent would be recognized as excluding, in their own instances respectively, the slender portion of endowment necessary, and in the case of all but the few leaders sufficient to the earning of the pay thus to be earned; but, in every eye without exception, the most visionary of all imaginary visions, would be *that*, by which the fulfilment of incontestable duty, though in the field of time not covering near so much as half the year, (See Report of the 27th March, 1817, p. 20) were to be regarded as either practicable or desirable.

As to what regards *constancy of attendance*, the proof, as shewn already under that head, stands upon your own Journals.

As to what regards the *Exclusion of Placemen's votes*, I call in Mr. Brand. This instrument of purification was found so intolerable to the nerves not only of *Whigs*, but of *Whig Reformists*, (of course altogether *moderate Reformists*) that on the only one of the two occasions in which Mr. Brand executed the originally announced design of an annual reproduction of his proposition for parliamentary reform*, he found himself obliged to leave out this most efficient and unobjectionable of his proposed arrangements: and even then, such had been the offence taken at the injury done to the *party*. by propositions admitted on the former occasion in *favour* of the *people*, that from 115 against 234, his numbers were reduced to 88 against 215†.

On the same occasion, another efficient proposition, omitted by the same Honourable Reformist, was—*that* for the taking of the votes in parochial or other such small districts.

In a word, on this same second or last occasion, every thing that had before proposed, was reduced or altered to that for abolishing, in some way not mentioned, the proprietary seats, and increasing the number of the County seats: to the number of the sources of that terrorism, by the consideration of which, Charles Fox, had (as before*) disapproved that measure.

Note, that from their giving in the first instance the support of their votes to a proposed arrangement of reform, it follows not by any means,

* Cobb. Deb. xxiii. 99 to 106, May 8th, 1812.

† Ibid. anno 1810. xvii. 164; anno 1812. xxiii. 106: 161. "He" (Mr. Brand) "was ashamed thus to delay the House before empty benches; he expected a more full attendance of those Members who usually voted on the same principles with himself."

‡ See note page 57.

that Honourable Gentlemen have the smallest liking to it, or the slightest intention to continue their support to it: neither can conclusions in proof of inward favour and intentions be drawn with any certainty, even from *speeches*—nay even from *motions*—in support of it: for by maturer reflection, operating upon intervening experience, further and true lights shewing the falsity of the lights by which they had at first been guided, original deviations from the path of consummate wisdom lie at all times open to correction. Witness *Earl Grey*, and *Lord Erskine*, and *Mr. Tierney*, with *et cæteras* upon *et cæteras*.

When an Honourable *back* has been turned upon any measure of reform,—expect ye good men and true to whom disappointment is a treat, to see the Honourable *visage* that belongs to it, turned again with a smile towards reform in any shape.

V. *Country Gentlemen Opposition of their particular Interests to efficient Reform, and thereby to the universal interest.*

Would not radical reform be generally and undeniably prejudicial in a variety of ways, to the interest of the great Landholders, whether in the situation of *Country Gentlemen*, employing their influence in providing of seats for themselves or their connexions, or in the situation of Peers, conferring, in the character of *Patrons*, seats on any but themselves?

1. Mention has just been made of the circle, filled by those in whose eyes the perpetual vision of a *coronet*, suspended over their head, occupies the place of the *Labarum*, or the *New Jerusalem*.

2. In virtue of the principle of *practical equality of suffrage*, the Counties, would (most, if not all of them) require to be divided into Electoral districts, what in this respect would be the consequence to the class of persons in question?—that a gentleman, who in an entire county beholds at present an Edom over which he may cast forth his shoe, would find this *whole* reduced to a *part*, corresponding to the number of the Electoral Districts into which the county would be divided. Say that for procuring to him, as before, a *seat*, the district in which the greatest part of his territorial property is situated, would suffice. So far, so good: his station in *the House* would remain unchanged. But a falling off from his importance in *the County*—from every part of his influence but that exclusively attached to his seat in the House, proportioned to the number of the fractions, would be produced.

Suppose four be the number of the Electoral Districts into which the county is divided, from each of them one seat to be filled. On this supposition, in the field of his present dominion, instead of *one* joint potentate, he would have *three* to share with him:—instead of one *Pompey*, each *Cæsar* would have three *Pompeys*.

3. Even in that one of the four supposed districts, in which his territorial demesnes were principally or exclusively situated, his possession even of the *one* seat in question might lose much of its present security.

Once more, does not a *Knight of the Shire* behold his surest dependance in the force of *competition-excluding terrorism*? If yes, then (as shewn in chapter ix.) proportioned to the extent of that same shire is the pressure of that force*.

* That part of the existing system of representation which regards the counties, found (as hath been already seen, Chap. IX.) no very strenuous admirer in *Charles Fox*. The denomination of *Lackland*, belonged to that most powerful advocate of the

VI. *Options—Compromises—Experiments—Postponements.*

For my part, if it depended upon me, gladly would I give up annual Parliaments, if at that price, even though it were confined to the Population Districts, I could obtain the householder-plan, accompanied with secrecy of suffrage, compensation given for proprietary seats, and even for close boroughs. I feel, sensibly, the plague which it would be to Honourable Gentlemen, regularly as the year comes, to set, each of them, his stewards to drive to the poll-booth his portion of the swinish multitude: I feel still more sensibly the plague which it cannot but be to be so driven. In no instance, is any sensation of satisfaction ever produced in my breast, by the idea of uneasiness, considered as existing in any human breast—honourable any more than swinish, and not outweighed by greater satisfaction elsewhere. Quantity of corruption being the same in both cases, by the reproduction of it *every year* instead of *once in every three years*, much would be lost to individual comfort, nothing gained to public security—security against oppression and legalized pillage. Nothing will I conceal, nothing will I exaggerate. Even by the exclusion of the whole number of *corruption-eaters*, supposing their places filled by an equal number of *corruption-hunters*, nothing more in effect would be gained, than the difference between fear of loss and hope of gain. No: nothing more than that difference; but, whether that difference would be slight and inefficient, let any one judge after making the case his own, and asking himself which would be the greater, his grief on losing his all, or his joy on doubling it. I would always obtain the good I look for, at the expence of the least possible suffering. Many men *deserve* reward: no man *deserves* punishment. When a surgeon cuts into a limb, is it because the patient has *deserved* the smart? No: but that the limb may be healed. Reward *is*, Punishment *is not*, a thing to be *deserved*.

For my own part, I should not want much of being satisfied for the remainder of my own life, could I but see the former *Friends of the People* repent of their repentance; repent of it, and no more said; it would be too hard upon them to ask them for the reasons of it. But freedom! freedom!—all suffrages must be *free*, or they are worse than none. *For* and *with* the people, the thing might surely be done with the *Friends of the People*, and those not friends in name only—for their leaders.

VII. *Uses of this Exposure*

What now is the practical use of this display of the state of interests—of this exposure, melancholy as it is—melancholy and inauspicious, but not the less necessary.

Answer. 1. That those, who, on looking into themselves, have the satisfaction of beholding in themselves merit sufficient for purchasing popu-

cause of the people with no less propriety, than to the Monarch to whom we are indebted for the first of our Magna Chartas: nor, either in Wiltshire or elsewhere, have any seats been observed among the appendages of Holland House.

By the Sheridan or Sheridans, support (I am just informed) was given, not only to annual Parliaments, but to universal suffrage. Time would not allow me the satisfaction of digging up the speech in which, by a title still clearer than that of *Charles Fox*, this so long his first assistant proved his right to a place among the advocates of the wild and visionary system—ringleaders of the swinish multitude.

This service I understand has been performed in the lately published pamphlet of *Mr. Evans*.

larity of the true and everlasting fabric, may come forward, and, instead of sitting with folded hands to see us crushed, or lending their hands to the work of crushing us, condescend to head us, and lead us—of the swinish multitude.

Yes, perhaps here and there, at one time or other, may be found a few such superior minds. Such was the Duke of Richmond's: he did not scoff at *universal suffrage*, he advocated it. He himself framed—he himself made public a plan of Reform, and that plan was founded on it.

Yes, even in each House, there may, perhaps, be found a few such eccentrically generous minds: and these the people will have for their leaders; and these their leaders will be adored; in life-time they will be worshipped; and, after death, they will be immortalized.

But, to be thus immortalized, they must have been changed into *People's Men*. *Whigs* they would be no longer, but *Renegados*.

2. That, when these refined spirits are thus drawn off and lodged in their proper receptacle, the heart of an adoring people, the power of the mass which they will have left behind, may find itself reduced to its true and proper amount.

As to these last—*The desperate Tories, who would rather perish in defence of corruption, than yield to the voice of the people*—the force and efficiency of their grand instrument of delusion—argument in the shape of *authority* will evaporate in proportion as the state of their interests being laid open, the direction in which those interests operate, is seen to be adverse to the only efficient mode of Reform:—*that* argument, which, being composed of the alleged *self-formed* judgment of the supposed *closely thinking few*, seeks to supply, as it were, from an inexhaustible fountain, matter for the *derivative* judgment of the *loosely thinking many*.

Arguments of the only genuine stamp being inaccessible to them, what then will be their resource? *Answer*. Henceforward, as till now, silence, storm, or fallacy. But, of the stock of such arms as the arsenal of *fallacy* offers to their hands, a part not altogether inconsiderable, and, that among the readiest at hand, has already been brought out: pre-exposed to a damping atmosphere, and thus rendered unfit for use.

Mark well, there is nothing of blame in all this truth, unwelcome as it cannot but be. Blame, employed upon this occasion, would be as ill grounded as it would be useless. Man is a compound of *nature* and *situation*. Such is the force of *situation* here, that no probity of *nature* can ever have power to resist it. If these men were to be stoned, how many are there among us, who, upon trial, would be found entitled to cast the stones? That, which these men do and forbear to do, those who are most angry with them, would (with few exceptions indeed) not do and forbear to do in their place. Thus sad, and, *but for the silently increasing strength of their own minds*, hopeless, is the condition of the PEOPLE. Every thing, that in any shape has *power* at its back, is either *Whig* or *Tory*. The *Tories* are the people's avowed *enemies*. Man must change his nature, ere to any radically remedial purpose, the *Whigs*, the great body of the *Whigs*, can be their *friends*.

In so far as real sympathy is necessary, to the receiving on any occasion, protecting assistance at their hands, it may now be imagined, whether any such affection can ever be reasonably looked for from the body of the *Whigs*, by the great body of the people.

Happily, no such feeling of sympathy is necessary to be felt by the *Whigs*, in order to induce them to assist the *people*, on almost all government

questions, except the all-comprehensive one of Radical Reform in Parliament.

Between that aristocratical confederacy and the great body of the people, in respect of most matters of detail, separately taken, the community of interests may be stated, as to a certain degree, sufficient for their purpose.

On no occasion, under the ever encreasing weight of the yoke of oppression and misrule, can the people receive the slightest chance (talk not of *relief*, for that is at all times out of the question), but for *delay of increase*, from any other hand than that of the Parliamentary Whigs. As to *liberty of speech*, to all such purposes, every where out of the House it is already gone. In the House, the Whigs still have—and probably for some time longer will continue to have, possession of that instrument, without which, no resistance can be made. In the sort of struggle, faint as it is, which from time to time, the Whigs contrive to summon up strength enough to maintain against the ever overbearing force of their antagonists, scarcely can they so much as *endeavour* to serve *themselves*, in any way, without serving, in some way or other, the interest of the *people*.

Will the time ever come, in which, on the one hand, so intolerable will have become the system of misrule, so grievous the yoke of despotism, on the other hand, in the eyes of the Whigs, so plainly hopeless the chance of their ever being, though it were but for a moment, taken into power; that, in their calculation, the value of their share in the *partial* and *sinister* interest will no longer be greater than that of their share in the *universal* interest? Will the time ever come, in which, in each man's estimate, the system of misrule and oppression will have swollen to such a pitch, that, in the sacrifice made of the universal interest on the altar of despotism, he has more to fear, as a victim, than to hope for as a priest. This will depend, partly on the degree of precipitation or caution, with which the system of despotism proceeds on in its course; partly on the joint degree of discernment and public feeling which shall have place on the part of the Whigs. But the great fear is, lest for their saving themselves and the country together, the time may not already be too late.

ALREADY A LEWIS, G—— WILL BEFORE THAT TIME HAVE BEEN MADE A FERDINAND. Whether individuals or bodies;—without means of communication, nothing effectual can be done, by any two parties, for mutual defence. Sole instruments of communication between mind and mind, these three:—the *tongue*, the *pen*, and the *press*. By the *pen*, without the aid of the *press*, nothing effectual can in these days be ever done. Of what will be done, and *that* without delay, for the depriving the people of the use of the *press*, an earnest has been already given: given in the here several times alluded to, but elsewhere too little noticed, decision of the House of Commons*. As to the *tongue*, under one of the late liberticide Acts, two London *Aldermen*, sitting at Guildhall, have sufficed to put an end to all public use of *that* instrument, on this or on any other part of the field of politics. In this state is *civil liberty*. In *Liverpool*, already has the arm of persecution been raised against the *Unitarians*. In this state is *religious liberty*.

The heart is pierced through and through with the melancholy truth. YES: ALL THAT RULE—ALL THAT EVEN THINK TO RULE—ARE AGAINST THE PEOPLE. *Causes will have their effects.* SOONER OR LATER, unless a change takes place, THE PEOPLE—the

* See page 43, last paragraph.

people, IN THEIR OWN DEFENCE, WILL BE AGAINST ALL THAT RULE*.

† A parting word or two, respecting the pamphlet lately published by Mr. Evans. Time forbidding all examination of it with my own eyes, the following is the result of a report made to me by an intelligent friend. With little or no exception, historical facts, authorities, arguments, nay even proposals, in favour of *radical* reform: conclusions—conclusions alone—in favour of *moderate*: many and important historical facts and authorities.

Under these circumstances, it cannot but be my wish that every person into whose hands this too long work may fall, may yet add to it the pamphlet of Mr. Evans.

Another word or two on the *mode of treating* the subject.

In respect of temper, is there a reader to whom the cause of the difference observable between the *Plan* itself and the *Introduction* to it is an object of the least curiosity? I will answer him without disguise. The *Plan* itself was designed for any eyes that could find patience to look at it. A few exceptions excepted—(and those alas! how few!)—this melancholy *Introduction*, not for Honourable eyes, but for swinish eyes alone. Against interest, against a host of confederated interests, what can argument do?—Exactly as much as against a line of musketry.

A last word on the new oppression to which we are now doomed, viz. the *suppression of petitions*: the closing up of that channel, through which, under the protection of the *Bill of Rights*, from that time, down to the present Session, we possessed all over the kingdom, the means of knowing one another's thoughts on the subject of our common interests.

Framed by that masterly hand, (the Right Hon. Charles Abbott, late Speaker of the House of Commons, now a Peer;) which is so consummately adequate to every work it undertakes—(ah! would the times were such as to allow it to undertake none but good ones!)—I see just come out a set of arrangements, admirable as they are new, for giving the most efficient and timely, the most in every way commodious, publicity to the proceedings of the House. The first specimen has just reached my hand:—but, from amidst these flowers—a snake, how can I help seeing it? lifts up its head and threatens me:—“Any *petitions*, or other proceedings, which *may occasionally be printed by special order*, might follow as a Supplement or Appendix to the Votes, not impeding their daily delivery, and be printed and circulated afterwards with due diligence, according to their length.”

Any petitions? yes: and therefore any petitions, even for *Parliamentary Reform*, even for *Radical Reform*, even for the wild and visionary reform *may henceforward be printed*, so it be *by special order*. But will any such *special order* for dissemination of any such visionary matter in its whole extent, or in any considerable portion of its extent, be generally obtained? Was there any design that it should? Till now the *substance*, even of those visions, was in use to be inserted in the Votes: and thus, on so easy a condition as that of putting on the uniform of prescribed respect, petitioners, in all parts of the United Kingdom, might, without fear of adding to the troubles of Mr. Attorney-General, have had the possibility of coming to the knowledge of one another's minds.

Seeing the use of the press interdicted to petitions for reform, by a former decision, so perfectly pretenceless—seeing that clause of the Bill of Rights which regards petitions, thus, in part, already repealed by a decision of the House of Commons: how can any eye, how averse soever, avoid seeing another wound, and that a still more desperate one, now given to the liberties which, by that so much celebrated, but alas! how vague and imperfect law, were in part professed, in part intended, to be secured?

Admirable as these new arrangements are, so far as concerns the new matter added, has there ever been a time in which the demand for them did not exist since the day on which, in addition to the power, the talent requisite to the making of them found its way into the chair from which they issued? No: but not till now has the demand been so imperative for this, the final suppression of all pernicious visions.

As to whatsoever has been done in the way of *addition*, *compression*, and *acceleration*, never was applause more sincere than that which has here been paid. But

suppression, saving special order or special motion, suppression thus final: and among the matters suppressed, the matter of all *petitions*, and among these petitions, all petitions for *reform*, here lies the evil, and a more portentous one, where shall it be found?

Economy, forsooth, the motive! O rare Economy!

From the suppression of the whole quantity of matter proposed to be suppressed, the expense upon which a saving can by possibility be made, not more than 2,000*l.* a year;* and out of this, what would be the greatest amount of saving that could be made by the suppression of *petitions* alone? A few hundreds a year, or perhaps only a few score. But the sum thus to be saved by the suppression of petitions, suppose it to the amount to the *whole* of the 2,000*l.* For this 2,000*l.* would any man who was not an enemy to English liberties, be content to sell so valuable a portion of them as this? To sell *this*, now that so many *others* have so lately been torn from us? *This*, on the preservation of which depends perhaps the only chance yet left to us for the recovery or the preservation of any of the others?

If, of all places imaginable, the place chosen for the seat of economy, and such economy! must be the Chapel of St. Stephen, once the great sanctuary of English liberties, might not even *there* some more proper source or object for it be found? Suppose, for example, under the head expense, the saving made were made of the money so regularly consumed in that same place, in the periodical pampering, performed at the expense of the people upon their self-styled Representatives: upon these sometimes self-styled servants of the people, while so many of their masters are perishing every day for want of necessities?

By the first glance, at the first specimen of the new arrangement in company with the *Report* by which it was explained, was the suspicion in question awakened: within the compass of *ten* days, behold the confirmation it has already received from experience.

Since this commodious regulation has been acted upon, *five* instances of Petition for Reform have occurred: in *one* of them alone has the *printing* been ordered: in every other of the four instances suppression has been the result. In the one instance in which the printing was ordered, how came it to be ordered? Because, on the part of the Member by whom it was presented, there was a desire no such suppression should take place. In the four other instances, how happened it that the petitions were thus suppressed? Because, in the instance of the Honourable Members by whom they were respectively presented, either there was an opposite desire, or whether the petition was circulated or suppressed was a matter of indifference†.

Last date of the first Number, viz. 45, of the paper printed upon the new Plan, under the title of "*Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons*," 24th April, 1817. In this number, p. 392, follow two articles in the words and figures, following:

"36. Reform in Parliament, &c. Petition of *Wolverhampton*, presented."

"74. Reform in Parliament, &c. Petition of Persons residing in *Andover*, presented."

Votes, &c. No. 46. 25 April, 1817, p. 396.

"31. Taxation and Reform of Parliament, &c. Petition of Provost, &c. of *Lithgow*; to lie on the table"

Votes, &c. No. 47. 28 April, 1817, p. 400.

"37. Retrenchment of Expenditure, Reform of Parliament, &c. Petition of Inhabitants of *Dunfermline*, relating thereto; to lie on the table."

In this same No. 47. p. 400, note the following articles:

"38. Academical Society of London,—Petition for permission to continue their Debates; to lie on the Table and to be *printed*. [Appendix No. 4.]"

N. B. Members stated as belonging to the Universities or Inns of Court: one of them a Member of Honourable House. Society close: No swinish multitude:

* Report, 27th March, 1817, on printed Votes, &c. p. 3.

† In the paper of the "*Votes, &c. of the House of Commons*," printed upon the *old* plan, all petitions presented to the House were printed of course, and delivered the next day to all the Members. Not so on the *new*, as Mr. Bentham has well shewn.—EDITOR.

class thus favoured, the gagging—not the gagged. Privileged orders, partaking or preparing to become partakers, in the separate and sinister interest. It required the undaunted zeal of Mr. Recorder Sylvester to find any objection here.—*See Morn. Chron. 3d May, 1817. Proceedings of the London Sessions, May 2d.*

To manifest his respect for the principles and interests of Honourable House, what is it that the generous hardihood of the learned Gentleman would not be ready to do—yea, in the very teeth of Honourable House?

“ 39. Distress, and want of employment,—Petition of Inhabitants of Birmingham to lie on the Table, and to be printed. [Appendix, No. 5.]”

Distress great; about Reform, nothing. Useful ground afforded for the new job: for diverting from the only remedy the attention of the suffering people; for leading them to suppose that their distresses are really an object of regard; and, as of course for giving increase to influence.

Votes, &c. No. 50, 1st May, 1817, p. 412.

“ 20. Reduction of Taxes, Reform of Parliament, &c. Petition of Inhabitants of *St. Ives* (Hunts), &c.; to lie on the Table, and to be printed. [Appendix, No. 7.]”

In this one behold the only instance, in which, after presenting the Petition, the Member moved that it be printed. This Member was *Sir Francis Burdett*.

The only inducement which Honourable House can have to submit to any such measure as this of its own Reform; being composed of the desires of the people as made known to one another as well as to Honourable House, which Reform can never take place, but in proportion as the particular interest of Honourable House is made to give way to the universal interest—is it now in human nature, that any thing should be omitted by Honourable House, which in the eyes of Honourable House can consistently with the rules of human prudence be done towards the prevention of so unpleasant an effect.

That, for some time after the introduction of the new arrangement, no resistance should be made to a motion for giving to these Petitions for Reform, how unwelcome so ever, the before-accustomed circulation—is altogether natural: especially when, by any such resistance, such a pressure as that which it would be in the power of *Sir Francis Burdett* to apply, would have to be encountered. Yet even already out of *five* Petitions, is the extinguisher dropped upon *four*: this under the green tree, judge how it will be in the dry?

Why load the Parliamentary press with any such useless trash? These petitions—either they agree with one another, or they disagree. Do they agree? from some one manufactory do they all come. Do they disagree? the greater the disagreement, the more conclusive the proof of wildness—of visionariness—of the impossibility of doing any thing that shall be generally satisfactory to the swinish multitude. Behold here an argument, ready to serve, and to prevail, and at all times, for the suppression of that which is to be suppressed.

Has no such plan of suppression been ever formed, or, one having been formed, will Honourable Gentlemen prevail upon themselves to relinquish it?—Nothing can be more simple or unobjectionable than the remedy: Standing Order, that every Petition that has been received shall be printed of course, and in due course. Suppose an order to this effect refused, on a motion duly made, would any such refusal fall any thing short of the most conclusive proof, of the justness of those suspicions which, consistently with any regard for the public welfare, could not be suppressed?

CATECHISM
OF
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM;
OR,
OUTLINE OF A PLAN
OF
Parliamentary Reform:
IN THE
FORM OF QUESTION AND ANSWER; WITH REASONS TO EACH
ARTICLE.

§ 1. ENDS to be aimed at on the occasion of Parliamentary Reform.

QUESTION 1. What are the *ends*, to the attainment of which a system of Parliamentary representation, and parliamentary practice, ought to be directed?

Answer. Many might here be mentioned. But, whatever be their number, they may all be brought under one or another of three expressions, viz.

1. Securing, in the highest possible degree, on the part of Members, the several *endowments* or *elements of aptitude*, necessary to fit them for the due discharge of such their trust.

2. Removing, or reducing to the smallest possible amount, the inconveniences attendant on *Elections*.

3. Removing, or reducing to the smallest possible amount, the inconveniences attendant on *Election Judicature*.

Question 2. What are these *endowments* or *elements of aptitude*?

Answer. They may all be comprehended under one or other of three expressions: viz. 1. Appropriate *probity*. 2. Appropriate *intellectual aptitude*. 3. Appropriate *active talent*.

Question 3. What is to be understood by *appropriate*, applied, as here, to endowments?

Answer. That modification of each such endowment, which is, in a particular manner, suitable to the particular situation of a representative of the people, deputed by a part, to fill, in the character of a trustee or agent for the whole, a seat in that assembly, to which belongs one out of three shares in the legislative department of government, together with the right and duty of watching over the exercise of the two others, viz. the administrative and the judicial.

Question 4. What is to be understood of *appropriate*, as applied to *probity*?

Answer. On the part of a Representative of the People (on each occasion, whether in speaking or delivering his vote), appropriate probity consists in his pursuing that line of conduct, which, in his own sincere opinion, being not inconsistent with the rules of morality or the law of the land, is most conducive to the general good of the whole community for which he serves; that is to say, of the whole British empire: forbearing, on each occasion, at the expense either of such general good, or of his duty in any shape, either to accept, or to seek to obtain, or preserve, in any shape whatsoever, for himself, or for any person or persons particularly connected with him, any advantage whatsoever, from whatsoever hands obtainable; and in

particular from those hands, in which, by the very frame of the constitution, the greatest quantity of temptation is necessarily and unavoidably lodged, viz. those of the King, and the other members of the executive branch of the government, the King's Ministers.

Question 5. What is to be understood here by *appropriate*, as applied to the endowment of *intellectual aptitude*?

Answer. Forming a right judgment on the several propositions, which, either in Parliament, or out of Parliament, but if out of Parliament, with a view to Parliament, are liable to come before him: and, to that end, in Parliament forming a right conception, as well of the nature of each proposition, considered in itself, as of the *evidence*, adduced or capable of being adduced, whether in support of it, or in opposition to it, and the observations thereon made, or capable of being made in the way of *argument*, for it or against it, as above.

Question 6. What is to be understood here by *appropriate* as applied to *active talent*?

Answer. Talents suited to the due performance of several *operations*, which, in the course of his service, in or out of the House, but more particularly in the House, it may happen to a Member to be duly called upon to perform, or bear a part in: for example, *introducing*, or endeavouring to introduce, by way of *motion*, any proposed law or measure which he approves: delivering a *speech* in support of any proposition which he altogether approves; or in opposition to one which he altogether disapproves: proposing an *amendment* to any proposed law or measure which he approves in part only: drawing up, or helping to draw up, a *Report*, concerning such or such matters of fact, for the inquiring into which it has happened to him to have been appointed to act as Chairman, or other Member, of a Committee; putting relevant *questions*, concerning matters of fact, to persons examined before the House, or any Committee of the House, in the character of *witnesses*.

§ 2. Means, conducive towards these Ends.

QUESTION 7. What are the *means* that promise to be most effectually conducive to the accomplishment of the above several ends?

Answer I. In the first place come those which have, for their end or object, the securing, in the highest degree of perfection, the several *endowments* or *elements of aptitude*, requisite on the part of Members, as above.

These are—

1. Exclusion of *Placemen* in general from the right of sitting in the House in the quality of *Members* entitled to *vote*.
2. Seating in the House *Official persons*, named by the King, from each department, *without* right of *voting*, but with right of *speech* and *motion*, subject at all times to restriction or interdiction by the House.
3. Elections annually renewed: with power to the King to ordain a fresh Election at any time.
4. Speeches (made in the House) correctly, completely, and *authentically* taken down, and regularly and promptly *published*.
5. Constancy, punctuality, and universality of *attendance* secured.

Answer II. Next comes the *means*, which have for their end the removing or reducing, to their least possible dimensions, the *inconveniences* attendant on *Elections* and *Election Judicature*.

6. In each Electoral District, the number of the Voters is uniformly large.
7. Each Elector's title, *payment* made to a certain amount to certain *taxes*:—the evidence of such title, a duplicate of the *Tax Collector's* re-

ceipt: the paper (call it the *Voting-paper*) delivered, or else transmitted (by *post*), to the returning Officer; in case of transmission, the Elector having first written upon it, according to directions printed on the Voting Paper itself, the name of the Candidate for whom he means to vote.

8. When performed by *delivery*, the voting should be *secret*.

To establish the genuineness and sufficiency of the Collector's signature, the Voter presents his voting-paper to the Returning Officer, in presence of the Agents of the Candidates. The shortest glance suffices. Its admission is signified by marking it with a stamp. The voter is thereupon presented with a ticket, which, out of the sight of every person, he drops, through a slit, into a box marked with the name of the Candidate for whom he means to give his vote. Penalty on forging the signature of a Collector, or personating a Voter: to enforce it, each voting-paper is retained. Delivery not to be performed by proxy: for in that case a known friend to one of the Candidates might require to be the proxy, and thus the design of secrecy would be frustrated.

9. To insure secrecy, in the case where the voting is performed by transmission (by *post*), the voting-paper contains a promise of secrecy, signed by the Voter, and conceived in terms of such strength, that, without offering an affront to him, neither a Candidate, nor any one on his behalf, can request the breach of it. Not that even by this means the assurance of secrecy can be rendered altogether so perfect in the case of transmission, as in the case of delivery, as above.

Marks in place of names not admitted. They would be incompatible with secrecy. A vote is of little value to him, who, not being as yet able to write, grudges the trouble necessary to the learning to write his name.

10. Members seats 600; of which, 400 seats for *territory*, and the remainder 200 seats for *population*.

11. To form the *Territorial* Electoral districts, the whole of Great Britain and Ireland is divided into, say 400, districts, as nearly equal in size as is consistent with convenience resulting from local circumstances. One Member is chosen for each, and parishes compose the elementary portions. No parish is divided.

12. The *Population* Electoral Districts are composed of certain Towns, the population of which amounts to a certain number of souls, or upwards.—Say, merely for illustration, 10,000:—precision might be given, on examination of the Population Returns. Each of these Towns fills one or more seats, in proportion to its numbers: but in such sort, that the whole number of seats thus filled does not exceed the 200.

The three Capitals, London, Dublin, and Edinburgh, would thus possess that ascendancy which is their due: due to them, not merely on the score of population, but also on the score of appropriate information and intelligence.

13. For the seats corresponding to these Population Electoral Districts, voting otherwise than in the most surely secret mode, by *delivery*, need not be admitted.

14. On the part of persons possessing the one qualification required as above, such circumstances, as would be apt to present themselves in the character of grounds of disqualification, need not be regarded. *Aliens*, for example, would be admitted: but to such a degree would they be outnumbered, that though they were all enemies, no sensible practical mischief could ensue. *Females* might even be admitted: and, perhaps, with as little impropriety or danger, as they are in the Election of Directors for the government of the 30 or 40 millions of souls in British India.

By all the inequalities and other untoward results put together that could have place in the above plan, no practical mischief could be produced equal to that which, on the present plan, a single pocket-borough is sufficient to produce.

§ 3. Means conducive to aptitude in Members :—1. Placemen not to vote, nor be seated by Election.

QUESTION 8. To which of the above ends does the exclusion proposed to be put upon the votes of placemen, promise to be conducive?

Answer. To appropriate probity.

Question 9. In what way?

Answer. In this way. By keeping the right of voting out of the hands of persons possessing other situations, to which advantage, in large masses is attached, in the shape of money, power, and reputation, together with expectation of further advantage, in the same and other shapes, all liable to be taken from them, without reason assigned, and at the King's pleasure; persons, therefore, so situated, that (speaking of the generality of them) it is not in the nature of man that they should not, on all ordinary occasions, be in the habit of sacrificing, and continue disposed to sacrifice, in so far as depends upon each man's vote, the general interest of the empire and their public duty, to the desire of preserving such advantageous situations; and, for that purpose, conforming themselves to the will of the person or persons, be they who they may, on whom their continuance in such situations depends.

Nor should any such disposition appear wonderful, when it is considered, that even the worst King and the worst Minister having, on many points, the same interest with the body of the people, it is not in the nature of man, that they should harbour any intention, or wish, of doing any act that may be productive of injury to the general interest, except in so far as it may happen that particular interests of their own can be served by such act; and, that, so long as they content themselves with doing no other sort of mischief than what has been commonly done already, they stand assured of support, not only from each other, but from the multitude of those, in whose eyes the standard of right and wrong is composed of nothing more than the practice of "great characters," that is, of any characters whatsoever, in "high situations."

§ 4. Means, &c. continued. II. Placemen seated by the King, with Speech and Motion, without Vote.

QUESTION 10. To which of the ends does the arrangement of seating official persons from the official departments, without votes, but with the right of speech and motion, subject to restriction or interdiction by the House, promise to be conducive?

Answer. To appropriate intellectual aptitude.

Question 11. In what way?

Answer. In this way. It being all along matter of necessity on the part of the King and his Ministers to secure for their measures, either the co-operation, or, at least the acquiescence of the House, it will be all along their interest, and, therefore, naturally their endeavour, to find out and station in the House such persons, as, being furnished with the requisite degree of obsequiousness as towards his will, are in an eminent degree distinguished by the talent of persuasion, including that sort and degree of appropriate *intellectual aptitude* which is necessary to it. This intelligence, be it what

it may, the House may at all times be thus made to have the full benefit of, and, at the same time, without having its decisions perpetually exposed to be turned aside into a sinister course, by the weight of so many dependent votes, expressive, not of any will of the voters, guided by any opinion of their *own* concerning the general interest, but of the will, guided by the particular, and, therefore, sinister interest of the King, or of some Minister, or of some private, and unknown favourite of the King.

By this means the King and his ministers would possess at all times what is the best chance, for obtaining, and maintaining, in the House, the only *honest* kind of influence, viz. *the influence of understanding on understanding* : and that purified, by the preceding and following proposed arrangements taken together, from that *dishonest* kind of influence, *the influence of will over will*.

Question 12. But, is it not necessary, that every man, who proposes a law or measure in the House, should have a vote to give in support of it?

Answer. No more than that every Advocate who makes a motion in the Court of King's Bench should have a vote to give in support of it on the Bench.

In the business of judicature, it has never yet been thought necessary, or so much as conducive, to the giving to the justice of the case the benefit of such appropriate intelligence and active talent as may be afforded by the Advocates on both sides, that the advocates on either side should take their seats on the Bench, each of them with a vote equal in its effect to that of any of the Judges.

§ 5. Means, &c. continued. III. Annual Elections.

QUESTION 13. To which of the above ends does the proposed annual renewal of Elections promise to be conducive?

Answer. To all three : and in the first place to *probity*.

Question 14. In what way?

Answer. In divers ways.

1. On the part of each member taken individually : in case of transgression, by the prospect of eventual exclusion ; and that speedy, to wit, at the next Election, at furthest within a twelvemonth.

2. On the part of the whole House, taken collectively : by reducing, to so small a quantity, the length of sinister service, which it would be in the power of the King or his Ministers, to purchase, at the hands of any one Member : and increasing at the same time the number of such lengths of service, as they would find themselves under the continually recurring necessity of purchasing, out of the whole number of members, ere they could secure the commencement or continuance of any bad course of government.

3. By reducing, in so great a degree, whatever inducement a Candidate would have, on the occasion of a contest, to launch out into any such expense, as, by straitening his circumstances, might, in the hope of obtaining an indemnification, engage him to place himself in a state of dependence on the King, or any set of Ministers ; whether Ministers in possession or Ministers in expectancy, making in this respect no difference.

Question 15. In what way does this means promise to be conducive to *intellectual aptitude and active talent* ?

Answer. By perpetually holding up to the view of each successful Candidate, now become a Member, the near prospect of a fresh Election, when it may happen to his constituents to have the choice of rival candidates : for all whom the encouragement will be greater and greater, in proportion as, on his part, any feature of unfitness, absolute or comparative, has, in either of these two shapes,

been manifested; viz. whether by discourses indicative of ignorance or weakness, by constant silence and inactivity, or by absence or slackness of attendance.

§ 6. Means, &c. continued. IV. Speeches authentically and promptly published.

QUESTION 16. To which of the above ends does the correct, compleat, authentic, and constant taking down, and regular publishing all speeches made in the House, promise to be conducive?

Answer. To all three.

Question 17. In what way does it promise to be conducive to *probity*?

Answer. 1. By impressing upon each man's mind the assurance, that by the public in general, and by his own constituents in particular, he will, thenceforward, and then for the first time, *be judged of*, in the only way in which, in his situation, a man can be rightly and justly judged of, *according to his works*—held up, according to his deserts, to *esteem* or *disesteem*, for every thing which he *has* said, and not, as happens but too often at present, for saying that which he had not said.

2. In so far as concerns veracity and sincerity, by operating as a check upon those misrepresentations, which, for the purpose of the moment, are so apt to be hazarded, under favour of the at present indispensable rule, which precludes reference to former debates: misrepresentations respecting the speaker's own opinion; misrepresentation respecting facts at large;—misrepresentations respecting the speeches of other Members: misrepresentations, sometimes resulting from carelessness and temerity, sometimes accompanied with wilful falsehood.

Question 18. In what way does it promise to be conducive to *intellectual aptitude*?

Answer. In the several ways following; viz.

1. By furnishing to each Member, on the occasion of each motion, a correct and compleat view of whatsoever *evidences* and *arguments* have been brought forward on the occasion of the same motion, or any other past motion, so connected with it as to afford either evidences or arguments justly applicable to it: thereby, so far as they go, furnishing him with better and safer grounds on which to found his opinion, his speeches, if any, and his vote, than can be furnished by any other means.

2. By impressing upon each man's mind, that assurance of being judged of according to his *words*, which has just been brought to view, in the character of a security for appropriate *probity*. For, the more correct the judgment which he is assured will be passed upon that part of his *works*, the stronger the motive which he has for making whatsoever exertions shall appear to him to be necessary, to save him from the dishonour of being found wanting in point of appropriate *intellectual aptitude*?

3. By furnishing the only completely efficient means for detecting and pointing out the existence and successfully counteracting the influence, as well of the *misrepresentations* above-mentioned, as of those rhetorical *fallacies* and devices, the efficiency of which depends—partly on the irremediable *uncertainty* in which, in the case of word-of-mouth discourse, the *identity* of the words in which they are conveyed remains involved—partly on the want of the time requisite for searching out, and bringing to light the errors and false judgments which they seek to propagate and inculcate*.

* On the subject of these *fallacies*, some loose papers were, at the writing of the above paragraph, lying on the author's shelves. Not long ago—to serve as a

4. By keeping out of the House such persons as, on the ground of experience, shall, either in their own judgment, or that of their Constitutional Judges, the People, have been found unable to abide this test.

§ 7. Means, &c. continued. V. Attendance, punctual and general, secured.

QUESTION 19. To which of the ends does constancy and punctuality of attendance, on the part of each Member, and thence of the whole House, promise to be conducive?

Answer. To all three ends.

Question 20. In what way to *probity*?

Answer. In sundry ways, as follows; viz.

1. Whatsoever indication can be afforded, by the correct and compleat taking down and *publishing* a man's *speeches*, as above, it is only through the medium of his *attendance*, and in proportion to the constancy of his *attendance* in the House, that any such speeches can be afforded.

2. When the state of *law* and *custom* (with the exception of such of the Members, whose constant obsequiousness to the will of the *Arch-tempter*, *C——r General*, together with the whole of their support on every occasion, is secured by the dependance of their situations) leaves it altogether at a man's option whether he will attend or not—in this case, by simply forbearing to attend at the place where, in point of *moral duty*, his attendance is due, it is, on every occasion, in the power of any man, and every man, to afford to the Arch-tempter, and that without either shame or danger, exactly *half* the support which he could have afforded, by attending and voting on that side:—and so, in the case of any particular pernicious measure, to which he finds himself exposed to the temptation of shewing undue favour: thus, whether it be by leaving unopposed what he ought to have opposed, or by leaving unsupported what he ought to have supported, doing effectually by his absence, exactly half the mischief, which, howsoever desirous, he durst not have done in case of his presence.

Question 21. In what way to *intellectual aptitude*?

Answer. The more frequent a man's attendance, the greater his experience; and the greater his experience, the more perfect is that branch of his *intellectual aptitude* which consists in an acquaintance with the nature of his business, whatsoever it may be.

Question 22. In what way to *active talent*?

Answer. The more frequent a man's attendance, the greater will be his experience: and, be the business what it may, the greater is his experience

sort of appendix to some others, in which somewhat greater progress had been made, on the subject of the *Tactics of Political Assemblies*, they were, by the author's friend, *Mr. Dumont*, put into that French dress, in which, by the same able hand, so many other uncompleted works of the author's have been made to appear so much to their advantage. Copies of this work are in London, probably some of them in the hands of the Foreign Booksellers: but, owing to some accident, none have yet been seen by the author of these pages:—1. Fallacies of the *Ins.* 2. Fallacies of the *Outs.* 3. *Either-side* Fallacies. In the original, these were the general heads. One general character belongs to almost all of them; and that is *irrelevancy*, irrelevancy with relation to the particular subject, be it what it may, to which they are applied. It were truly curious to observe, in how large a proportion these are the materials of which Parliamentary and other political speeches—not to speak of other political works—are composed.

in the examination and management of it—the greater will be his expertness at it—that expertness, which is, at the same time the effect of active talent, and the cause of it.

Question 23. Considering how thin, except on extraordinary occasions, the attendance is at present, what reasonable expectation can there be of anything like an habitually universal attendance, and by what means can it be secured?

Answer. On the part of a Trustee or an Agent, whose duty cannot be performed but at a certain place, absence from that place is a neglect which involves in it every other, and against which, forfeiture of the Trust is, as soon as it takes place, an effectual as well as gentle remedy. Let but the operation of Election recur with the proposed degree of frequency, it brings with it of course, this remedy, together with a time of trial, sure to recur at a stated and never long distant period. For insuring the efficacy of this remedy, and thereby for securing in every such instance a degree of constancy and punctuality of attendance, equal at least to what is seen in any of the *Offices*, there can need but one thing more, which is—an equally sure and effectual *notification* of every such act of transgression, as it takes place.

To this purpose a regular and authentic publication, of two Tables of the following descriptions, would obviously suffice:—

Table I. DAILY-GENERAL-ATTENDANCE TABLE: exhibiting, for each day, the name of every Member present at any time of the sitting, together with the part taken by each, on each question on which there has been a division.

N.B. If, to the present tedious, inconvenient, and inadequate mode of division, were substituted, the prompt, convenient, adequate, and obvious mode of giving in names, each man giving in his name, for instance, on a card, without stirring from his place, divisions would of course be much more frequent than at present, and the knowledge obtained by the constituent, of the political conduct and character of his representative proportionally more complete.

Table II. ANNUAL-INDIVIDUAL-ATTENDANCE TABLE: exhibiting on every day of sitting throughout the year, for the instruction of his constituents, the conduct of each Representative, in respect of *attendance*, *vote*, and *speech*: with the grounds of *excuse*, if any, for each default, in case of non-attendance.

N.B. On extraordinary occasions, for party purposes, instances have now and then been known, in which Tables of the nature of the above-mentioned *General-Attendance-Table*, have, without authority, been printed and disseminated by individual hands.

If the security thus afforded were found not sufficient, punishment, in the pecuniary shape, combinable with reward in the same shape, might, in the most simple and effectual manner, without need of prosecution, or intervention of lawyers and lawyercraft, be employed to strengthen it, by a law framed upon the principle of that class of laws which are said *to execute themselves*.

On his Election, each Member *deposits* with the Clerk a sum of money: say (merely for illustration) 400*l*.

A computation is made of the greatest number of days in the year during which it is probable the House will sit;—say 200. Each day of attendance, on entrance, the Member *receives back* from the hands of a Clerk appointed for that purpose, 2*l*.: and, at the end of the year, if the number

of days of sitting has fallen short of the computed number, 2*l.* is returned for each day whereby it has so fallen short.

If the aggregate of the sums thus forfeited on each day, were divided among the Members attendant on that day, the force of *reward* would thus be added to that of *punishment*.

Of the many opulent, and thence idle incapables, who, at present, while the *House* is left empty, crowd the *list*, some would probably, even on the proposed plan of representation, obtain, by means of the illustration shed around them by their opulence, a probationary year, with little or no intention, or at any rate without any persevering habit, of regular attendance. The superfluity of these idle favourites of fortune would, in this way, afford a not altogether unwilling supply to the exigencies of the more assiduous and less opulent. And here would be emolument without corruption : *pay*, for, and in proportion to, honest *service*.

In this way the *penalty* for non-attendance, with or without the *reward* for attendance, might, by the light of experience, be increased or reduced at pleasure.

Question 24. Are the arrangements above proposed to be considered as being, when taken together, sufficient to insure on the part of the population of the House, a degree of appropriate probity, sufficient for all occasions ?

Answer. Against so vast and perpetually increasing a mass of temptation and corruption, constantly and indispensably lodged in a single hand, no remedy that promises to act as a preservative, can safely be considered as superfluous.

Whatsoever is either *good* in itself, or thought to be so, is capable of being employed in the character of *reward* : and whatsoever is employed in the character of reward, becomes *corruption*, when applied to a *sinister* purpose : when applied to a man, in such manner as to direct his endeavours to doing *good* to the *one* or to the *few*, at the expense of overbalancing *evil* to the *many*.

No reward, with or without title to reward, ever is or can be bestowed by the King, that is not bestowed at the expense of the people.

Title to reward is—adequate *service* rendered, or in some shape or other about to be rendered, to the public : and whatever reward is bestowed without such title being established, is bestowed as *favour* : and, besides being bestowed in *waste*, whatever is bestowed as mere favour operates as *corruption*, by the expectation of it.

Peerages, bestowed not only without extraordinary public service, but without public service in any shape, or so much as the pretence for it, constitute a conspicuous example of corruption applied to the purpose of corruption.

In the shape of a peerage, *corruption* is capable of being employed to corrupt those, whose opulence suffices to preserve them from being corrupted in any other shape. County Members and Borough Members together, the occupiers of no inconsiderable part of the whole number of seats, are held by the King in a state of invisible, perhaps, but not the less corrupt, less constant, or less efficient dependence. In one House by peerages, in the other by advancements in the peerage, the pretended independence of Judges is converted into dependence.

In the reign of George I. a Bill for restraining the employment of corruption in this shape, passed the House of Lords. Since that time, the quantity thus employed has received a prodigious increase. The reign in

which the Bill was thrown out of the Commons, was the same, in which a set of Representatives who had been elected by their constituents for three years, were engaged and enabled to elect themselves for seven years; thus vitiating the constitution by a poison of new invention, under the effects of which it has been labouring and lingering ever since.

§ 8. Inconveniences incident to Elections, and Election judicature.

QUESTION 25. What are the inconveniences attendant on Elections?

Answer. They are so various, and depend, many of them, on such various contingencies, that it seems scarce possible to make a compleat enumeration of them. The principal of them will, however, be found comprehended under two heads: viz. 1. To Candidates, expense and vexation: 2. On the part of Electors and *persons at large*, loss of time (a loss which is of itself equivalent to so much expense) idleness, drunkenness, quarrels, mischief to person and property on the occasion of *riots*.

Question 26. What are the *sources* of the expense?

Answer. These will vary, according as the expenditure of money is permitted or prohibited by law, and in case of prohibition, according as the prohibition is followed or not followed by compliance.

Here follow some of the principal items—

1. Given, with a view to the Election, though before a vacancy, and thence penalty-proof—*entertainments*: instruments of corruption, defying all limit, as well in point of number as in point of expense.

2. Previously to the Election, expense of drawing up and publishing advertisements, in newspapers and hand-bills.

3. At *previous meetings*, and on the Election day at the place of Election—expense of engaging persons to attend as *Clerks*, and make minutes of proceedings.

4. In the case of *distant votes*, expense of conveyance, with or without refreshment, during the journey, to and from the place of election.

5. Money, or money's worth, given for votes; whether directly, in the way of bribery, to the voters themselves, or indirectly to other persons having the command of votes in the way of influence.

6. In the case of a *scrutiny*, Expenses of Counsel, Attorneys, and other Agents, employed in the attack and defence of the disputed votes.

7. Occasional law-suits—produced by the uncertainties which, to so great an extent, hang over the titles to Election right, and the intrigues employed for the creation, preservation, or destruction of such rights.

Question 27. What are the inconveniences attendant on Election Judicature?

Answer. Expenses, vexations, and delays.

Question 28. Wherein consist the *expenses*?

Answer 1. In fees to Counsel: viz. for Opinions, and, in case of a trial before an Election-Committee of the House of Commons, for attendances, day after day, at the Committee.

2. In money paid to witnesses for expense of journies and loss of time.

3. In fees to attornies and other agents, for carrying on the cause, as above.

4. Occasionally, in the expenses of suits at law, concerning such offices as, in the case of seats for Boroughs, confer the right of voting on the Election of Members, or, in some way or other, the means of influencing such Elections.

Question 29. Wherein consist the *vexations*?

Answer 1. In that burthen of attendance which falls upon the Members (fifteen in number), of whom the judicatory is composed:—2. In those vexations which, on that occasion, in the shape of anxiety, candidates experience, or are liable to experience:—3. And in those which fall upon such witnesses, in whose instance such compensation money as happens to be allowed to them, as above, is more or less inadequate.

Question 30. Wherein consists the *delays*?

Answer. In the stop so frequently put to the business of the House, by the anxiety of Members to avoid serving on those judicatories. On the occasion of the sort of Lottery, by which the fifteen who are to serve on each cause are determined—to avoid being thus impounded, they have frequently been known to absent themselves, in such numbers, as not to leave in attendance the number necessary to constitute a House.

2. In the length of time, during which, in case of an *undue return*, the *Electors*, instead of the person who, in their eyes, is most fit, see their share of power exercised by one who, in their eyes, may be unfit; and the *Candidate*, whose right it was to be returned, loses the benefit of that right.

§ 9. Election Inconveniences—Means for their Removal.

QUESTION 3. In what way do the above-mentioned means promise to be conducive to the removal of the inconveniences attendant, as above, on Elections and Election-Judicature?

Answer. As to *expense*:—by striking off at one stroke all expenses whatsoever, except such as are comparatively inconsiderable, such as those incurred in the publication of advertisements by the Candidates, and those incurred incidentally on the occasion of previous meetings.

1. *Loss of time, idleness, drunkenness, and riots*, have for their cause *large concourses* of people, with entertainments given to Electors by Candidates, or their friends. But any such large concourse of people will have no object; nor (votes being secret) will any man be at any such expense in giving entertainments, the receivers of which may, for aught he can know, be composed, in as large a proportion, of his adversaries as of his friends.

2. The expense of conveyance and refreshment, in the case of distant voters, will be struck off altogether. For there cannot be any pretence either for offering or receiving money on that score, when the utmost effect that could be expected from the longest journey, may equally be produced by a paper put into the post.

3. As to Lawyers, Clerks, and other Agents, neither on the occasion of collecting the votes at the place of election, nor on any such occasion as that of an Election-Committee of the House, can there be either use or room for any such assistance. All that the Returning Officer will have to do is—out of the boxes denominated from the several candidates—to count the number of *voting-papers* that have been put into each box.

There would be no such vexations as those from the obligations of serving on Election Judicatories, and from the delays attendant on such judicature, because there would be no such judicature; and there would be no such judicature, because there could be nothing to try:—unless by possibility, and that without probability, any such offence should be committed, as, by the Collector, a refusal to sign and deliver the duplicate receipt on the *voting-paper*; or, by a Postmaster, a suppression of a multitude of such papers at the Post Office; or, by a Returning Officer, a false return—respecting this or that one out of a small number of matters of fact, all of them

simple, and in their nature either of themselves notorious, or easily made notorious.

For the purpose of punishment, prosecutions for any such offences would of course be left to the established dilatoriness of the technical mode of procedure pursued in the ordinary Courts. But, for the purpose of applying an immediate parliamentary remedy to a false return, a single day's sitting, of a Grenville-Act Committee of the House of Commons, would suffice.

Question 32. If, in the instance of each Elector, the disposition made by him of his vote were thus to be placed altogether out of the reach of the public eye, so that a vote may be refused to the most worthy, given to the most unworthy of all Candidates, and that without danger, and consequently without fear of shame, might there not be too much reason to apprehend, that considerations of a purely selfish nature would become generally predominant?

Answer. No: not to any such effect as that of seating a Candidate really and generally deemed less worthy, to the exclusion of a Candidate really and generally deemed more worthy: which effect is the only practical bad effect the case admits of.

If, indeed, matters were so circumstanced, that, by voting in favour of any candidate whatsoever, it were possible for the majority of the Electors in any district to obtain, each of them for himself, any considerable private advantage, which, by the open mode of voting, he would be deterred from aiming at, it were certainly too much to expect that they should forego any such advantage: and if such sacrifice of public interest to private were accordingly repeated in a considerable proportion of the whole number of Electoral districts, the inconvenience to the public service might be found sensible and considerable.

But when, by the shortness of a man's time in his seat, and the multitude of the persons, to each of whom, at the hazard of being betrayed by any one of them, and this without any tolerable assurance of his giving his vote in favour of the briber, the bribe would be to be offered; when by all these means together, the obtainment of a seat by bribery is rendered, as it would be, to so unprecedented a degree improbable, it does not seem possible to divine by what means a candidate, generally deemed the less worthy, should obtain an effectual preference, to the exclusion of one generally deemed the more worthy.

On the other hand, in the case of the *open* method hitherto in use, the effect of it is, on every occasion, to force Electors, in a number to which there are no limits, to give their vote in favour of the less worthy, to the exclusion of the more worthy, candidate, on pain of suffering, each of them, some personal inconvenience, to the magnitude of which there are no limits.

And this power, which, by means of some such relation as those between landlord and tenant, between customer and dealer, between employer and person employed, in a word, between patron and dependent, men of over-*swaying* opulence possess and exercise, over men less favoured by the gifts of fortune, this power of *forcing* men to vote against their consciences, has been termed "the legitimate influence of property," and spoken of as that foundation stone, by the removal of which "the subversion of the constitution" would be effected.

If, in the event of his voting in favour of him who, in his estimation, is the *less* worthy candidate, in preference to him who, in his opinion, is the more worthy candidate, a man sees no prospect of advantage to himself, nor of disadvantage in the contrary event, it seems not too much to hope and ex-

pect that his vote will most commonly be in favour of that candidate who, in his opinion, is the *more* worthy candidate.

If conscience will not do this, it will do nothing. But assuredly, the less deeply men are *led*, or lead themselves, into *temptation*, the more likely they will be to be *delivered*, or to deliver themselves, from *evil*.

The less it is that the law expects from every man, the less it will expose itself to disappointment. *Less* than the disposition to do good, so far as it is to be done by serving the public, in such cases, and in such cases only, in which it can be done without an atom of loss or other inconvenience to himself, cannot surely be expected from any man.

Question 33. Is not any such mode of voting by a mixture of writing and printing, in comparison of the good *old* mode of voting, practised by the *wisdom of our ancestors*, viz. voting by word of mouth, an *innovation*, and that a signal one?

Answer. In one point of view it is an innovation—in another, *not*. Considered as an art in general use, the *art of writing* must, to whatsoever purpose applied, and consequently when applied to any such purpose as this, be acknowledged to be an innovation, and that a very signal one: then comes the art of *printing*, which, especially when considered as an art in general use, is a still more sweeping one. These arts being innovations, it cannot but be an innovation to apply them—whether to the purpose in question or to any other purpose. But if these be innovations, they will not, it is hoped, be placed in the class of mischievous ones.

On the other hand—if (in this, as in other matters,) the wisdom of our ancestors be considered, as consisting in the employing, for each purpose, at each point of time, the best and most convenient method in their time known and practicable—there is not, in the mode of voting here proposed, any innovation at all, much less a mischievous one.

Our ancestors employed the most convenient mode practicable, in employing the *word-of-mouth* mode: *we*, their posterity, employ the most convenient mode practicable, in employing the *written* and *printed* mode.

Thus doing, we may, therefore, be said, and with truth, to take the wisdom of our ancestors for our guide.

§ 10. *Collateral advantages, referable to the situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.*

QUESTION 34. Are these that have been mentioned, all the *advantages* resulting, or all the *uses* derivable, from the means above proposed to be employed for securing the several elements of aptitude on the part of Members?

Answer. Far from it. Various collateral advantages may be seen resulting, in case of the employing of these means.

Question 35. What are the *classes of persons*, by or through whom these collateral advantages would be received?

Answer. They are various: and in particular five descriptions of persons may be mentioned in this view: viz.

1. Parliamentary Electors, by whose votes, members of the House of Commons would be seated.

2. Members of the House of Lords.

3. King's men, whether in or out of the House; that is to say, the persons occupying, under the King, the principal public offices.

4. The higher classes of the people taken at large.

5. The lower classes of the people taken at large.

Question 36. In what particular *ways* does the employment of these means promise to be serviceable, in the instance of these several descriptions of persons?

Answer. 1. To *Parliamentary Electors*, as such, it promises increase of *appropriate intellectual aptitude*: 2. To King's men in the House, and to their respective subordinates, in or out of the House, increase of appropriate probity, *intellectual aptitude*, and active talent: 3. To Members of the House of Lords, increase of intellectual aptitude, and at the same time increased security for probity: 4. To the higher classes at large, increase of probity and intellectual aptitude: 5. To the lower classes at large, increase of comfort, by increase of kindness and courtesy towards them, on the part of the higher classes; and on their own part, increase of appropriate intellectual aptitude, from the habit of appropriate discussion.

Question 37. What are the several *parts* of the plan by which those several advantages promise to be produced?

Answer. 1. That which seats Placemen in the House from the several *departments*, with every right but that of voting: 2. That which provides for the correct and complete taking down, and immediate and regular publication, of all *speeches* made in the House: 3. And that which gives uniformly extended *numbers* to the voters in the several Electoral Districts—*liberty* to all their votes, and *regularly annual* recurrence to the Elections.

Question 38. In the case of Electors, in what way do the promised collateral advantages promise to take place, and from what means?

Answer. From the correct and complete publication of all speeches made in the House, the Electors would, as well as the Member, be gainers, by so much as each man pleased—as many of them as pleased, in the article of *intellectual aptitude*.

Of the probity of his representative, so far as indicated by his attendance; and in case of his attendance, of his probity and intellectual aptitude, in so far as indicated by his vote; and, in case of his speaking, of his probity, intellectual aptitude, and active talent, so far as indicated by his speeches, every Elector that pleased, would, on every occasion on which he pleased, possess the most complete and correct evidence that the nature of the case admitted of.

Question 39. In the case of *Placemen*, in what shapes, and by what means, do the promised collateral advantages promise to take place?

Answer. By the tendency which such a situation would have, to improve in their respective breasts, the several *endowments*, or elements of aptitude above-mentioned, relation being had to the business of their respective offices.

The beneficial influence of the arrangement would not confine itself to the case of those *high* in office, who, in virtue of it, would be seated in the House: it would extend to their respective *subordinates out of the House*.

Take first the case of those seated in the House, and by official duty, and the proposed *Attendance-Tables*, rendered constant in their attendance there.

1. Appropriate probity, will, in their instance, have for its aid, the continual *scrutiny*, actual or impending, to which they will remain subject: subject, with full power of giving, to themselves and to one another, whatsoever support can be afforded by *speeches*, that is, by *evidence* and by *argument*; but without that power of self-support, deserved or undeserved, which a confederated body of men, linked together by one common interest, and that a sinister one, afford to themselves and one another by their *votes*:

men who, while they are co-partners and co-defendants by their *offices*, are fellow judges over each other by their *votes*.

2. The arrangement promises increase to appropriate intellectual aptitude, on the part of official persons of the same descriptions, by rendering it to them matter of increased necessity, to obtain and retain correct and complete information, respecting the whole mass of business habitually transacted in their respective offices; lest, by want of correctness, completeness, or promptness, in the answers given by them to questions put to them in the House, from time to time, in relation to such business, any deficiency on their part, in point of appropriate official knowledge, should stand exposed.

Take next the case of the several *subordinates not having seats* in the House.

Increase of appropriate probity, will, in *their* instance, have, as will be seen, for its immediate cause, the increase of both endowments, probity and intellectual aptitude, as above, on the part of their respective *heads having seats* in the House.

1. As to *probity*, be the office what it may, the more correctly, completely, and generally, the business of it is understood, the more difficult will it be for improbity, in any shape, on the part of a subordinate, to profit by any undue protection, which any Head in the office, might happen to be disposed to give to it; and the more *correct* and *complete* the *information* is, which the Head possesses in relation to the business of his subordinate, the more effectual will be the degree of *vigilance*, be it what it may, with which it may happen to him to be disposed to look into their conduct in this view.

2. Again, as to appropriate intellectual aptitude, be the species of *information* what it may, the more *frequently* any such Head in office is liable to be called upon in the House to furnish it, the more frequently will he thereby be obliged to address himself to subordinates for information, in relation to such parts of the business as happen to be more immediately within the sphere of action of subordinate; and, the more frequently and *suddenly* any such subordinate is liable to be thus called upon, the more cogent will be the motives, by which he will find himself urged to obtain, and retain the most complete mastery, which it is in his power to possess, of the business in question: lest, in respect of this element of official aptitude, any deficiency should eventually come to be exposed.

3. As to appropriate active talent, by whatsoever means, in these several situations, the arrangement in question promises to be conducive to the increase of appropriate *intellectual aptitude*—by the same means, and in the same proportion it promises to be conducive to *this* more immediately efficient element of official aptitude.

On the part of official men of both descriptions, it moreover promises to secure, in another way, a more and more ample measure of appropriate active talent, as well as intellectual aptitude: viz. by keeping out of the respective offices all such *unfit* persons, as, either in their own opinion, or in the opinion of those to whom it belongs to judge, are unable to abide such close, and continually impending, scrutiny.

Question 39. In the present state of things, are not the business and conduct of official men, in the several departments, open in this same way to this same sort of scrutiny? and, such information as comes to be wanted, is it not continually called for, and obtained, from them, in and by the House?

Answer. To a certain degree, yes; but not upon a plan approaching in any degree to the character of a complete and adequate one.

In the *superior* departments, such as the Treasury, the several Offices of Principal Secretary of State for Home Affairs, of ditto for Colonial and Fo-

reign Affairs, and of ditto for the conduct of the War, in the Military department, the Admiralty, and the Ordnance, it is matter of accident whether the persons responsible in the first instance shall be in the House of Commons, in the House of Lords, or in neither; while, in several of the *subordinate* departments, such as the Excise and Customs, the Stamp Office, the Assessed Tax Office, the Navy Office, the Victualling Office, and others, in pursuance of the partial, insincere, and reluctant system of purification that has been employed, it has, by positive law, been made impossible for any person, acquainted with any part of the business, to occupy a seat in the only House of Parliament that would otherwise have been accessible to him: as if there were any thing either pernicious or inconvenient, or so much as usual, in a man's having a seat in an assembly in which he has not a vote.

Question 40. In the instance of any one of these departments, is there then ever any *ultimate* deficiency in respect of such information, as, in the judgment of the House, is proper to be collected and brought to view?

Answer. Not much perhaps, if compared with that which is *actually called for*: but much, if compared with that which *ought to be called for*, and would be called for, if the means of obtaining and calling for it were thus prompt, easy, and compleat,—in the degree in which, on the proposed plan, they would be.

In this or that department that might be mentioned, the Navy Office for instance,—the business of the office is a chaos, inclosed in a dark labyrinth, of which no clear and comprehensive view has ever yet been taken, so much as by any of the persons habitually at work in it.

And, even in the case of such information as comes to be actually given, the degree of *promptitude*, with which it is at present furnished, is apt to fall very short of that with which it might and would be furnished, if the persons, by whom or under whose direction it were to be furnished, were constantly under the eye, and at the command, of the House: and many are the instances, in which *that*, which does not come *promptly*, and almost at the moment at which it is called for, might, for any use that is or can be made of it, as well not have come *at all*.

And, though to answer its proper and intended purposes, it is altogether necessary, that the matter of such information should be put in a *written form*,—yet, to every one to whom Jury trial is known, it is manifest, how uninformative and unsatisfactory a dead mass of written evidence frequently is, in comparison of what it would be, if the import of it were upon occasion explained and elucidated, and the *correctness* and *completeness* of it secured,—by apposite questions, put on the spot by word of mouth, followed by immediate and unpremeditated answers, and with further questions in case of need suggested by those answers: and so on till every obscure point were made clear:—exactly in the same way as, for the conducting of his own private business, in the bosom of his own family, every head of a family obtains such information as he happens to stand in need of, from his own children or his own servants.

Question 41. In the case of the House of *Lords*, by what means do the promised advantages promise to take place?

Answer. By means of that article which provides for the correct and compleat *taking down*, and immediate publishing, of all *speeches* made in the House of Commons.

Question 42. In what way does it promise to be productive of those advantages?

Answer 1. In case of a Bill, or other measure, sent up from the Commons to the Lords House, it promises to be productive of a degree of appropriate intellectual aptitude as yet unexampled, by furnishing the Members of that House, upon whose decision the fate of every proposed law (not to speak of other incidental and miscellaneous measures) depends, a correct, compleat, and authentic representation of the several *arguments*, by which it has been supported and opposed.

2. In the same way it tends to secure, in the same superior quarter, an increased degree of appropriate *probity*—for, when all the several arguments, which, in the case, for example, of a proposed law, have been adduced in favour of it, when all these arguments have been consigned to determinate words, and those words committed to writing, together with all the arguments that could be found capable of being urged against it on the other side, in this case, the more satisfactory and cogent the arguments in favour of it appear, the more difficult will it be for any Member of the Upper House to find out and set in opposition to it, any arguments that will bear the test of the public eye; or, for the whole House, without any warrant afforded on the ground of reason, to venture, howsoever uncongenial it may be to particular interests or favourite prejudices, to reject it.

Question 43. In the case of the *higher classes* at large, by what means do the promised advantages promise to take place?

Answer. By means of that article which provides for the *frequent* recurrence of Elections, in conjunction with that which prescribes, in relation to the several seats, an increased and nearly uniform *extent* to the *numbers* of the persons sharing in the Election franchise.

Question 44. In what way?

Answer. In both ways, viz. in the way of *intellectual aptitude*, and in the way of *probity*.

1. In the way of appropriate *intellectual aptitude*—it promises to improve the texture of their minds, by bringing within the reach of a much greater number of them than at present, the prospect of a place in the most efficient seat of government: such place being, at the same time tenable, not absolutely, but only upon such terms, as, after the first year, will leave to each man little hope of his being continued in it, in any other event than that of his having made manifestation of distinguished *active talent*, or at least *intellectual aptitude*: and, by thus giving increase to the number of competitors, giving proportional increase to the exertions made by each, in the hope of manifesting his superiority over the rest.

2. In the way of appropriate probity, by rendering it the interest of every man who sets before his eyes any such prospect, at whatsoever period of his life it may be his hope to see it realized, to lay a foundation for such hope, by an uniform and constant course of *kindness* and courtesy, as well as of *justice*, towards all persons in whom the success of his exertions may be in any degree dependent: and, in particular, as towards the *lower classes*, which, of necessity, are every where the most populous ones.

In the present state of things—a Borough-holder, or a man of first rate opulence, who, by weight of metal, is looked upon as able to sink every bark that should dare to steer the same course, commands the seat, without need of paying any such price for it.

Question 45. In the case of the *lower classes*, by what means do the promised advantages promise to take place?

Answer. By means of the last article above mentioned. It being, to so considerable an additional extent, the interest of the *higher classes*, to main-

tain, in their intercourse with the lower classes, an uniform and constant course of justice, kindness, and courtesy ; hence, by each individual of those higher classes, in proportion as his conduct is fashioned by that interest, the feelings of the lower classes will be respected, and their interests consulted, and treated with regard.

Out of the virtue of the higher classes, thus cometh forth the comfort of the lower.

Question 46. Are *these* collateral advantages *all* that can be stated as likely to result from the plan, in case of its being adopted ?

Answer. If the question be confined to the plan itself, meaning the arrangements of which it is composed, then, to one or other of the above five heads, whatsoever beneficial results can be stated as likely to be produced by the plan, would, it is supposed, be found referable.

But, if the *principles*, by which these have been suggested, are found to be those which belong to the nature of the case—if in the list of objects brought to view in the character of *ends* proper to be aimed at, none are included but such as have a just title to a place in it, and all are included that have any just title ; let this be supposed, and by means of these principles, the plan will, in this case, be found capable of being applied to an *additional* and perfectly distinguishable use : to wit, the serving as a *test* or touchstone, by which the eligibility of ever *other* plan, that has been, or that can ever be, brought forward, may be tried.

In the persons of Members, in the persons of the Representatives of the People, is it conducive ? and if so, by *which* of the several arrangements contained in it, is it conducive, to *probity*, to *intelligence*, to *active talent* ?

By all of them put together, is it thus conducive in a sufficient degree ?

The same questions, with regard to the several classes of *placemen* belonging to the executive branch of government ?

The same questions, with regard to the *Lords*, without whose concurrence nothing, in the way of legislation, can, on any occasion, be done.

The same questions, with regard to the several *inconveniences* attached, in the existing state of things, to Elections and Election Judicature ?

Such are the questions, by the application of which the eligibility, absolute and comparative, of *any and every other plan*, would, it is supposed, be rendered pretty clearly apparent.

Strong and sound may that plan be pronounced, that shall have stood examination, upon these interrogatories : self-convicted of insufficiency, the plan that shall have shrunk from the test which they afford.

The *arrangements* themselves can no farther be of use, than in proportion as they are adopted. But—although they should not, any one of them, be adopted—yet the *principles* on which they are grounded, and by which they were suggested, might still, in this way, be found to be not altogether without their use.

THE END.

A SKETCH
OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

IN THE
REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE,
INTRODUCED INTO THE PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN,
FROM 1770 TO 1812.
DRAWN UP BY MR. MEADLY.

LONDON: PRINTED IN THE YEAR 1812.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, May 14th, 1770.

THE EARL OF CHATHAM, in moving an *Address to the King*, to desire he would dissolve the present parliament, stated, that, "instead of depriving a county of its representative," alluding to the case of Mr. Wilkes, "one or more members ought to be added to the representation of the counties, in order to operate as a balance, against the weight of several corrupt and venal boroughs, which perhaps could not be lopped off entirely, without the hazard of a public convulsion."*

* "Purity of Parliaments," said his Lordship, in his answer to an address of thanks from the city of London for the above declaration, June 1st, 1770, "is the corner-stone of the Commonwealth: and as one obvious means towards this necessary end, to strengthen and extend the natural relation between the constitution and the elected, I have publicly expressed my earnest wishes for a more full and equal representation, by the addition of one knight of the shire in the county, as a farther balance to the mercenary boroughs. I have thrown out this idea with the just diffidence of a private man, when he presumes to suggest any thing new in a high matter. Animated by your approbation, I shall continue humbly to submit it to the public wisdom, as an object to be most deliberately weighed, accurately examined, and maturely digested."

And again, in a letter to Earl Temple, April 17th, 1771, he said, "Allow a speculator in a great chair, to add, that a plan for a more *equal representation*, by additional *knights of the shire*, seems highly seasonable; and to shorten the *duration* of parliament not less so."*

* Almon's Anecdotes of the Earl of Chatham, 8vo. II. p. 84, and Addresses from the Court of Common Council to the King, 1760-70. 167-8.

House of Commons, Thursday, March 21st, 1776.

ALDERMAN WILKES moved, "that leave be given to bring in a bill for a just and equal representation of the people of England in parliament;" which being seconded by Alderman Bull, was opposed by Lord North, and lost without a division*.

House of Lords, Friday, June 2d, 1780.

The DUKE OF RICHMOND was introducing his bill to restore annual parliaments, to procure a more equal representation, and to regulate the election of Scotch peers, when he was prevented from proceeding by the alarming riots in Palace-yard†.

House of Commons, Tuesday, May 7th, 1782.

THE HON. WILLIAM PITT moved, "that a committee be appointed to enquire into the state of the representation in parliament, and to report to the House their observations thereon." He was seconded by Alderman Sawbridge; but Sir Horace Mann moving the order of the day, it was carried by a majority of twenty—Ayes 161—Noes 141,—and the original motion lost‡.

House of Commons, Wednesday, May 7th, 1783.

THE HON. WILLIAM PITT moved, "That the most effectual and practicable measures ought to be taken for the better preventing both bribery and expense in the election of members to serve in parliament.

2. "That whenever it shall be proved before a select committee of the House of Commons, duly appointed to try and determine the merits of any

* "My idea," said Mr. Wilkes, "in this case, as to the wretched and depopulated towns and boroughs in general, I freely own, is amputation. I say with Horace, *Inutiles ramos amputans, feliciores inserit*.—I will at this time, Sir, only throw out general ideas, that every free agent in this kingdom should in my wish be represented in parliament; that the metropolis, which contains in itself a ninth part of the people, and the counties of Middlesex, York, and others, which so greatly abound with inhabitants, should receive an increase in their representation; that the mean and insignificant boroughs, so emphatically stiled the rotten part of our constitution, should be lopped off, and the electors in them thrown into the counties; and the rich, populous trading towns, Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, and others, be permitted to send deputies to the great council of the nation."—Wilkes's Speeches, 1786. 8vo. p. 54-71.—Parliamentary Register, 1776. III. 432-442.

† By his Grace's bill it was intended to enact and declare, "That every commoner of this realm, excepting infants, persons of insane mind, and criminals incapacitated by law, hath a natural, unalienable, and equal right, to vote in the election of his representative in parliament. That the election of members to serve in the House of Commons ought to be annual. That the manner of electing the Commons in parliament, and all matters and things respecting the same, be new modelled according to the present state of the kingdom, and the ancient unalienable rights of the people. That the number of members in the House of Commons being 558, the total number of electors should be divided by that, to give the average number of those, having a right to elect one member."

‡ Mr. Pitt said, "he would not, in the present instance, call to their view or endeavour to discuss the question, whether this species of reform or that; whether this suggestion or that was the best; and which would most completely tally and square with the original frame of the constitution;—it was simply his purpose to move for the institution of an inquiry, composed of such men as the House should, in their wisdom, select as the most proper and best qualified for investigating this subject, and making a report to the House of the best means of carrying into execution a moderate and substantial reform in the representation of the people."—Parl. Reg. 1782, VII. 120-141.—Wyvill's Political Papers, I. 442-480.

election or return for any place in the kingdom, that the majority of the electors had been guilty of corrupt practices in such election, it will be proper in all such cases, that such place shall from thenceforth be disabled from sending representatives to parliament; and that such electors as shall not (by due course of law) be convicted of any such corrupt practices, shall be enabled to vote at the election of the knights of the shire in which such place shall be situated.

3. "That in order to give further security to the independence of parliament, and to strengthen the community of interest between the people and their representatives, which is essential to the preservation of our excellent constitution on its true principles, it is proper that an addition should be made to that part of the representation which consists of members chosen by the counties and the metropolis."* Mr. Henry Duncombe seconded the motion, but the *order of the day* being moved by Mr. Powys, it was carried, Ayes 293, Noes 149.—Majority 144.

House of Commons, Wednesday, June 16th, 1784.

ALDERMAN SAWBRIDGE moved, "That a committee be appointed to enquire into the present state of the representation of the Commons of Great Britain in parliament." He was seconded by Alderman Newnham; but Lord Mulgrave moving the previous question, it was carried—Ayes 199, Noes 125.—Majority 74.

House of Commons, Monday, April 18th, 1785.

THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT moved, "That leave be given to bring in a bill to amend the representation of the people of England in parliament,"† which being seconded by Mr. Henry Duncombe, the House divided—Ayes 174, Noes 248.—Majority 74.

House of Commons, Thursday, March 4th, 1790.

THE RIGHT HON. HENRY FLOOD moved, "For leave to bring in a bill to amend the representation of the people in parliament," and was seconded by Mr. Grigby; but Mr. Pitt threatening to move an adjournment, the motion was withdrawn.‡

* Mr. Pitt gave notice to the House, that if the above resolutions were carried, he should then move for leave to bring in a bill to provide for the disabling of such places from sending members to parliament, in which the majority of electors shall have been proved guilty of corrupt practices; and a bill for the better securing the independence of parliament.—Parl. Reg. 1785. IX. 688-736.—Wyvill's Pol. Pap. 253-5. 636-675.

† "His plan," Mr. Pitt observed, "consisted of two parts: the first was more immediate than the other, but they were both gradual. The first was calculated to produce an early, if not an immediate, change in the constitution of the boroughs; and the second was intended to establish a rule by which the representation should change with the changes of the country. It was, therefore, his intention to provide in the first instance, that the representation of thirty-six of the most decayed boroughs, which should be disfranchised on their voluntary application to parliament for an adequate consideration, should be distributed among the counties, and that afterwards any which might still remain of a similar description, should have the power of surrendering their franchise, and the right of sending members be transferred to such large and populous towns as should desire it."—Parl. 1785. XVIII. 42-83.—Wyvill's Pol. Pap. 372-442.

‡ "My proposition," said Mr. Flood, "is that one hundred members should be added, and that they should be elected by a numerous and responsible body of electors: the resident householders in every county:—resident, because such persons must be best acquainted with every local circumstance, and can attend at the

House of Commons, Monday, April 30th, 1792.

MR. GREY gave notice of his intention of moving, in the next session of parliament, for a reform in the representation of the people; when Mr. Pitt declared his decided hostility to the measure, and was supported in it by several members, who were usually hostile to his administration.

House of Commons, Monday, May 6th, 1793.

MR. GREY presented a petition from certain persons, members of the SOCIETY OF FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE, stating with great propriety and distinctness the defects which at present exist in the representation of the people in parliament, which they declared themselves ready to prove at the bar; urging the necessity and importance of applying an immediate remedy; and praying the House to take the same into their serious consideration*. Mr. Grey declined bringing forward any specific plan of reform, and moved "for the appointment of a committee to take the petition into consideration, and report such mode of remedy as shall appear to them proper." The Hon. Thomas Erskine seconded the motion, and, after two days debate, the House divided—Ayes 41, Noes 282.—Majority 241.

House of Commons, Friday, May 26th, 1797.

MR. GREY moved for "leave to bring in a bill to reform the representation of the people in the House of Commons†," and was seconded by the Hon. Thomas Erskine. On a division there appeared—Ayes 93, Noes 258.—Majority 165.

place of election with the least inconvenience or expense to themselves or the candidate; and householders, because, being masters or fathers of families, they must be sufficiently responsible to be entitled to franchise. They are the natural guardians of popular liberty in its first stages—without them it cannot be retained."—Parl. Reg. 1790. XXVII. 196-218.—Wyvill's Pol. Pap. II. 536-563.

* The petitioners, in concluding, thus forcibly recapitulated the objects of their prayer.

"That your honourable House will be pleased to take such measures, as to your wisdom may seem meet, to remove the evils arising from the unequal manner in which the different parts of the kingdom are admitted to participate in the representation.

"To correct the partial distribution of the elective franchise, which commits the choice of representatives to select bodies of men of such limited numbers as renders them an easy prey to the artful, or a ready purchase to the wealthy.

"To regulate the right of voting upon an uniform and equitable principle.

"And finally to shorten the duration of parliaments, and, by removing the causes of that confusion, litigation, and expense, with which they are at this day conducted, to render frequent and new elections, what our ancestors at the Revolution asserted them to be, the means of a happy union and good agreement between the king and people."—Parl. Reg. 1793, XXXV. 375-522.

† Mr. Grey proposed that, "Instead of ninety-two county members, as at present, there should be 113: instead of two for the county of York, for instance, two for each riding, and so in other counties, where the representation is not proportionate to the extent of soil and population: that each county or riding should be divided into grand divisions, each of which should return one representative, and that the right of election should be extended to copyholders, and to leaseholders for a certain number of years. That the other members should be returned by householders; that great towns should require a greater number of electors to one representative; that the country should be divided into districts, and no person permitted to vote for more than one member; that the poll should be taken through the whole kingdom in one day; and that the duration of parliament should be limited to three years."—Parl. Reg. 1797, Vol. II. 577-657.

House of Commons, Friday, April 25th, 1800.

MR. GREY moved, "that it be an instruction to the committee appointed to consider of his Majesty's most gracious message respecting the union between Great Britain and Ireland, to take into their consideration the most effectual means of providing for, and securing the independence of Parliament."* Mr. Tierney seconded the motion, which was rejected on a division—Ayes 34, Noes 176.—Majority 142.

House of Commons, Thursday, June 15th, 1809.

SIR FRANCIS BURDETT moved, "That this house will, early in the next session of parliament, take into consideration the necessity of a reform in the representation†." Mr. Madocks seconded the motion, and the House divided—Ayes 15, Noes 74.—Majority 59.

House of Commons, Monday, May 21st, 1810.

THE HON. THOMAS BRAND moved, "That a committee be appointed to inquire into the state of the representation of the people in parliament, and of the most efficacious means of rendering it more complete, and to report the same with their observations thereupon to the House."‡ On a division, there were—Ayes 115, Noes 234.—Majority 119.

* After objecting to the increased influence of the crown, which might arise from the introduction of 100 Irish members, in the present state of the representation, Mr. Grey said, "Although I do not agree that it is necessary for those, who disapprove of any specific plan, to propose a substitute, I am ready to state what I consider calculated to remove some part of the inconveniences which we apprehend. I would suggest that forty of the most decayed boroughs should be struck off, which would leave a vacancy of eighty members. I should then propose that the ratio, on which Ireland is to have 100 representatives, should be preserved: and the proportion to the remainder 478 would give us 85 members for that country. The county elections would give 69 members, and 16 remain to be chosen by a popular election, by the principal towns. By this motion it is only intended to keep parliament in its present state, to prevent it from becoming worse."—Parl. Reg. 1800, Vol. II. 347-377.

† "My plan," said Sir Francis Burdett, "consists in a very few, and very simple regulations, and as the disease we labour under has been caused by the disunion of property and political right, which reason and the constitution say should never be separated, the remedy which I shall propose will consist in re-uniting them again. For this purpose I shall propose,

"That the freeholders, householders, and others, subject to direct taxation, in support of the poor, the church, and the state, be required to elect members to serve in parliament.

"That each county be subdivided according to the taxed male population, and each subdivision required to elect one representative.

"That the votes be taken in each parish by the parish officers; and all elections finished in one and the same day.

"That the parish officers make the returns to the sheriff's court to be held for that purpose at stated periods; and

"That parliaments be brought back to a constitutional duration."—Hansard's Parl. Deb. XIV. 1041-1071.

‡ Mr. Brand stated, "that he did not mean to touch the right of voting for county members, except by letting in copyholders, and assimilating the mode of voting in Scotland to the practice of this country; but that, whilst he left the right of voting so far untouched, he should propose to disfranchise the boroughs, in which the members were returned upon the nomination of individuals, and as the numbers of the House would be diminished in that proportion, to transfer the right of returning such members to populous towns, and to apply any surplus to the more populous counties; that he would recommend the duration of parliament to be

House of Commons, Friday, May 8th, 1812.

THE HON. THOMAS BRAND moved, "for leave to bring in a bill to repeal the act 31 George II. c. 14. and to entitle copyholders to vote for knights of the shire."* The Marquis of Tavistock seconded the motion, and the House divided—Ayes 88, Noes 215.—Majority 127.

† SUPPLEMENT TO MR. MEADLEY'S "SKETCH."

House of Commons, Tuesday, May 20th, 1817.

SIR FRANCIS BURDETT moved "that a Select Committee be appointed to take into consideration the state of the Representation, and to report their opinion thereon to the House. The Hon. Thomas Brand seconded the motion, which was rejected on a division.

Ayes 99, Noes 265.—Majority 188.

House of Commons, Tuesday, May 19th, 1818.

SIR R. HERON moved for leave to bring in a Bill to repeal the Septennial Act. The motion was seconded by Sir Samuel Romilly, and the House divided.—Ayes 42, Noes 117.—Majority 72.

House of Commons, Tuesday, June 2nd, 1818.

SIR FRANCIS BURDETT moved certain resolutions†; he was seconded by Lord Cochrane, and the House divided,—Ayes 2, Noes 126—Majority 124.

made triennial, together with a concurrent arrangement for collecting the votes by districts and parishes. And that, with a view to the independence of parliament, persons holding offices without responsibility should not be suffered to have seats in that House."—Parl. Deb. XVII. 123-164.

* Mr. Brand said, "he would also propose to get rid of nomination, and to throw the representation of the close boroughs into an enlarged representation of the more populous counties. One part, therefore, of the plan which he had in view, was to bring in a bill for the abolition of those boroughs, and the consequent appropriation of a more extensive suffrage to the more populous counties, from whence an equalization of members to the different parts of the empire would arise. He did not wish to make any innovation, but rather to restore to the constitution what that great innovator, Time, had taken from it."—Votes of the House of Commons, 1812, No. 80.—Morning Chronicle, May 9, 1812.—Parl. Deb. XXIII. 99-161.

† Mr. Bentham's references are to the propositions before the Supplement.

‡ 1. That no adequate security for good Government can have place, but by means of, and in proportion to, a community of interest between Governors and governed: and that the truth of this principle has been unequivocally recognized in speeches delivered from the Throne by all the Kings of this Realm (except only King Charles the First, and King James the Second) from the accession of King James the First, down to the present reign, both inclusive. This resolution contained extracts from several King's speeches, in which Sir Francis stated, that the principle of his first resolution was recognized.

2. That on any occasion upon which this community of interest fails to be entire, the interest of the few, or of the one, ought to give way to the interest of the many; and that the truth of this principle has been recognized in speeches delivered from the Throne by the Kings of this Realm, of every family from the accession of King James the First, down to the present reign, both inclusive. This resolution contained extracts from several speeches, in which Sir Francis stated, that the principle of his third resolution was recognized.

3. That under the Government of this country, no such community of interest can have place, but in so far as the persons in whose hands the administration of

public affairs is vested, are subject to the superintendence and controul, or check of the Representatives of the people; misrepresentatives speaking and acting in conformity to the sense of the people.

4. That, according to established usage as evidenced by speeches from the Throne, and other public acts, the Members of this House being in their collective capacity styled Representatives of the people, and the powers exercised by them, being on no other ground recognized as Constitutional; it is, only in so far as they are really and substantially Representatives of the People, that the powers so exercised by them are constitutionally exercised.

5. That it is only in so far as the Members of this House are in fact chosen, and from time to time removable by the free suffrages of the great body of the people, that there can be any adequate assurance, that the acts done by them are in conformity to the sense and wishes of the people; and therefore, that they can in truth, and without abuse of words, be styled, or declared to be Representatives of the people.

6. That no member of this House can otherwise than by a notorious fiction be styled a Representative of any part of the people, other than of the part composed of such individuals, as have or might have voted on his election. And, that, by the general appellation of Representatives of the people, is, and ought to be understood Representatives of the whole body of the people.

7. That the sense of the whole body of the people cannot be adequately conformed to, by their Representatives, except in so far as the suffrage of each person in the choice of his Representative has a force and effect, as equal as may be, to that of the suffrage of every other person. And that such equality of force and effect cannot have place, except in so far as in the case of each Representative, the number of persons possessing the right of voting on his election, is (as far as legal circumstances will permit) the same as in the case of every other.

8. That on the occasion of electing a representative of the people, no man's suffrage can with truth be said to be free, except in so far as in the delivery of it, he stands unexposed to the hope of eventual good, or the fear of eventual evil to himself, and his connexions from the power or influence of every other individual on account of his suffrage.

9. That the advantage and necessity of comprehensive, equal and free suffrages has been recognized in divers speeches from the Throne. This resolution also contained several extracts from King's Speeches.

10. That the sense of the people can never be truly represented and conformed to by their Representatives, otherwise than in so far as those Representatives are dependent upon the wishes of their Constituents for their continuance in their situation as Representatives; such wishes of the Constituents being expressed by their suffrages, freely delivered as above.

11. That though to give this dependence the greatest perfection of which, without regard to other objects it might be susceptible, would require that at all times it should be in the power of every Electoral body to remove its Representative, in the same manner that it is in the power of every individual, who has granted to another a power of Attorney, to revoke the same; for as much as in such a state of things, the people, instead of deputing Representatives to manage their public concerns, would be in their own persons engaged in the superintendence or management thereof, to the prejudice of the business of private life: hence it becomes necessary that this same power of removal should not have place otherwise than at certain stated, or more or less distant periods.

12. That for as much as the dependence of the Representatives upon their constituents will be the greater, the shorter the term is, during which they are exempt from removal; and as no inconvenience can be apprehended from one election at the least, taking place in every year; and as it appears by divers statutes, and long continued practice in obedience thereto, that the principle at least of annual elections is conformable to the ancient laws and practice of this realm; it is therefore expedient that the people should be enabled to remove their representatives, and, if necessary, repair the misfortune of having made an improper choice, at least once in every year.

13. That the sense of the people considered as a standard to which the sense of their rulers ought to conform, is, not the sense entertained by the people in any past period of time, and which may have undergone subsequent change, but on the contrary, is the sense of the people taken in its freshest state; and that this truth has been repeatedly recognized in speeches delivered from the Throne, by his late Majesty King George the Second, and by his present Majesty. This resolution contained several extracts from speeches in which their late and present Majesties expressed their satisfaction on seeing the most certain information of the sense, disposition, and wishes of the people, by a new choice of their representatives.

14. That by the words **SENSE, DISPOSITION, and WISHES** of the people, employed in the said speeches, nothing less than the sense, disposition, and wishes of the whole body of the people can with propriety be understood: for as much as if it be the interest and duty of his Majesty to collect and attend to the sense, disposition, and wishes of any one part of the people, it cannot be so in any less degree in regard to any other part.

15. That except by petitions, and even by those means no otherwise than occasionally and partially, and therefore inadequately, the **SENSE, DISPOSITION, and WISHES** of the people can be conveyed to his Majesty; in no other manner than by the choice made by them of persons to sit and serve in this house in the character of Representatives; and, that except in the same inadequate manner by petitions, those who have no part in the choice of Representatives, cannot at any time make known to His Majesty, the part which their sense, disposition, and wishes, has in the sense, disposition, and wishes of the whole body of the people.

16. That for as much as no power lodged in the hands of constituents can create or maintain the due dependence of their Representatives, unless the good or evil which may be produced by the exercise of such power, be at all times in the expectation of the Representatives greater than any that can be made to accrue to them by any other person or persons whose interest or supposed interest it may be to engage them in a violation of their trust; it is therefore necessary, that by all practicable means every Representative of the people be rendered as completely exempt as possible from every such external influence.

17. That the offices, commissions, and emoluments, the power, rank, dignities, and other advantages, which are at the disposal of the Crown, constitute so many instruments of temptation, by which the Members of this House are exposed to be seduced from their duty, and induced to sacrifice the general interest of the People, to the particular interest, or supposed interest of the Crown, its servants, and their adherents.

18. That as this House is now constituted, a large proportion of the Members thereof obtain their seats by the appointment or favour of particular individuals, without being elected, or at least without being freely elected by any part of the People; and that such Members are continually exposed to be seduced from their duty, and induced to sacrifice the general interest of the People, to the particular interests of their respective patrons.

19. That for as much as the influence of the Crown cannot be exercised and made productive of its natural effect, without counteracting and overpowering the influence of the People in the breasts of the Members of this House, so as to engage them to make continual sacrifice of the interest of the People to the separate interests of the servants of the Crown and their adherents; such influence may with truth and propriety be termed a sinister influence.

20. That Parliamentary Patronage not only prevents or interrupts comprehensive, free, and equal suffrage, whereby alone the sense of the People can be made known, but operates on the one hand as a perpetual inducement to the servants of the Crown to favour the individuals who are possessed thereof, at the expense and to the prejudice of the People; and on the other hand as a perpetual temptation to those individuals to maintain and increase the influence of the Crown from which they may expect to derive benefit for themselves and their connexions.

21. That by a resolution passed on the 6th April 1780, it was declared by this House, that the influence of the Crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished.

22. That ince that time the influence of the Crown has been greatly increased, on the one hand by the increase of the public debt in respect of the taxes raised for paying the interest thereof, and the profitable patronage and power exercised in relation to the several offices and commissions necessary for the collection of those taxes; and on the other hand by the increase of the standing army, in respect of the patronage and power exercised in relation to the offices and commissions thereunto belonging, and the means of employing the same power to stifle the voice and destroy the liberties of the people.

23. That for as much as no adequate diminution of the influence of the Crown can now be effected, the only resource which remains is to correct this influence by a counterforce consisting of the influence of the people.

24. That this House taking into consideration the gracious intentions so often expressed by his Majesty, particularly calls to mind the speech delivered on the 5th Dec. 1782, in which his Majesty speaking to both Houses of Parliament, and after declaring it to be the fixed object of his heart to make the general good, and true spirit of the constitution, the invariable rule of his conduct, was pleased to say, "To insure the full advantage of a Government conducted on such principles depends on your temper, your wisdom, your disinterestedness, collectively and individually,—my people expect those qualifications of you, and I call for them;"—and again the speech delivered on the 19th May, 1784, in which his Majesty was pleased to say, "You will find me always desirous to concur with you in such measures as may be of lasting benefit to my People—I have no wish but to consult their prosperity;"—and again the speech delivered on the 25th January, 1785, in which his Majesty was pleased to say, "You may at all times depend on my hearty concurrence in every measure which can tend to alleviate our national burthens, to secure the true principles of the constitution, and to promote the general welfare of my People."

25. That this House taking also into consideration the gracious disposition of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, assures itself with the fullest confidence, that his Royal Highness, acting in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, will be pleased to vouchsafe his sanction to all such measures as may be necessary for placing the influence of his Majesty's People in this House on a firm and unalterable footing.

26. That therefore this House proceeding on the principles above declared, is resolved to make one great sacrifice of all separate and particular interests, and to proceed to establish a comprehensive and consistent plan of reform; in virtue whereof, the whole people of the United Kingdom, may be fairly and truly represented in this House; and, in order to that end, this House does hereby declare:—

I. That it is expedient and necessary to admit to a participation in the elective suffrage, all such persons as being of the male sex, of mature age, and of sound mind, shall, during a determinate time antecedent to the day of election, have been resident either as householders or inmates, within the district or place in which they are called upon to vote.

II. That the territory of Great Britain and Ireland taken together, ought to be divided into 658 Election districts, as nearly equal to each other in population as consistently with local convenience they may be; and, that each such election district ought to return one Representative, and no more.

III. That for the prevention of unnecessary delay, vexation, and expense, as well as of fraud, violence, disorder, and void elections, the election in each district, ought to be begun and ended on the same day, and that day ought to be the same for all the districts; and that for this purpose, not only the proof of title, but also every operation requiring more time than is necessary for the delivery of the vote, ought to be accomplished on some day, or days, antecedent to the day of election, and that the title to a vote should be the same for every elector, and so simple as not to be subject to dispute.

IV. That for the more effectually securing the attainment of the above objects, the Election districts ought to be subdivided into sub-districts for the reception of votes, in such number and situations as local convenience may require.

V. That for the securing freedom of election the mode of voting ought to be by ballot.

VI. That for more effectually securing the unity of will and opinion, as between the People and their Representatives, a fresh election of the members of this House ought to take place, once in every year at least; saving to the Crown its prerogative of dissolving parliaments at any time, and thereupon after the necessary interval, summoning a fresh Parliament.

NOTE FOR PAGE SIX.]—Mr. Bentham has very clearly shewn, that it is the interest of a Monarch (C——r General), of a corrupted and corrupting Aristocracy, and of a corrupt majority of the House of Commons, to draw by every means in their power, and in the greatest quantity possible, money from the pockets of the swinish multitude.

Yet some matter of reflection on the benefits of our matchless constitution, will be found derivable from what follows:—

I.—To form an estimate of the sum of money drawn from the people from 1793 to the present time, in the crusades which our ministers have made against the liberties of mankind, the amount of the following items should be ascertained:—

1. The amount of taxes raised in every year, above the amount of the taxes in the year immediately preceding the first year of war.

2. The amount of the difference between the Boroughmongers' debt as it stands now, and as it stood in 1792.

3. The amount of Parish and Poor rates raised in every year, above the amount of the same in the year immediately preceding the first year of war.

4. The whole cost of this war can never be ascertained until the boroughmongers' debt, the taxes, and the rates, are reduced to what they were in 1792.

II.—The ministers have passed that infamous Act called the Alien Bill, to please the Holy league of despots.—Now when the French Revolution took place, the government not only gave refuge to the emigrants, but bestowed immense sums for their support. It is to be wished, that some individual, who has leisure, inclination, and documents, would furnish these accounts.

I. Amount of all money given to the suffering Clergy and Laity of France, from 1793, to this day.

II. For Toulouse and Corsican emigrants.

It is also desirable that an account should be made of all the money voted to the American Loyalists, which expense has not yet ceased.

III.—The immense and unprecedented subsidies granted to foreign powers, to aid in the crusade against liberty, distinguishing the last war from any former ones.

It appears by an account presented to the House of Commons, that in money alone, there has been given foreign powers, from 1793 to 1814. £46,331,000

In 1815. Money and all other supplies 10,030,000

In 1816. Money and all other supplies 17,032,000

To this requires to be added the value of the stores, &c. supplied from 1793 to 1814.

£73,393,000

IV.—Why does the English Government keep possession of all the Colonies of other nations? The people of England pay dearer for colonial produce than any other nation in Europe. An Army of 46,000, and, including India, of 66,000 men, is kept up to maintain possession of them.

V.—Penal Colonies.—Since its establishment in 1788, New South Wales has cost this nation more than three millions.

VI.—Splendour of the Crown—Misery of the People—Yes, these two are unnaturally conjoined. A list of the following items would enable us to judge how exactly one has kept pace with the other.

1. Annual income of the Civil List, from 1760 to 1818.

2. Separate establishments, and incomes of the Princes and Princesses, and the relations of the royal family, for every year the establishments have existed.

3. Deficiencies of the Civil List supplied by Parliament, (more than 12 times since 1760.)

4. Debts of the Princes paid at different times, outfits, &c. for marriages, &c.—including the £100,000 given to the Prince of Wales on his Regentship, by the *incapable ministers*.

5. Grants to all branches of the royal family from the droits of the Admiralty.

6. Money lent from the droits of the Admiralty and not repaid

7. Money of which tradesmen, &c. have been *disappointed* at different times, when compositions with creditors have been made.

8. Money of which the nation has been disappointed by the Royal property being exempted from the payment of the property-tax, by a WHIG ministry.

NOTE TO PAGE SEVEN.]—Lord Wellington's money.

In this instance, as in former ones, we are more able to present an outline than to fill it up.

I.—Money received by Lord Wellington.

1. Money received for all military situations held from his first situation, to 1818
2. Money received as Ambassador in France
3. Money received as Ambassador at Vienna
4. Money given after the battle of Salamanca 100,000
5. Money given after the battle of Toulouse 400,000
6. Money given after the battle of Waterloo 200,000
7. Share of the £800,000 voted as prize money for the war in Spain.
8. Share of the prize money 1,000,000l. for the battle of Waterloo, and capture or ransom of Paris
9. Interest already received from these gifts
10. To these may be added, a service of plate from Portugal, worth 400,000l. snuff-boxes, swords and stars innumerable: a great silver shield, &c.
11. Interest received from estates given him by Spain and Portugal

II.—Present income of Lord Wellington

1. Interest of 700,000l. at 5 per cent. 35,000
2. Pay as Field Marshal
3. Pay as Commander in Chief in Europe
4. Pay from the Allied Powers as their Commander in Chief of the Army of Occupation
5. Pay as Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards
6. Emolument from clothing the men of his regiment
7. Income from Spanish estate (said to be 10,000l. per annum.)
8. Income from Portuguese estate.
9. Income from Dutch estate as Prince of Waterloo

It is hoped that the following Tables will be found to give support to many of the arguments of Mr. Bentham for Universal Suffrage, and equality of representation—which two arrangements would produce a uniformly large number of voters in each electoral district.

TABLE I.—THE REPRESENTATION, AS IT WILL BE IN THE REFORMED STATE OF THINGS.

The total population of the British Isles, is 16,600,000
The number of representatives (the same as at present) 658

Divided according to the respective population, as follows:—

	Population.	Representatives.
England	9,800,000	389
Wales	600,000	24
Scotland	1,700,000	67
Ireland	4,500,000	178
	16,600,000	658

TABLE II.—THE REPRESENTATION AS IT IS AT PRESENT.

Total Number of Representatives	658
Of which are for Ireland	100
Scotland	45
Wales	24
England—	
40 counties, 2 each	80
200 cities & boroughs, 2 each	400
5 boroughs, 1 each	5
1 city	4

246

489

—658

TABLE III.—VOTES BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE IN A RADICAL REFORM.

ENGLAND.

Population of England	9,800,000
Representatives	389
Persons to each Representative	25,192
Of whom, under a system of Universal Suffrage, would vote, about	6,280
Making the Total English Voters	2,442,920

But for the purpose of comparing the reform system with the present system, in the next Table,

The Representatives must be taken as at present!..... 489

The Voters to each Representative

5,000

But as (with the exception of 1 city sending 4 members, and 5 boroughs sending 1 member each) under the present system, each place sends 2 members, the number of voters, for the purpose of comparing the reform system with the present, must be taken at.....

10,000

TABLE IV.—VOTERS IN THE PRESENT CORRUPT SYSTEM.

Each place should have 10,000 voters.

ENGLAND.

Cities and Boroughs.	With more Voters than	And less Voters than	Average Number of Voters.	Total Voters.
51		50	25	1,275
33	50	100	75	2,475
30	100	200	150	4,500
17	200	300	250	4,250
— 131				— 12,500
8	300	400	350	2,800
8	400	500	450	3,600
21	500	750	625	13,175
8	750	1000	875	7,000
10	1000	2000	1250	12,500
10	1500	3000	1750	17,500
8	2000	4000	3000	24,000
2	10,000	15,000	12,500	25,000
— 75				— 105,575
206				— 118,075

RESULTS.

12,500 voters in 131 places return 259 members, or an absolute majority of the 489 English representatives.

12,500 voters return 257 more members than Westminster, which has 15,000 voters, and therefore 257 members more than they ought.

12,500 voters in the present corrupt state of things, exercise as much influence as in the reformed state of things, would be exercised by one million, two hundred and ninety-five thousand voters.

There are 131 places returning members in which the average number of voters is not one hundredth part of what it should be, viz. 10,000.

Out of 206 places returning members, there are but two which have the requisite number of voters.

The whole number of voters in the whole 206 voting places is not the twentieth part of those who ought to vote, and who would vote under a reformed state of things.

Englishmen! this is *virtual* representation;—behold in the next table its results.

TABLE V.—THE ENORMOUS EXTENT OF CORRUPTION.

Cities and Boroughs.	Average Number of Voters.	Corrupt Places.	Independent Places.	Proportion of Independent Places to the whole number, expressed in parts of 1000.
51	25	51	0	0000
33	75	32	1	0030
30	150	28	2	0066
17	250	16	1	0059
8	350	5	3	0375
8	450	8	0	0000
— 147			— 7	
21	625	15	6	0270
8	875	3	5	0615
10	1250	4	6	0600
10	1750	1	9	0900
8	3000	0	8	1000
2	12500	0	2	1000
— 59			— 36	
206			43	0187

Average of 6 divisions 0048.

Average of 6 divisions 0610.

RESULTS.

The proportion between the smallness or largeness of the number of voters, and their consequent corruptness or independence is curious and instructive; where, in the instance of the fifth and sixth ranks, the proportion is destroyed; it will be observed, that by coupling them it is restored. So also in the instance of the third and fourth ranks, and of the ninth and tenth. Upon the whole, we may assume this principle: The fewer the number of voters, the fewer, and in an increasing ratio, the number of independent places. The greater the number of voters, the greater, and in an increasing ratio, the number of independent places: and draw this undeniable—this irrefutable inference—that, as even in the present corrupt state of things, no place with more than two thousand voters is corrupt; so, in the reformed state of things, upon the plan drawn up by Mr. Bentham, and proposed by Sir Francis Burdett, all places would be independent, because none would have less than six thousand voters; there being 389 Electoral districts, to return, each, one member.

The plan of Bentham? Yes! There is the plan of the Reformers; let them never swerve from it. The Book of Bentham? Yes! there are the arguments of the Reformers, to *them* let them refer their opponents. The Plan of Bentham? Yes! there is the salvation of England; and who—who has observed the signs of the times, and knows the wide spread of knowledge among the people—can doubt, that, through that plan, salvation is at hand?—EDITOR.

THE END.

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THE END



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